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SUMMARY	  The	  metaphoric	  language	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  one	  of	  its	  most	  striking	  aesthetic	  features.	  But	  the	  use	  of	  such	  literary	  language	  is	  not	  merely	  decorative	  –	  these	  aesthetic	  dimensions	  of	  the	  text	  have	  ethical	  import	  as	  well.	  Aesthetics	  as	  a	  philosophical	  discipline	  emerged	  during	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  as	  aesthetic	  concerns	  were	  differentiated	  from	  moral	  concerns	  and	  the	  artistic	  ideal	  was	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  autonomy.	  Thus	  art	  was	  classified	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  had	  no	  extrinsic	  aims	  and	  the	  ideal	  audience	  was	  likewise	  a	  disinterested	  observer.	  But	  the	  Zhuangzi	  deploys	  aesthetics	  very	  differently.	  Importantly,	  the	  text	  does	  communicate	  an	  ethical	  vision,	  which	  I	  argue	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  ming	  (明).	  The	  Zhuangzi	  plays	  on	  ming’s	  moral	  and	  educational	  associations	  and	  recasts	  it	  as	  a	  cultivated	  practice	  in	  which	  beliefs	  are	  continually	  reassessed	  in	  light	  of	  changing	  situations.	  The	  text	  uses	  aesthetics	  in	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  ethical	  vision.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  uses	  metaphor	  in	  order	  to	  hint	  at	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  good	  life	  from	  a	  variety	  vantage	  points.	  It	  communicates	  its	  vision	  by	  continually	  switching	  perspectives	  and	  disrupting	  or	  overturning	  the	  reader’s	  expectations	  about	  who	  has	  wisdom	  and	  how	  wisdom	  should	  be	  understood.	  This	  metaphoric	  approach	  or	  aesthetic	  mode	  of	  communication	  is	  indirect,	  forcing	  the	  reader	  to	  make	  connections	  among	  the	  different	  ideas	  and	  perspectives	  provided	  by	  the	  text,	  rather	  than	  spelling	  out	  those	  connections	  for	  the	  audience.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  text	  itself	  is	  very	  much	  like	  the	  unconventional	  teachers	  it	  portrays	  who	  give	  pithy	  and	  obscure	  
 vii 
instructions,	  or	  sometimes	  do	  not	  even	  speak	  at	  all.	  Rather	  than	  telling,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  shows	  us	  what	  it	  is	  to	  live	  the	  good	  life.
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CHAPTER	  ONE:	  INTRODUCTION	  	  Aesthetics	  and	  ethics	  have	  traditionally	  been	  treated	  as	  distinct	  realms	  of	  study,	  with	  the	  aesthetics	  often	  taking	  a	  backseat	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  ethics.	  But	  rather	  than	  treating	  these	  realms	  of	  study	  independently,	  we	  can	  look	  at	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  relate	  to	  one	  another.	  Looking	  at	  the	  connection	  between	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics	  we	  might	  find	  how	  aesthetics	  can	  be	  made	  into	  a	  useful	  tool	  to	  meet	  the	  challenge	  of	  new	  and	  changing	  ethical	  problems.	  So	  it	  is	  the	  question	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  are	  related	  that	  motivates	  my	  discussion	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi.1	  And	  while	  there	  are	  many	  ways	  to	  understand	  aesthetics,	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  unique	  stylistic	  choices	  direct	  our	  attention	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  aesthetics	  as	  a	  distinct	  mode	  of	  communication.	  Broadly	  speaking	  there	  are	  two	  questions	  that	  address	  the	  relationship	  of	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics:	  1)	  what	  is	  the	  relevance	  of	  ethics	  for	  aesthetics,	  and	  2)	  what	  is	  the	  relevance	  of	  aesthetics	  for	  ethics.	  The	  first	  category	  of	  questions	  usually	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  addressing	  the	  ethics	  of	  the	  artwork	  or	  artistic	  process,	  answering	  such	  questions	  as,	  what	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  ethical	  evaluation	  of	  art?	  Should	  art	  be	  subjected	  to	  ethical	  
                                                1	  Throughout	  this	  dissertation	  I	  will	  use	  “the	  Zhuangzi”	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  text,	  “Zhuangzi”	  to	  refer	  the	  author(s)	  of	  the	  text,	  and	  “Zhuang	  Zhou”	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  character	  in	  the	  text.	  Hanyu	  Pinyin	  is	  used	  throughout	  the	  dissertation	  except	  in	  cases	  where	  an	  author	  prefers	  another	  transliteration	  for	  his	  or	  her	  name.	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evaluations?	  What	  is	  art’s	  ethical	  responsibility?	  These	  are	  worthwhile	  and	  interesting	  questions,	  however	  my	  project	  will	  deal	  with	  questions	  of	  the	  second	  category:	  what	  is	  the	  relevance	  of	  aesthetics	  for	  ethics?	  One	  answer	  to	  this	  second	  question	  is	  that	  aesthetics	  can	  do	  the	  work	  that	  ethics	  aims	  to	  do	  but	  is	  unable	  to	  achieve.	  A	  postmodern	  narrative	  holds	  that	  ethics	  has	  its	  source	  in	  some	  extra-­‐moral	  source	  such	  as	  God	  or	  universal	  reason;	  yet	  the	  disillusionment	  with	  modernity	  displaced	  these	  objective	  foundations,	  and	  ethics	  has	  been	  left	  unable	  to	  give	  meaning	  to	  individuals’	  lives.	  With	  the	  collapse	  of	  traditional	  morality	  some	  turn	  to	  aesthetics.	  Richard	  Rorty,	  for	  example,	  suggests	  that	  the	  aesthetic	  life	  is	  one	  that	  constantly	  seeks	  enlargement	  through	  engaging	  with	  the	  world,	  and	  expanding	  one’s	  possibilities.2	  While	  the	  postmodern	  concern	  about	  totalizing	  structures	  that	  have	  the	  tendency	  to	  marginalize	  minority	  perspectives	  is	  an	  important	  one,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  entirely	  necessary	  to	  rid	  us	  of	  the	  pursuit	  of	  an	  ethical	  life	  in	  favor	  of	  aesthetics,	  as	  Rorty	  would	  have	  us	  do.	  Those	  who	  would	  like	  to	  eschew	  ethics	  altogether	  imagine	  that	  all	  ethics	  have	  their	  authority	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  appeal	  to	  some	  extra-­‐moral	  source,	  which	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  various	  problems.	  But	  there	  are	  examples	  of	  ethics	  that	  do	  not	  fall	  into	  this	  category.	  Eudaimonistic	  ethics,	  for	  example,	  ground	  morality	  in	  the	  growth	  and	  
                                                2	  Richard	  Rorty,	  “Freud	  and	  Moral	  Reflection”	  in	  Pragmatism’s	  Freud:	  
The	  Moral	  Disposition	  of	  Psychoanalysis,	  ed.	  Joseph	  H.	  Smith	  and	  William	  Kerrigan	  (Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1986),	  1-­‐27.	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development	  of	  the	  individual	  and	  community.3	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  all	  ethics	  are	  invariably	  systematic	  and	  universal	  frameworks	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  completely	  discarded,	  and	  this	  fact	  makes	  the	  rejection	  of	  ethics	  entirely	  seem	  a	  bit	  like	  throwing	  the	  baby	  out	  with	  the	  bath	  water.	  Just	  because	  some	  moral	  frameworks	  are	  inadequate	  for	  addressing	  certain	  ethical	  problems	  does	  not	  mean	  we	  ought	  to	  discard	  the	  idea	  of	  ethics	  altogether.	  And	  so	  another	  way	  to	  answer	  this	  second	  question	  is	  to	  use	  aesthetics	  to	  rehabilitate	  our	  moral	  frameworks	  rather	  than	  abandoning	  them	  altogether.	  Here	  one	  might	  take	  some	  aspect	  of	  aesthetics	  and	  use	  it	  to	  think	  about	  ethics	  in	  a	  new	  light.	  For	  example,	  creativity	  or	  the	  practical	  engagement	  of	  a	  medium	  when	  applied	  to	  ethics	  directs	  us	  to	  think	  of	  ethics	  as	  a	  practical	  activity	  that	  requires	  imagination.	  Using	  aesthetic	  values	  to	  think	  about	  ethics	  allows	  us	  to	  pose	  alternatives	  to	  a	  Kantian	  understanding	  of	  ethics,	  whose	  basis	  in	  rationality	  and	  focus	  on	  rule	  application	  might	  deny	  the	  role	  of	  creativity	  or	  flexibility	  in	  an	  ethical	  framework.	  	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  the	  Zhuangzi	  might	  stand	  out	  as	  having	  something	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  conversation	  regarding	  the	  overlap	  of	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics.	  People	  who	  seem	  to	  live	  worthwhile	  lives	  are	  often	  characterized	  in	  aesthetic	  terms:	  Cook	  Ding’s	  dismantling	  of	  an	  ox	  is	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  rhythm	  or	  cadence	  (yin⾳音),	  and	  likened	  to	  a	  dance	  
                                                3	  For	  example,	  see	  G.E.M.	  Anscombe,	  “Modern	  Moral	  Philosophy,”	  
Philosophy	  33,	  no.	  124	  (1958),	  1-­‐19.	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(sanglin	  zhi	  wu桑林之舞).4	  When	  Sang	  Hu	  dies,	  his	  friends	  sing	  and	  play	  music,	  and	  similarly	  when	  Zhuang	  Zhou’s	  wife	  dies,	  he	  is	  found	  drumming	  and	  singing.5	  These	  are	  thought-­‐provoking	  examples	  of	  how	  the	  good	  life	  might	  be	  characterized	  in	  aesthetic	  terms	  or	  how	  art	  contributes	  to	  ethical	  living.	  But	  beyond	  these	  examples	  of	  individual	  characters,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  a	  literary	  masterpiece,	  renowned	  for	  its	  aesthetic	  style.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  uses	  storytelling,	  metaphor,	  humor,	  and	  irony,	  in	  attempting	  to	  engage	  its	  audience.	  This	  project	  is	  concerned	  with	  aesthetics	  as	  a	  particular	  mode	  of	  presenting	  an	  idea,	  and	  showing	  how	  that	  mode	  is	  intimately	  related	  to	  the	  ethical	  significance	  of	  the	  text.	  	  
1.	  Recent	  Attempts	  at	  Forging	  a	  Connection	  	  The	  question	  of	  how	  aesthetics	  might	  aid	  ethics	  has	  been	  taken	  up	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  directions.	  Clive	  Bell	  and	  Monroe	  Beardsley	  developed	  Kant’s	  formalistic	  notion	  of	  the	  judgment	  of	  beauty,	  in	  which	  the	  value	  of	  the	  
                                                
4 Zhuangzi	  (莊子),	  Zhuangzi	  Jishi	  莊子集釋,	  ed.	  Guo	  Qingfan	  郭慶藩	  (Beijing:	  Zhonghua	  Shuju,	  1961),	  3.118	  and	  The	  Complete	  Works	  of	  Chuang	  
Tzu,	  trans.	  Burton	  Watson	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1968),	  50.	  All	  citations	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  refer	  to	  Guo’s	  Zhuangzi	  Jishi	  and	  the	  Watson	  translation	  (hereafter	  ‘Zhuangzi’	  and	  ‘Watson’	  respectively)	  and	  I	  use	  Watson’s	  translations	  unless	  otherwise	  stated.	  I	  have	  altered	  Watson’s	  translations	  to	  use	  Hanyu	  Pinyin	  Romanization.	  	  
5 Zhuangzi 6.264-276 & 18.614-615, Watson 86-87 & 191-192. 
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aesthetic	  is	  intrinsic.6	  Mark	  Packer	  preserves	  this	  formal	  understanding	  of	  aesthetics	  as	  he	  tries	  to	  show	  how	  the	  aesthetic	  can	  supplement	  the	  ethical	  in	  giving	  a	  more	  complete	  account	  of	  a	  particular	  phenomenon,	  thereby	  setting	  the	  two	  on	  even	  footing.7	  He	  argues	  that	  our	  moral	  intuitions	  do	  not	  fully	  explain	  some	  of	  the	  laws	  we	  enforce.	  There	  are	  times	  when	  we	  find	  ourselves	  outraged	  by	  some	  act,	  not	  because	  it	  offends	  our	  moral	  sensibilities,	  but	  rather	  because	  it	  affects	  our	  aesthetic	  sensibilities.	  For	  example,	  Packer	  argues	  that	  the	  desire	  to	  outlaw	  the	  eating	  of	  human	  flesh,	  even	  if	  we	  could	  grow	  and	  harvest	  it	  through	  genetic	  cloning	  and	  thus	  without	  harming	  any	  individuals,	  is	  because	  it	  offends	  our	  aesthetic	  tastes.	  Aesthetic	  judgments	  do	  not	  depend	  upon	  external	  concerns.	  Because	  the	  aesthetic	  is	  intrinsically	  valuable,	  offensive	  behavior	  that	  has	  no	  external	  explanation	  for	  its	  offensive	  character	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  recourse	  to	  our	  aesthetic	  sensibilities.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  Bell’s	  formal	  understanding	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  rehabilitated	  its	  image	  as	  ethic’s	  flippant	  sibling	  can	  be	  debated.	  However,	  the	  formalism	  movement	  undoubtedly	  served	  to	  perpetuate	  the	  divide	  between	  the	  two.	  Packer’s	  demonstration	  of	  the	  import	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  by	  showing	  how	  it	  supplements	  moral	  judgments	  in	  giving	  a	  more	  complete	  account	  of	  some	  phenomenon	  does	  not	  go	  far	  enough.	  In	  relying	  on	  a	  
                                                6	  See	  Clive	  Bell,	  Art	  (New	  York:	  Frederick	  A.	  Stokes	  Company,	  1914),	  and	  Monroe	  Beardsley,	  “The	  Aesthetic	  Point	  of	  View,”	  Metaphilosophy	  1,	  no.	  1	  (1970),	  39-­‐58.	  	  7	  Mark	  Packer,	  “The	  Aesthetic	  Dimension	  of	  Ethics	  and	  Law:	  Some	  Reflections	  on	  Harmless	  Offense,”	  in	  American	  Philosophical	  Quarterly	  33,	  no.	  1	  (1996),	  57-­‐74.	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formalist	  understanding	  of	  aesthetic	  judgments,	  his	  account	  prevents	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics	  from	  finding	  any	  deeper	  relation.	  If	  art	  is	  reduced	  to	  merely	  its	  intrinsic	  value	  we	  cannot	  claim	  its	  significance	  for	  supplementing	  moral	  frameworks	  that	  seem	  inadequate	  to	  meet	  our	  ethical	  demands.	  If	  we	  are	  going	  to	  talk	  about	  aesthetics	  as	  a	  resource	  for	  addressing	  ethical	  demands	  we	  need	  to	  go	  beyond	  a	  formal	  understanding	  that	  limits	  what	  we	  can	  do	  with	  aesthetics	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  intrinsic	  value.	  	  	   Some	  strategies	  for	  linking	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics	  seem	  to	  challenge	  what	  Noel	  Carroll	  terms	  “radical	  autonomism,”	  which	  holds	  that	  art	  has	  no	  extrinsic	  value.	  Carroll	  notes	  that	  not	  all	  art	  has	  moral	  significance,	  but	  that	  some	  art,	  specifically	  the	  narrative	  arts,	  are	  constructed	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  elicit	  our	  moral	  precepts.8	  Narratives	  require	  the	  audience	  to	  fill	  in	  the	  unexpressed	  aspects	  of	  the	  story	  using	  their	  own	  preexisting	  moral	  emotions	  and	  imagination	  in	  engaging	  the	  text.	  Crime	  and	  Punishment	  appeals	  to	  our	  sensibility	  that	  murder	  is	  wrong,	  and	  that	  sensibility	  makes	  Rodion’s	  plight	  intelligible	  to	  its	  audience.	  Narrative	  art	  awakens	  its	  audience’s	  moral	  precepts,	  and	  also	  serves	  as	  a	  training	  ground	  in	  which	  the	  audience	  practices	  applying	  those	  precepts	  in	  novel	  scenarios.	  The	  practice	  of	  making	  moral	  judgments,	  in	  turn,	  expands	  our	  capacity	  for	  moral	  reasoning	  and	  feeling.	  Carroll	  follows	  in	  the	  footsteps	  of	  seminal	  thinkers	  like	  Tolstoy,	  who	  
                                                8	  Noel	  Carroll,	  “Moderate	  Moralism,”	  The	  British	  Journal	  of	  Aesthetics	  36,	  no.	  3	  (1996),	  223-­‐238.	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saw	  art	  (especially	  the	  narrative	  arts)	  as	  a	  moral	  training	  ground.9	  In	  engaging	  with	  the	  aesthetic	  we	  are	  able	  to	  simultaneously	  arouse	  our	  already	  present	  moral	  forms	  and	  give	  them	  substance,	  thereby	  developing	  and	  expanding	  our	  understanding	  of	  them.	  	  However,	  we	  should	  question	  the	  relevance	  of	  such	  theories	  for	  the	  text	  with	  which	  this	  project	  is	  concerned.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  has	  no	  overarching	  narrative	  or	  even	  a	  singular	  voice	  of	  wisdom	  that	  unifies	  the	  text,	  and	  is	  moreover	  thematically	  varied.	  Given	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  poly-­‐vocal	  quality,	  Carroll’s	  understanding	  of	  narrative	  ethics	  that	  develop	  certain	  moral	  sentiments	  might	  not	  be	  the	  best	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	  relationship	  between	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  in	  the	  text.	  In	  addition	  to	  focusing	  on	  the	  extrinsic	  value	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  in	  terms	  of	  art’s	  capacity	  to	  motivate	  or	  structure	  ethics,	  another	  way	  to	  conceive	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  is	  to	  look	  at	  the	  aesthetic	  qualities	  of	  ethics.	  Taking	  his	  cue	  from	  the	  pragmatist	  tradition,	  Joseph	  H.	  Kupfer	  describes	  the	  individual	  moments	  of	  aesthetic	  experience	  as	  mutually	  enhancing	  one	  another,	  and	  as	  united	  into	  a	  cohesive	  whole.10	  The	  aesthetic	  experience	  can	  serve	  moral	  development	  insofar	  as	  it	  trains	  the	  imagination	  to	  creatively	  seek	  arrangements	  that	  enhance	  individuals	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  build	  unities.	  Thus	  the	  aesthetic	  educates	  the	  moral	  imagination	  to	  build	  bridges	  
                                                9	  Leo	  Tolstoy,	  What	  is	  Art?,	  trans.	  Alymer	  Maude	  (New	  York:	  Funk	  &	  Wagnalis	  Company,	  1904).	  	  10	  Joseph	  H.	  Kupfer,	  Experience	  as	  Art	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1983)	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between	  self	  and	  other,	  and	  preserve	  continuity	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  appreciating	  differences.	  Marcia	  Cavell	  echoes	  this	  pragmatic	  approach	  by	  casting	  the	  moralist	  and	  the	  aesthete	  as	  similarly	  engaged	  in	  a	  process	  of	  inquiry.	  She	  notes	  that	  both	  aesthetic	  and	  moral	  judgments	  are	  made	  not	  by	  recourse	  to	  higher	  principles,	  but	  by	  attention	  to	  the	  unique	  particulars	  of	  a	  situation.11	  We	  are	  able	  to	  call	  Robin	  Hood	  a	  hero	  and	  denounce	  Ma	  Barker	  as	  a	  criminal	  for	  the	  same	  reason:	  in	  both	  cases	  we	  must	  consider	  the	  broader	  context,	  which	  is	  inclusive	  of	  our	  own	  background	  assumptions	  and	  experiences.	  It	  is	  this	  character	  of	  imagination	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  piece	  together	  aspects	  of	  a	  situation	  with	  our	  own	  experience	  that	  is	  common	  to	  both	  moral	  and	  ethical	  judgments.	  	  The	  Zhuangzi	  differs	  from	  the	  above	  surveyed	  strategies	  in	  that	  it	  uses	  aesthetics	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  ethical	  vision.	  Its	  ethical	  concerns	  and	  presupposition	  of	  an	  active	  audience	  put	  it	  at	  odds	  with	  mainstream	  and	  formalist	  influenced	  aesthetics.	  Furthermore	  the	  text’s	  demonstrative	  quality	  imbues	  its	  aesthetic	  dimensions	  with	  greater	  persuasive	  force,	  thereby	  setting	  it	  apart	  from	  the	  narrative	  ethics	  and	  pragmatist	  aesthetics.	  The	  
Zhuangzi’s	  aesthetic	  demonstration	  of	  the	  good	  life	  offers	  a	  perspective	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics	  that	  is	  missing	  from	  the	  current	  discussion.	  	  
                                                11	  Marcia	  Cavell,	  “Taste	  and	  the	  Moral	  Sense,”	  in	  Ethics	  and	  the	  Arts,	  
Vol.	  5,	  ed.	  David	  E.W.	  Fenner	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2013),	  293-­‐301.	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2.	  Ethics	  and	  Interpretations	  	  Trends	  in	  scholarship	  regarding	  the	  ethical	  dimension	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  range	  from	  complete	  denial	  of	  such	  a	  dimension,	  based	  on	  its	  skeptical	  or	  relativist	  stance,	  to	  interpretations	  that	  claim	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  capable	  of	  serving	  as	  a	  ground	  for	  a	  well-­‐formed	  moral	  system.	  Bryan	  Van	  Norden	  astutely	  points	  out	  that	  “the	  Zhuangzi	  acts	  almost	  like	  a	  Rorschach	  test:	  different	  interpreters	  see	  different	  things	  in	  it,	  and	  what	  they	  see	  there	  often	  reveals	  more	  about	  their	  own	  preoccupations	  than	  about	  the	  Zhuangzi	  itself.”12	  There	  are	  various	  reasons	  why	  scholars	  have	  denied	  the	  role	  of	  ethics	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi.	  While	  Chad	  Hansen	  does	  so	  to	  keep	  consistent	  with	  his	  “relativist-­‐skepticism”	  interpretation,	  other	  denials,	  such	  as	  Robert	  Eno’s,	  amount	  to	  a	  denial	  that	  a	  rule-­‐based	  moral	  system	  can	  be	  teased	  out	  of	  the	  text.13	  And	  still	  others,	  such	  as	  Eske	  Møllgaard,	  claim	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  gives	  us	  a	  moral	  maxim	  not	  unlike	  Kant.14	  	  
                                                12	  Bryan	  Van	  Norden,	  “Competing	  Interpretations	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi,”	  
Philosophy	  East	  and	  West	  47,	  no.	  2	  (1996),	  247.	  	  13	  See	  Robert	  Eno,	  “Cook	  Ding’s	  Dao	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  Philosophy,”	  in	  
Essays	  on	  Skepticism,	  Relativism,	  and	  Ethics	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  ed.	  Paul	  Kjellberg	  and	  Philip	  J.	  Ivanhoe	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1996),	  127-­‐151.	  Here	  Eno	  agrees	  with	  Hansen	  that	  the	  Qiwulun	  chapter	  expresses	  a	  relativist	  position	  about	  the	  value	  of	  assertions,	  but	  does	  admit	  that	  “the	  text	  not	  only	  passes	  a	  positive	  judgment	  concerning	  the	  value	  of	  skill	  knowing,	  but	  also	  takes	  the	  ethical	  position	  of	  advocating	  that	  people	  make	  a	  sustained	  effort	  to	  reform	  themselves	  through	  the	  acquisition	  of	  a	  dao.	  It	  is,	  in	  this	  regard,	  nonrelativistic	  in	  its	  value	  stance”	  (136).	  	  14	  See	  Eske	  Møllgaard,	  “Zhuangzi’s	  Religious	  Ethics,”	  Journal	  of	  the	  
American	  Academy	  of	  Religion	  71,	  no.	  2	  (2003),	  347-­‐370.	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   One	  way	  to	  conceive	  of	  the	  well-­‐lived	  life	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  it	  urges	  us	  to	  accord	  ourselves	  with	  some	  pre-­‐linguistic	  or	  pre-­‐conceptual	  reality	  that	  underlies	  our	  conventional	  mode	  of	  existence.	  This	  ethical	  vision	  is	  often	  packaged	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  mystical	  orientation.	  Burton	  Watson,	  Benjamin	  Schwartz,	  and	  David	  Hinton	  account	  for	  the	  strangeness	  of	  the	  language	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  by	  claiming	  literary	  devices	  such	  as	  paradox	  and	  pseudological	  discussion	  are	  employed	  to	  free	  the	  reader	  from	  conventional	  evaluative	  judgments	  that	  keep	  him	  tethered	  to	  the	  unhappy	  pursuits	  of	  wealth,	  recognition	  and	  other	  traditionally	  valued	  items.	  Watson	  claims	  that	  while	  essentially	  all	  philosophers	  of	  ancient	  China	  were	  concerned	  with	  meeting	  the	  demands	  of	  a	  chaotic	  and	  absurd	  world,	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  is	  unique	  in	  that	  it	  responds	  with	  a	  mystical	  vision,	  rather	  than	  a	  political	  doctrine.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  caters	  to	  the	  “spiritual	  elite”	  rather	  than	  the	  political	  elite.	  Our	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  world	  arises	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  conventional	  evaluations	  we	  apply	  to	  it.	  “Death,”	  for	  example,	  is	  only	  anxiety	  producing	  because	  I	  have	  labeled	  it	  as	  such.	  If	  we	  resist	  these	  evaluations	  then	  such	  terms	  lose	  their	  sway	  over	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  respond	  to	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  this	  allows	  us	  to	  transcend	  our	  limiting	  intellect	  and	  find	  union	  with	  the	  Dao	  –	  the	  undifferentiated	  ultimate	  reality.15	  
                                                15	  Burton	  Watson,	  Chuang-­‐Tzu:	  The	  Basic	  Writings	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  also	  see	  Benjamin	  Schwartz,	  The	  World	  of	  
Thought	  In	  Ancient	  China	  (Cambridge:	  Belknap	  Press	  of	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1985),	  186-­‐254	  and	  David	  Hinton,	  Chuang	  Tzu:	  The	  Inner	  Chapters	  (New	  York:	  Counterpoint	  Press,	  1998).	  Watson,	  Schwartz,	  and	  Hinton	  see	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  a	  Laozian	  mystical	  vision.	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In	  emphasizing	  the	  transcendent	  nature	  of	  mystical	  union	  with	  the	  Dao,	  Watson	  and	  Schwartz	  may	  be	  pigeonholing	  the	  Zhuangzi	  into	  a	  Buddhist	  or	  even	  Christian	  form.	  Mystics	  such	  as	  Plotinus,	  Bonaventure,	  and	  others	  see	  mystical	  union	  as	  a	  process	  of	  assent,	  wherein	  with	  each	  upward	  movement	  distinctions	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  world	  fall	  away	  in	  unification	  with	  an	  eternal	  and	  ultimately	  singular	  reality	  that	  transcends	  our	  everyday	  experience.	  The	  
Zhuangzi	  does	  not	  collapse	  into	  this	  sort	  of	  monistic	  vision.	  Diversity	  and	  multiplicity	  are	  celebrated	  rather	  than	  transcended.	  	  In	  order	  to	  combat	  a	  possible	  misunderstanding	  of	  Zhuangzi	  as	  a	  Neoplatonist	  or	  Christian	  mystic,	  Lee	  Yearley	  and	  Harold	  D.	  Roth	  give	  more	  nuanced	  accounts	  of	  what	  they	  perceive	  as	  a	  uniquely	  Daoist	  or	  at	  least	  Zhuangzian	  mysticism.	  Like	  Schwartz	  and	  Hinton,	  they	  note	  Ziqi	  of	  Nanguo’s	  trance-­‐like	  state	  and	  Yan	  Hui’s	  “mind	  fasting”	  as	  evidence	  of	  meditative	  practices	  that	  point	  to	  the	  religious	  nature	  of	  the	  text.	  Yearley	  suggests	  that	  these	  references	  paired	  with	  the	  qualities	  of	  skillful	  action	  indicate	  an	  “intraworldly	  mysticism,”	  which	  consists	  not	  in	  a	  union	  with	  some	  transcendent	  power	  that	  is	  beyond	  the	  world,	  but	  in	  a	  radical	  break	  with	  our	  everyday	  orientation	  so	  that	  we	  see	  the	  world	  in	  a	  new	  and	  unified	  way.	  Such	  a	  mystical	  experience,	  Yearley	  claims,	  “lacks	  the	  apparently	  normal	  essentials	  of	  being	  human.”16	  Roth	  distinguishes	  between	  two	  kinds	  of	  mystical	  
                                                16	  Lee	  H.	  Yearley,	  “Zhuangzi’s	  Understanding	  of	  Skillfulness	  and	  the	  Ultimate	  Spiritual	  State,”	  in	  Essays	  on	  Skepticism,	  Relativism,	  and	  Ethics	  in	  the	  
Zhuangzi,	  ed.	  Paul	  Kjellberg	  and	  Philip	  J.	  Ivanhoe	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1996),	  160.	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experience	  that	  complement	  one	  another:	  introvertive	  mystical	  experience,	  in	  which	  one	  loses	  oneself	  in	  union	  with	  the	  Dao,	  and	  extrovertive	  mystical	  experience,	  in	  which	  one	  returns	  to	  the	  phenomenal	  world	  detached	  from	  one’s	  self	  and	  fixed	  cognition.	  The	  latter	  is	  somewhat	  akin	  to	  Yearley’s	  understanding	  of	  intraworldly	  mysticism,	  although	  Roth	  talks	  about	  this	  state	  in	  terms	  of	  “flow	  cognition.”17	  Having	  some	  greater	  awareness	  after	  mystical	  union	  with	  the	  Dao,	  one	  is	  no	  longer	  tethered	  to	  his	  own	  fixed,	  and	  thus	  limited,	  point	  of	  view,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  can	  effortlessly	  harmonize	  with	  the	  conditions	  of	  any	  situation.	  Roth	  breaks	  down	  the	  daojia-­‐daojiao	  distinction	  by	  demonstrating	  how	  the	  entire	  tradition	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  Neiye	  chapter	  of	  the	  Guanzi,	  in	  which	  we	  are	  given	  a	  set	  of	  self-­‐cultivation	  techniques.18	  Thus,	  for	  Roth,	  ‘Daoism’	  designates	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  self-­‐cultivation	  techniques,	  and	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  a	  ‘Daoist’	  text	  since	  it	  alludes	  to	  such	  techniques.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  is	  interpreted	  as	  advancing	  a	  sort	  of	  mystical	  religiosity,	  which	  makes	  use	  of	  such	  techniques	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  mystical	  union.	  Yet	  Roth’s	  attempt	  to	  break	  down	  the	  philosophical	  and	  religious	  Daoism	  divide	  results	  in	  the	  shoehorning	  of	  the	  entire	  tradition	  into	  a	  ‘daojiao’	  understanding	  and	  ignores	  other	  philosophical	  aspects.	  It	  seems	  that	  we	  should	  be	  able	  to	  problematize	  
                                                17	  Harold	  D.	  Roth,	  “Bimodal	  Mystical	  Experience	  in	  the	  ‘Qiwulun’	  Chapter	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi”	  in	  Hiding	  the	  World	  in	  the	  World,	  ed.	  Scott	  Cook	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  2003),	  15-­‐32.	  	  18	  Harold	  D.	  Roth,	  Original	  Tao:	  Inward	  Training	  (Nei-­‐Yeh)	  and	  the	  
Foundations	  of	  Taoist	  Mysticism	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1999).	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the	  distinction	  between	  philosophical	  and	  religious	  Daoism	  without	  dispensing	  with	  one	  half	  of	  the	  disjunct.	  It	  might	  be	  more	  productive	  to	  think	  of	  various	  Daoist	  positions	  as	  related	  via	  family	  resemblance	  rather	  than	  a	  common	  ground.	  To	  suppose	  that	  there	  is	  a	  universal	  feature	  that	  ties	  them	  together	  relegates	  other	  features	  of	  Daoism	  to	  the	  sidelines.	  Interpretations	  that	  see	  the	  Zhuangzi	  exclusively	  as	  propagating	  a	  mystical	  religiousness	  are	  missing	  out	  on	  other	  interesting	  facets.	  	  A.C.	  Graham	  and	  David	  Loy	  exemplify	  another	  approach	  on	  according	  with	  some	  deeper	  reality	  by	  breaking	  with	  the	  conventional	  mode	  of	  existence	  in	  casting	  the	  Zhuangzi	  in	  anti-­‐rationalist	  terms.	  Graham	  notes	  that	  the	  use	  of	  argumentation	  in	  the	  text	  is	  typically	  directed	  against	  the	  use	  of	  argumentation.19	  The	  Zhuangzi	  asks	  the	  reader	  to	  dispense	  with	  his	  intellectual	  capacity	  that	  is	  responsible	  for	  argumentation,	  which	  divides	  up	  the	  world	  into	  ‘this’	  and	  ‘that’,	  and	  instead	  focus	  on	  disciplining	  the	  spontaneous	  energies	  that	  naturally	  guide	  him.20	  For	  Graham	  and	  Loy,	  there	  is	  no	  rational	  decision	  that	  characterizes	  the	  Zhuangzian	  sage.	  Instead,	  the	  well-­‐lived	  life	  is	  one	  that	  has	  shed	  the	  rational	  everyday	  perspective	  that	  is	  inadequate	  for	  grasping	  the	  undifferentiated	  ultimate	  reality.21	  	  
                                                19	  A.C.	  Graham,	  Chuang-­‐Tzu:	  The	  Inner	  Chapters	  (Indianapolis:	  Hackett	  Publishing,	  2001),	  9-­‐14.	  	  20	  A.C.	  Graham,	  “Taoist	  Spontaneity	  and	  the	  Dichotomy	  of	  ‘Is’	  and	  ‘Ought’,”	  in	  Experimental	  Essays	  on	  Chuang-­‐Tzu,	  ed.	  Victor	  H.	  Mair	  (Honolulu:	  University	  of	  Hawaii	  Press,	  1983),	  3-­‐23.	  	  21	  See	  also	  David	  Loy,	  “Zhuangzi	  and	  Nagarjuna	  on	  the	  Truth	  of	  No	  Truth,”	  in	  Essays	  on	  Skepticism,	  Relativism	  and	  Ethics	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  ed.	  Paul	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Anti-­‐rationalist	  readings	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  face	  at	  least	  two	  problems:	  First,	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  that	  logic	  is	  only	  used	  to	  attack	  reason.	  An	  anti-­‐rationalist	  reading	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  famous	  “happiness	  of	  fish”	  passage	  might	  interpret	  Zhuang	  Zhou’s	  use	  of	  logic	  against	  Hui	  Shi’s	  sarcastic	  queries	  about	  the	  reliability	  of	  Zhuang	  Zhou’s	  knowledge	  as	  a	  demonstration	  of	  the	  futility	  of	  logic	  in	  establishing	  any	  rational	  ground	  for	  knowledge	  or	  moral	  claims.	  But	  interpretations	  of	  this	  particular	  passage	  abound,	  with	  Hans-­‐Georg	  Moeller	  claiming	  that	  the	  passage	  is	  intended	  to	  promote	  a	  lighthearted	  philosophical	  musing.	  Rather	  than	  seeing	  reason	  as	  attacking	  itself,	  on	  Moeller’s	  reading	  reason	  becomes	  the	  playful	  raising	  of	  questions	  and	  engaging	  in	  debate	  as	  a	  desirable	  mode	  of	  existence.22	  The	  multiple	  interpretations	  of	  the	  role	  of	  logic	  show	  that	  its	  use	  is	  evidence	  that	  supports	  multiple	  interpretations,	  not	  just	  an	  anti-­‐rational	  stance.	  Secondly,	  any	  interpretation	  that	  suggests	  a	  return	  to	  some	  pre-­‐conceptual	  understanding	  or	  mode	  of	  existence	  unduly	  writes	  off	  the	  role	  of	  reason	  and	  concept	  application	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi.	  Sages	  in	  the	  text	  do	  draw	  on	  concepts	  that	  allow	  them	  to	  make	  distinctions	  and	  pose	  alternatives.	  But	  that	  they	  make	  choices	  does	  not	  commit	  us	  to	  saying	  that	  the	  text	  is	  advocating	  rationality	  as	  a	  primary	  characteristic	  of	  the	  good	  life.	  It	  is	  entirely	  possible	  to	  hold	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  allows	  for	  concept	  application	  but	  that	  the	  ethical	  
                                                                                                                                Kjellberg	  and	  Philip	  J.	  Ivanhoe	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1996),	  50–67.	  	  22	  Hans-­‐Georg	  Moeller,	  “‘Rambling	  without	  Destination’	  on	  Daoist	  ‘Youing’	  in	  the	  World,”	  in	  Zhuangzi	  and	  the	  Happy	  Fish,	  ed.	  Roger	  T.	  Ames	  and	  Takahiro	  Nakajima	  (Honolulu:	  University	  of	  Hawaii	  Press,	  2015),	  248-­‐260.	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life	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  rational	  deliberation	  or	  concept	  application.	  In	  short,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  deny	  every	  instance	  of	  reason.	  However,	  we	  can	  have	  concepts	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  say	  that	  rational	  deliberation	  and	  application	  of	  concepts	  is	  not	  what	  is	  most	  important	  for	  those	  leading	  the	  good	  life.	  Just	  because	  reason	  is	  inadequate	  for	  characterizing	  the	  good	  life	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  need	  to	  dispense	  with	  concepts	  altogether.	  Overall	  there	  is	  room	  for	  rationality	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  and	  admitting	  its	  role	  will	  also	  allow	  us	  to	  see	  the	  logic	  behind	  its	  aesthetic	  construction.	  As	  will	  be	  shown,	  the	  various	  illustrations	  of	  sagacity	  and	  portraits	  of	  the	  good	  life	  are	  crafted	  in	  a	  way	  that	  they	  are	  responding	  to	  Warring	  States	  uses	  of	  rhetoric	  and	  ideas	  about	  the	  transmission	  of	  wisdom.	  It	  is	  this	  integration	  of	  rational	  concerns	  that	  allow	  for	  a	  unique	  Zhuangzian	  aesthetic.	  Hansen	  is	  among	  those	  who	  claim	  that	  interpreting	  Zhuangzi	  as	  an	  “antirational	  mystic”	  is	  not	  doing	  justice	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  text’s	  thought.	  He	  especially	  argues	  interpretations	  that	  understand	  Dao	  as	  some	  ultimate	  ontological	  grounds	  with	  which	  an	  individual	  can	  merge	  do	  so	  because	  they	  fail	  to	  recognize	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  broader	  philosophical	  context.	  According	  to	  Hansen,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  ought	  to	  be	  grouped	  with	  the	  Neo-­‐Mohist	  thought	  in	  what	  he	  terms	  the	  “Analytic	  Period”	  of	  ancient	  China.	  If	  we	  understand	  this,	  then	  we	  can	  understand	  that	  for	  the	  author	  of	  the	  Inner	  Chapters,	  Dao	  is	  not	  a	  metaphysical	  substance,	  but	  a	  linguistic	  discourse	  that	  guides	  behavior;	  hence	  we	  have	  the	  different	  “daos”	  of	  the	  Confucians	  and	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the	  Mohists.	  The	  Qiwulun	  chapter	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  should	  be	  read	  as	  pointing	  out	  the	  conventional	  nature	  of	  language	  and	  by	  extension	  normative	  discourses.	  Names	  and	  ascriptions	  of	  shi	  or	  fei	  (this/that,	  right/wrong)	  are	  always	  relative	  to	  a	  particular	  linguistic	  discourse;	  for	  example,	  the	  Confucians	  and	  Mohists	  disagree	  on	  what	  is	  yi,	  but	  each	  justifies	  their	  definition	  of	  yi	  by	  recourse	  to	  different	  premises.	  Justification	  is	  internal	  to	  each	  linguistic	  discourse	  –	  there	  is	  no	  deeper	  foundation	  to	  which	  they	  can	  appeal	  in	  order	  to	  adjudicate	  between	  various	  “daos.”	  The	  Qiwulun	  gives	  us	  a	  relativistic	  skepticism	  that	  denies	  the	  Zhuangzi	  a	  positive	  ethical	  foundation.23	  	  Rather	  than	  making	  a	  point	  about	  the	  specific	  instances	  of	  relativism	  in	  the	  text,	  Hansen	  reads	  all	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  thought	  as	  a	  discourse	  on	  relativism.	  In	  generalizing	  the	  relativist	  themes	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  text’s	  thought,	  Hansen	  forcibly	  applies	  a	  framework	  to	  parts	  of	  the	  text	  where	  is	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  belong.	  Textual	  interpretations	  that	  isolate	  a	  literary	  device,	  theme,	  or	  section	  of	  text	  from	  other	  aspects	  of	  that	  text	  and	  then	  explain	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  text	  in	  terms	  of	  that	  single	  aspect	  are	  guilty	  of	  committing	  what	  Dewey	  termed,	  “the	  philosophical	  fallacy.”24	  In	  taking	  a	  single	  aspect	  of	  the	  text	  by	  which	  the	  rest	  of	  that	  text	  can	  be	  interpreted,	  
                                                23	  Chad	  Hansen,	  A	  Daoist	  Theory	  of	  Chinese	  Thought	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1992),	  265-­‐303.	  	  24	  For	  greater	  explanation	  of	  the	  philosophic	  fallacy	  see	  John	  Dewey,	  
The	  Quest	  for	  Certainty:	  A	  Study	  of	  the	  Relation	  of	  Knowledge	  and	  Action	  (New	  York:	  Minton,	  Balch	  &	  Co.,	  1929),	  21-­‐23.	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Hansen	  explains	  away	  interesting	  tensions	  and	  unduly	  reduces	  the	  importance	  of	  certain	  themes.	  On	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  from	  Hansen’s	  relativistic	  skepticism,	  which	  denies	  the	  Zhuangzi	  any	  normative	  thrust,	  are	  those	  who	  suppose	  the	  Zhuangzi	  gives	  us	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  moral	  maxim.	  On	  Møllgaard’s	  reading	  the	  Zhuangzi	  implores	  us	  to	  refrain	  from	  endorsing	  any	  power	  structure	  by	  adhering	  to	  the	  dictum,	  “do	  for	  others	  in	  not	  doing	  for	  others.”	  In	  adhering	  to	  this	  moral	  imperative	  one	  preserves	  freedom	  and	  transcends	  the	  everyday	  conflict-­‐ridden	  power	  structures	  that	  characterize	  the	  conventional	  mode	  of	  existence.	  Møllgaard	  insists	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  gives	  us	  a	  “religious”	  ethic	  not	  unlike	  that	  of	  the	  Gospels,	  in	  that	  they	  both	  emphasize	  transcending	  the	  conflicted	  human	  realm.25	  	   Møllgaard	  reads	  a	  strong	  ethical	  foundation	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  by	  searching	  out	  moral	  imperatives,26	  but	  such	  a	  systematic	  ethics	  may	  be	  unwarranted.	  Møllgaard	  attempts	  to	  carve	  out	  a	  moral	  guideline	  in	  looking	  to	  a	  passage	  in	  chapter	  six	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  wherein	  Zisanghu,	  Mengzifan,	  and	  Ziqinzhang	  decide	  to	  become	  friends	  since	  they	  are	  like-­‐minded	  in	  their	  
                                                25	  Møllgaard,	  “Zhuangzi’s	  Religious	  Ethics.”	  	  26	  Møllgaard	  insists	  that	  what	  makes	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  ethics	  ‘religious’	  is	  that	  such	  ethics	  transcends	  positive	  morality:	  it	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  social	  utility	  or	  effecting	  harmony	  –	  rather	  it	  seeks	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  human	  realm	  (See	  “Zhuangzi’s	  Religious	  Ethics”).	  Møllgaard’s	  understanding	  of	  “positive	  morality”	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  my	  use	  of	  “ethical	  foundation,”	  by	  which	  I	  mean	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  Møllgaard	  does	  interpret	  the	  Zhuangzi	  as	  espousing	  an	  ethical	  vision	  that	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  a	  clear	  moral	  injunction.	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desire	  not	  to	  impose	  nor	  be	  imposed	  upon	  by	  others.27	  When	  Zisanghu	  dies,	  Confucius	  explains	  to	  Zigong	  that	  the	  friends’	  singing	  and	  dancing	  and	  other	  odd	  behavior	  is	  due	  to	  their	  ability	  to	  wander	  beyond	  the	  boundaries,	  while	  Confucius	  is	  doomed	  by	  heaven	  to	  roam	  within	  them.	  Møllgaard	  does	  not	  explain	  why	  this	  particular	  passage	  is	  more	  relevant	  than	  others	  for	  drawing	  a	  moral	  maxim.	  Why	  not	  Cook	  Ding	  in	  the	  Yangsheng	  Zhu	  chapter,	  or	  even	  Robber	  Zhi	  from	  the	  Miscellaneous	  Chapters?	  Though	  conceivably	  related,	  these	  passages	  evoke	  different	  ideas	  about	  how	  one	  should	  act;	  because	  of	  this	  plurality	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  justify	  taking	  a	  single	  passage	  as	  offering	  a	  moral	  maxim	  that	  is	  the	  key	  to	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  ethical	  vision.	  Kuang-­‐Ming	  Wu	  and	  Robert	  Allinson	  have	  given	  more	  detailed	  analyses	  regarding	  the	  style	  of	  the	  text	  and	  its	  role	  in	  self-­‐cultivation.	  Both	  Wu	  and	  Allinson	  distinguish	  between	  literal	  and	  metaphoric	  language,	  citing	  the	  later	  as	  that	  which	  is	  most	  appropriate	  to	  ethical	  development.	  Allinson	  argues	  that	  the	  task	  of	  self-­‐transformation	  is	  impossible	  to	  convey	  literally,	  because	  such	  a	  project	  requires	  a	  subject	  and	  self-­‐transformation	  that	  amounts	  to	  the	  deconstruction	  of	  the	  self,	  and	  its	  attendant	  subject-­‐object	  boundaries.28	  Myth	  and	  metaphor	  are	  strategies	  intended	  to	  stimulate	  the	  
Zhuangzi’s	  audience	  from	  a	  lesser,	  rational	  or	  conceptual	  consciousness	  to	  a	  higher,	  transcendent	  consciousness.	  Wu	  similarly	  argues	  that	  the	  language	  of	  
                                                27	  Zhuangzi	  6.264-­‐273,	  Watson	  86-­‐87.	  	  	  28	  Robert	  E.	  Allinson,	  Chuang-­‐Tzu	  for	  Spiritual	  Transformation:	  An	  
Analysis	  of	  the	  Inner	  Chapters	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1989),	  143-­‐155.	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the	  Zhuangzi	  serves	  as	  an	  impetus	  to	  the	  reader’s	  transformation;	  however,	  Wu	  sees	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  text	  as	  a	  unique	  collaboration	  between	  text	  and	  audience,	  which	  stirs	  the	  development	  of	  the	  mature	  self	  that	  engages	  with	  the	  world	  without	  passing	  judgment.	  Instead	  of	  struggling	  with	  preconceived	  ideas	  about	  the	  world,	  the	  mature	  self	  experiences	  it	  with	  childlike	  innocence.29	  Wu	  and	  Allinson’s	  analyses	  of	  the	  stylistic	  function	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  add	  a	  much-­‐needed	  perspective	  to	  Zhuangzi	  scholarship.	  The	  language	  of	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  is	  certainly	  one	  of	  the	  most	  striking	  features	  of	  the	  text	  and	  consideration	  of	  the	  role	  of	  style	  is	  often	  overlooked.	  However,	  both	  Wu	  and	  Allinson	  see	  language	  as	  a	  stimulus	  to	  overcome	  one’s	  conventional	  self	  and	  as	  such,	  seem	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  same	  traps	  as	  the	  mystic	  and	  anti-­‐rationalist	  camps	  of	  interpretation.	  While	  Wu	  preserves	  that	  celebration	  of	  individuality	  and	  diversity,	  he	  still	  maintains	  that	  the	  desired	  mature	  self	  is	  one	  that	  eschews	  judgments	  and	  concept	  application.	  I	  have	  already	  pointed	  out	  the	  possibility	  that	  concept	  application	  and	  rationality	  still	  have	  a	  place	  in	  the	  
Zhuangzi.	  Here	  I	  would	  also	  like	  to	  point	  out	  that	  that	  such	  concepts	  are	  present	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  we	  cannot	  form	  new	  concepts	  and	  evaluative	  judgments.	  Yet	  Wu	  seems	  to	  miss	  this	  point	  and	  conceives	  of	  concepts	  and	  judgments	  as	  stagnant	  universals,	  which	  ought	  to	  be	  transcended.	  The	  necessity	  of	  transcending	  a	  conventional	  self	  and	  attaining	  a	  higher	  self	  loses	  force	  when	  we	  return	  to	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  observations	  in	  the	  Qiwulun:	  
                                                29	  Kuang-­‐Ming	  Wu,	  Chuang	  Tzu:	  World	  Philosopher	  at	  Play	  (New	  York:	  Crossroads	  Publishing	  Company,	  1982),	  1-­‐25.	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concepts	  are	  not	  fixed.	  An	  implication	  of	  this	  position	  is	  that	  we	  are	  free	  to	  develop	  new	  ones.	  Thus	  rather	  than	  transcending	  some	  fallible	  human	  condition,	  the	  Qiwulun	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  asking	  its	  audience	  to	  be	  open	  in	  forming	  new	  judgments.	  	  Another	  common	  way	  to	  approach	  the	  text	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  is	  amoral.	  Robert	  Eno	  and	  Thomas	  Radice,	  for	  example,	  argue	  that	  the	  text	  would	  have	  us	  develop	  certain	  skills,	  but	  those	  skills	  are	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  morality.30	  Neither,	  Eno,	  nor	  Radice	  would	  deny	  that	  the	  text	  offers	  a	  normative	  vision.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  does	  make	  a	  prescription;	  however	  those	  prescriptions	  are	  not	  for	  moral	  norms.	  	   The	  distinction	  between	  moral	  and	  non-­‐moral	  norms	  has	  to	  do	  with	  whether	  someone	  who	  does	  not	  conform	  to	  those	  norms	  can	  be	  called	  morally	  bad	  or	  merely	  stupid,	  foolish,	  etc.	  For	  example,	  most	  of	  us	  would	  agree	  that	  my	  tendency	  to	  trip	  on	  the	  sidewalk	  only	  makes	  me	  clumsy	  and	  not	  morally	  deficient;	  perhaps	  I	  am	  not	  good	  at	  paying	  attention	  to	  where	  I	  am	  walking.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  should	  I	  steal	  money	  from	  a	  friend,	  I	  would	  likely	  be	  condemned	  as	  morally	  bad.	  In	  both	  cases	  the	  prescribed	  norm	  fails	  to	  be	  met,	  however	  only	  in	  the	  latter	  case	  would	  we	  deem	  the	  act,	  or	  person	  committing	  that	  act,	  immoral.	  Of	  course	  we	  can	  couch	  this	  in	  reverse	  terms:	  simply	  because	  one	  is	  a	  good	  cook	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  he	  is	  moral,	  whereas	  
                                                30	  Robert	  Eno,	  “Cook	  Ding’s	  Dao	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  Philosophy,”	  in	  
Essays	  on	  Skepticism,	  Relativism,	  and	  Ethics	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  ed.	  Paul	  Kjellberg	  and	  Philip	  J.	  Ivanhoe	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1996),	  127-­‐151	  and	  Thomas	  Radice,	  “Clarity	  and	  Survival	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi”	  Asian	  
Philosophy	  11,	  no.	  1	  (2001),	  33-­‐40.	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the	  individual	  who	  saves	  a	  child	  from	  a	  burning	  building	  is	  more	  obviously	  deserving	  of	  moral	  approbation.	  The	  distinction	  between	  moral	  and	  non-­‐moral	  norms	  is	  what	  allows	  many	  scholars	  to	  suggest	  that	  while	  the	  Zhuangzi	  proffers	  a	  normative	  vision	  and	  promotes	  a	  certain	  way	  of	  living,	  it	  need	  not	  be	  a	  moral	  vision.	  For	  example,	  if	  we	  must	  distinguish	  between	  moral	  and	  non-­‐moral	  norms,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  Cook	  Ding	  is	  a	  moral	  person.	  But	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Cook	  Ding	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  highly	  valued	  form	  of	  life;	  he	  is	  an	  example	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  live	  the	  good	  life.	  	   However,	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  advocates	  some	  non-­‐moral	  position	  presupposes	  that	  the	  text	  itself	  makes	  a	  distinction	  between	  norms	  that	  are	  moral	  and	  those	  that	  are	  non-­‐moral,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case.	  While	  we	  do	  see	  characters	  who	  violate	  norms	  portrayed	  as	  clumsy,	  stupid,	  etc.,	  we	  do	  not	  see	  characters	  that	  are	  “morally	  bad”	  in	  the	  above	  outlined	  sense.	  To use Nietzsche’s terms, we do see characters that are described 
in terms of “good and bad,” but not “good and evil.” This suggests that perhaps 
morality thusly understood does not apply to the Zhuangzi.31 
 However, rejecting the term morality from the discussion might mislead 
the reader into thinking that the text does not offer an ethical orientation, which 
the Zhuangzi does seem to offer. Insofar as it values certain forms of life over 
others	  and	  offers	  an	  overarching	  portrait	  of	  the	  good	  life, the Zhuangzi offers 
an ethical vision, or more colloquially, a morality. In order to avoid the confusing 
                                                31	  This	  argument	  has	  been	  made	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  ancient	  Greeks,	  as	  well.	  See	  Julie	  Annas,	  “Ancient	  Ethics	  and	  Modern	  Morality,”	  Philosophical	  
Perspectives	  6	  (1992),	  119-­‐136.	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proposition that the text offers a non-moral vision of the good life, it is necessary 
to take a broader and more informal understanding of morality.	  32	   In	  his	  study	  of	  wuwei	  in	  early	  china,	  Edward	  Slingerland	  makes	  several	  important	  interpretive	  remarks.	  Echoing	  Graham,	  Eno	  and	  others,	  Slingerland	  suggests	  that	  early	  China	  in	  general	  and	  Zhuangzi	  in	  particular	  emphasize	  the	  acquisition	  of	  skill-­‐knowledge	  over	  theoretical	  knowledge.	  It	  is	  this	  preference	  for	  skill-­‐knowledge	  or	  doing	  that	  leads	  Slingerland	  to	  look	  at	  the	  pursuit	  of	  perfected	  action	  in	  early	  China	  as	  a	  guiding	  concern	  of	  the	  Warring	  States	  period,	  which	  he	  conceives	  of	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  paradoxical	  concept	  wuwei,	  or	  “effortless	  action.”	  His	  choice	  of	  wuwei	  as	  a	  central	  concern	  in	  early	  China	  is	  in	  large	  part	  motivated	  his	  work	  in	  conceptual	  metaphor	  theory,	  which	  suggests	  that	  abstract	  thinking	  is	  rooted	  in	  sensory-­‐motor	  experience.	  If	  learning	  is	  an	  embodied	  act,	  then	  a	  preference	  for	  skill	  knowledge	  over	  theoretical	  knowledge	  is	  fitting.33	  While	  an	  emphasis	  on	  embodied	  knowledge	  does	  seem	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  it	  also	  glosses	  over	  some	  of	  the	  important	  differences	  within	  the	  larger	  tradition,	  to	  which	  we	  can	  see	  the	  Zhuangzi	  reacting.	  Chris	  Fraser	  suggests	  that	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  wuwei	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  removing	  desires	  and	  intentions,	  so	  that	  things	  can	  act	  by	  themselves.	  This	  is	  a	  more	  literal	  understanding	  that	  is	  
                                                32	  Jung	  H.	  Lee	  makes	  a	  very	  good	  argument	  for	  understanding	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  in	  moral	  terms	  by	  taking	  a	  broader	  definition	  of	  morality.	  See	  The	  
Ethical	  Foundations	  of	  Early	  Daoism:	  Zhuangzi’s	  Unique	  Moral	  Vision	  (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  MacMillon,	  2014),	  20-­‐21.	  	  33	  Edward	  Slingerland,	  Effortless	  Action:	  Conceptual	  Metaphor	  in	  Early	  
China	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  3-­‐20.	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used	  in	  the	  Laozi,	  which	  suggests	  that	  wuwei	  is	  much	  more	  a	  Daoist	  technical	  term	  than	  a	  guiding	  concern	  of	  early	  China.	  Fraser’s	  point	  is	  that	  different	  thinkers	  conceive	  of	  the	  content	  of	  perfected	  action	  differently.34	  Although	  Slingerland’s	  methodological	  approach	  is	  a	  promising	  resource	  for	  the	  future	  of	  comparative	  studies,	  he	  ultimately	  misses	  out	  on	  the	  complexities	  of	  not	  only	  the	  Zhuangzi	  and	  Daoist	  thinkers,	  but	  also	  broader	  Warring	  States	  period	  thought.	  	  The	  inadequacies	  of	  the	  above	  Zhuangzi	  interpretations	  can	  largely	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  an	  over	  emphatic	  drive	  for	  systematic	  coherence	  among	  the	  disparate	  facets	  of	  the	  text.	  Interpretations	  that	  attempt	  to	  impose	  too	  much	  coherence	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  seem	  to	  fall	  into	  two	  general	  traps:	  Firstly,	  there	  are	  those	  that	  attempt	  to	  take	  one	  aspect	  of	  the	  text	  and	  universalize	  it,	  making	  it	  the	  interpretative	  lynchpin	  of	  a	  systematic	  Zhuangzian	  philosophy.	  This	  is	  particularly	  evident	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Roth’s	  mystical	  interpretation	  and	  Hansen’s	  skeptical	  relativist	  reading.	  Despite	  Hansen’s	  protestation	  about	  anti-­‐rationalist	  mystical	  readings	  of	  the	  text	  being	  the	  product	  of	  a	  culturally	  biased	  hermeneutic,	  both	  he	  and	  Roth	  take	  a	  single	  aspect	  of	  the	  text	  and	  use	  it	  as	  a	  lens	  through	  which	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  text	  can	  be	  analyzed.	  In	  doing	  so,	  important	  themes	  and	  tensions	  are	  explained	  away:	  Hansen	  ignores	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  normative	  vision	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  and	  Roth	  misses	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  adroit	  rhetoric.	  	  
                                                34	  Chris	  Fraser,	  “On	  Wu-­‐Wei	  as	  a	  Unifying	  Metaphor,”	  Philosophy	  East	  
and	  West	  57,	  no.	  1	  (2007),	  97-­‐106.	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Secondly,	  there	  are	  interpretations	  that	  do	  adequately	  account	  for	  the	  various	  themes,	  styles,	  and	  other	  facets	  of	  the	  text,	  but	  do	  so	  by	  forcing	  them	  into	  a	  rather	  strange	  coherent	  vision.	  Graham,	  for	  example,	  skillfully	  acknowledges	  rationality	  (or	  irrationality),	  spontaneity,	  traditional	  Chinese	  cosmology,	  and	  other	  strands	  of	  thought	  present	  in	  the	  text.	  Graham	  reads	  the	  sagely	  mode	  of	  existence	  as	  one	  in	  which	  the	  is/ought	  distinction	  (the	  existence	  of	  which	  is	  a	  result	  of	  our	  conventional	  rational	  approach	  to	  the	  world)	  is	  dissolved.	  Here,	  the	  sagely,	  independent	  standpoint	  is	  achieved	  by	  imaginatively	  taking	  up	  other	  perspectives	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  a	  situation,	  including	  my	  own	  perspective	  and	  those	  of	  the	  future	  or	  past,	  and	  synthesizing	  them	  into	  some	  sort	  of	  non-­‐rational	  understanding	  of	  a	  situation,	  which	  spontaneously	  moves	  me	  in	  one	  inevitable	  direction.35	  One	  wonders	  whether	  the	  language	  and	  ideas	  Graham	  uses	  to	  piece	  together	  different	  themes	  is	  wholly	  appropriate	  to	  the	  text.	  It	  seems	  that	  in	  giving	  a	  coherent	  account,	  Graham	  is	  at	  least	  giving	  us	  a	  strange	  picture	  of	  the	  dissolution	  of	  fact	  and	  value	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  –	  one	  that	  doesn’t	  quite	  seem	  to	  fit	  with	  the	  broader	  philosophical	  context.	  Thus,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  if	  we	  are	  to	  give	  a	  unified	  story	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  explain	  away	  interesting	  tensions	  and	  themes	  by	  universalizing	  a	  single	  aspect	  of	  the	  text	  as	  the	  interpretive	  lynchpin,	  or	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  we	  can	  preserve	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  themes	  by	  rearranging	  them	  into	  a	  strange	  and	  alien	  picture.	  
                                                35	  Graham,	  “Taoist	  Spontaneity,”	  3-­‐23.	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When	  Van	  Norden	  claimed,	  “the	  Zhuangzi	  acts	  almost	  like	  a	  Rorschach	  test:	  different	  interpreters	  see	  different	  things	  in	  it,	  and	  what	  they	  see	  there	  often	  reveals	  more	  about	  their	  own	  preoccupations	  than	  about	  the	  Zhuangzi	  itself,”	  he	  intended	  to	  deride	  the	  abounding	  plurality	  of	  interpretations,	  but	  perhaps	  that	  is	  the	  point	  of	  the	  text.36	  The	  Zhuangzi	  defies	  reduction	  to	  a	  systematic	  set	  of	  principles	  in	  its	  illustrations	  of	  the	  good	  life,	  which	  work	  to	  both	  set	  and	  then	  usurp	  expectations	  of	  the	  readers,	  sometimes	  contradicting	  itself	  along	  the	  way.	  To	  force	  a	  systematic	  account	  onto	  the	  text	  using	  a	  single	  aspect	  as	  an	  interpretive	  fulcrum	  or	  by	  imposing	  some	  other	  story	  that	  attempts	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  every	  theme	  defies	  the	  indeterminate	  style	  of	  the	  
Zhuangzi.	  Preserving	  that	  indirect	  and	  non-­‐literal	  quality	  means	  taking	  somewhat	  seriously	  Van	  Norden’s	  point	  about	  the	  Zhuangzi	  serving	  as	  a	  Rorschach	  test.	  	  
3.	  The	  Indeterminate	  Zhuangzi	  
	  The	  Zhuangzi	  is	  indeterminate	  in	  at	  least	  two	  ways:	  contextually	  and	  stylistically.	  Firstly,	  those	  looking	  to	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  context	  for	  coherence	  are	  confronted	  with	  the	  composite	  nature	  of	  the	  text	  and	  a	  complex	  commentarial	  tradition,	  which	  are	  not	  adequate	  resources	  for	  establishing	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  proffering	  a	  coherent,	  systematic	  vision.	  Secondly,	  the	  varied	  
                                                36	  Van	  Norden,	  “Competing	  Interpretations,”	  247.	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and	  sometimes	  contrasting	  themes	  and	  genres,	  as	  well	  as	  perplexing	  literary	  tropes,	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  determining	  the	  text.	  One	  strategy	  for	  claiming	  the	  coherence	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  to	  contextualize	  the	  work.	  It	  is	  common	  knowledge	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  a	  multi-­‐author	  text,	  the	  received	  version	  of	  which	  was	  compiled	  and	  redacted	  over	  the	  course	  of	  several	  hundred	  years.	  Those	  who	  are	  looking	  for	  a	  unified	  vision	  often	  confine	  their	  analyses	  to	  the	  Inner	  Chapters,	  which	  are	  traditionally	  ascribed	  to	  the	  historical	  Zhuangzi,	  and	  view	  the	  Outer	  and	  Miscellaneous	  Chapters	  as	  variations	  on	  the	  ‘core’	  Zhuangzian	  philosophy.	  But	  the	  works	  of	  Esther	  Klein	  and	  David	  McCraw	  problematize	  this	  approach;	  their	  analyses	  suggest	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  suspend	  judgment	  on	  the	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  Inner	  Chapters	  were	  indeed	  written	  by	  a	  single	  hand,	  and	  so	  complicate	  the	  possibility	  of	  our	  drawing	  on	  the	  Inner	  Chapters	  to	  provide	  us	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  unified	  Zhuangzian	  philosophy.37	  	   Another	  way	  to	  utilize	  context	  to	  articulate	  a	  coherent	  vision	  from	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  is	  to	  draw	  on	  the	  commentarial	  tradition.	  Guo	  Xiang	  is	  attributed	  with	  the	  redaction	  of	  the	  original	  55	  chapter	  Zhuangzi	  into	  the	  received	  33	  books	  with	  which	  we	  are	  familiar.	  Thus,	  Guo’s	  own	  philosophical	  leanings	  in	  his	  redaction	  of	  the	  text	  and	  accompanying	  commentary	  greatly	  influence	  subsequent	  interpretations	  and	  we	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  say	  that	  these	  offer	  a	  
                                                37	  See	  Esther	  Klein,	  “Were	  There	  Inner	  Chapters	  in	  the	  Warring	  States?	  A	  New	  Examination	  of	  Evidence	  About	  the	  Zhuangzi,”	  T’oung	  Pao	  96,	  no.	  4–5	  (2010),	  299–369,	  and	  David	  McCraw,	  Stratifying	  Zhuangzi:	  Rhyme	  
and	  Other	  Quantitative	  Evidence,	  Language	  and	  Linguistics	  Monograph	  Series	  41	  (Taipei:	  Institute	  of	  Linguistics,	  Academia	  Sinica,	  2010).	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coherent	  vision.	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  commentarial	  tradition	  is	  a	  useful	  resource	  in	  unpacking	  various	  ideas	  and	  thoughts	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi.	  But	  even	  though	  Guo	  redacted	  the	  text	  to	  reflect	  his	  own	  philosophical	  stance,	  there	  is	  a	  tension	  between	  the	  stance	  that	  he	  sees	  the	  text	  supporting	  and	  what	  we	  read	  in	  the	  text.	  According	  to	  Brook	  Ziporyn,	  Guo’s	  Zhuangzi	  commentary	  expresses	  a	  concern	  with	  synthesizing	  the	  Confucian	  interest	  in	  norms	  and	  the	  Daoist	  emphasis	  on	  spontaneity,	  yet	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  chock	  full	  of	  anti-­‐Confucian	  polemics.	  Ziporyn	  observes	  that	  Guo	  tends	  to	  explain	  away	  this	  tension	  by	  referring	  to	  these	  attacks	  as	  parables,	  which	  have	  some	  other	  meaning.38	  The	  tension	  between	  the	  philosophical	  positions	  for	  which	  Guo	  sees	  the	  Zhuangzi	  as	  supporting	  evidence	  and	  the	  text’s	  proffering	  of	  contradictory	  themes	  demonstrates	  that	  Guo’s	  redaction	  and	  commentary	  is	  insufficient	  for	  determining	  the	  text.	  While	  the	  commentarial	  tradition	  is	  a	  rich	  resource	  for	  forming	  our	  ideas	  about	  what	  the	  Zhuangzi	  has	  to	  say,	  we	  should	  be	  reminded	  that	  the	  commentaries	  speak	  to	  various	  philosophical	  projects	  and	  contexts	  as	  well	  as	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi.	  The	  commentarial	  tradition	  is	  not	  an	  adequate	  resource	  for	  articulating	  a	  coherent	  Zhuangzian	  philosophy.	  Another	  way	  in	  which	  the	  text	  defies	  determination	  is	  by	  what	  I	  have	  alluded	  to	  as	  stylistic	  indeterminacy.	  The	  text	  moves	  from	  vignette	  to	  vignette,	  sometimes	  abruptly	  and	  seemingly	  without	  a	  connection	  to	  what	  came	  before	  and	  what	  happens	  after.	  For	  example,	  the	  first	  chapter,	  
                                                38	  Book	  Ziporyn,	  The	  Penumbra	  Unbound:	  The	  Neo-­‐Taoist	  Philosophy	  of	  
Guo	  Xiang	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  2003),	  29.	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Xiaoyaoyou,	  begins	  with	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  Kun	  fish	  into	  the	  enormous	  Peng	  bird	  and	  muses	  on	  remaining	  unaffected	  by	  external	  things,	  such	  as	  public	  opinion.	  The	  text	  proceeds	  to	  retell	  the	  story	  of	  Yao	  ceding	  the	  empire	  to	  Shun,	  in	  whose	  place	  the	  Zhuangzi	  has	  the	  hermit	  Xu	  You	  reject	  the	  offer	  citing	  the	  problematic	  nature	  of	  abandoning	  one’s	  role	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  chapter	  closes	  with	  an	  illustration	  of	  the	  value	  of	  uselessness	  where	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  points	  out	  to	  Hui	  Shi	  that	  the	  useless	  character	  of	  a	  tree	  permits	  it	  to	  remain	  intact.	  While	  these	  allegories	  evoke	  a	  sense	  of	  relatedness,	  the	  audience	  is	  not	  immediately	  presented	  with	  a	  single	  unifying	  thread	  that	  explains	  their	  relation.	  The	  text	  further	  reinforces	  this	  sense	  of	  lacking	  foundation	  by	  frequent	  recourse	  to	  paradox,	  raising	  questions	  without	  answers,	  and	  musing	  without	  making	  a	  final	  point;	  the	  author	  of	  the	  Qiwulun	  chapter	  writes,	  “Words	  have	  something	  to	  say.	  But	  if	  what	  they	  have	  to	  say	  is	  not	  fixed,	  then	  do	  they	  really	  say	  something?	  Or	  do	  they	  say	  nothing?”39	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  kinds	  of	  destabilizing	  literary	  tropes,	  the	  audience	  is	  also	  confronted	  with	  an	  array	  of	  themes,	  some	  of	  which	  only	  seem	  tangentially	  related	  and	  others	  of	  which	  seem	  quite	  opposed.	  The	  skill	  stories	  paint	  a	  picture	  of	  effortless	  action	  and	  an	  ease	  with	  which	  certain	  craftsmen	  move	  through	  the	  world.	  Wheelwright	  Bian,	  by	  virtue	  of	  his	  knack	  for	  contextual	  responsiveness,	  seems	  to	  stand	  on	  a	  higher	  moral	  ground	  than	  Duke	  Huan,	  who	  subscribes	  to	  the	  moral	  wisdom	  of	  the	  sages,	  which	  Bian	  refers	  to	  as	  
                                                39	  Zhuangzi	  2.63,	  Watson	  39.	  夫言非吹也，言者有言，其所言者特未
定也。果有言邪？其未嘗有言邪？	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“the	  dregs	  of	  the	  men	  of	  old.”40	  If	  there	  were	  an	  implicit	  ethical	  prescription,	  it	  would	  seem	  to	  contradict	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  claim	  that	  all	  things	  are	  affirmable	  or	  deniable	  from	  some	  perspective.41	  If	  the	  variety	  of	  perspectives	  makes	  all	  things	  affirmable	  or	  deniable,	  how	  can	  we	  say	  that	  any	  way	  of	  living	  is	  better	  than	  other	  way	  of	  living?	  The	  indeterminate	  nature	  of	  the	  text	  raises	  several	  questions:	  If	  the	  text	  defies	  reduction	  to	  a	  fixed	  meaning,	  how	  can	  we	  say	  that	  the	  text	  means	  anything	  at	  all?	  In	  what	  way	  should	  we	  interpret	  the	  text?	  How	  can	  we	  say	  the	  text	  communicates	  an	  ethics?	  	  	  
4.	  An	  Aesthetic	  Approach	  	  There	  are	  several	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  Zhuangzi	  might	  be	  considered	  aesthetic.	  Firstly,	  aesthetics	  designates	  a	  concern	  with	  fine	  arts.	  The	  centrality	  of	  music	  in	  early	  Chinese	  philosophical	  thought	  might	  lead	  one	  to	  understand	  the	  aesthetic	  dimension	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  contribution	  or	  concern	  with	  fine	  arts.	  While	  this	  is	  an	  interesting	  topic	  worth	  pursuing,	  this	  project	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  the	  manifestation	  of	  arts	  as	  such	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi.42	  Another	  understanding	  of	  aesthetic	  is	  that	  which	  is	  
                                                40	  Zhuangzi	  13.490-­‐491,	  Watson	  152-­‐153.	  然則君之所讀者，古人之
糟魄已夫！	  	  41	  Zhuangzi	  2.66,	  Watson	  39.	  	  42	  For	  an	  example	  of	  this	  tact,	  see	  So	  Jeong	  Park,	  “Musical	  Though	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi:	  A	  Criticism	  of	  the	  Confucian	  Discourse	  on	  Ritual	  and	  Music,”	  
Dao	  12,	  no.	  3	  (2013),	  331-­‐350.	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opposed	  to	  rationality;	  here	  the	  aesthetics	  is	  often	  associated	  with	  affectivity,	  irrationality,	  and	  sensory	  experience	  as	  opposed	  to	  intellectual	  and	  theoretical	  pursuits	  of	  knowledge.	  While	  it	  has	  become	  commonplace	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  Zhuangzi	  as	  rejecting	  theoretical	  or	  fact-­‐knowledge,	  an	  understanding	  of	  aesthetics	  that	  is	  opposed	  to	  rationality	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  best	  way	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  text.	  We	  do	  see	  various	  sagely	  exemplars	  making	  reasoned	  choices	  in	  the	  text,	  and	  applying	  concepts	  in	  what	  could	  be	  called	  a	  rational	  way.43	  However,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  these	  individuals	  are	  not	  sagely	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  use	  of	  reason.	  Rather	  it	  seems	  that	  rationality	  and	  affectivity	  are	  intertwined	  in	  the	  text’s	  vision	  of	  the	  good	  life.44	  One	  last	  way	  is	  to	  think	  about	  the	  aesthetic	  nature	  of	  the	  text	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  mode	  in	  which	  it	  represents	  its	  ideas.	  Stylistically	  the	  text	  is	  constructed	  of	  vignettes	  that	  move	  the	  reader	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  fantastical,	  humorous,	  and	  ironic	  allegories,	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  synthesize	  into	  a	  systematic	  ethical	  vision.	  Rather	  than	  approaching	  this	  stylistic	  indeterminacy	  as	  an	  obstruction	  to	  interpretation,	  it	  can	  be	  treated	  as	  an	  aesthetic	  element	  that	  provides	  a	  clue	  to	  the	  text’s	  ethical	  vision.	  Instead	  of	  giving	  a	  philosophical	  argument	  for	  or	  rhetorically	  attempting	  to	  persuade	  one	  to	  accept	  its	  claims,	  the	  text	  gives	  its	  reader	  portraits	  or	  illustrations	  that	  suggest	  or	  hint	  at	  a	  meaning	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  perspectives.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  has	  long	  been	  regarded	  as	  a	  
                                                43	  For	  example	  Cook	  Ding,	  who	  sets	  about	  carving	  up	  an	  ox.	  That	  he	  unifies	  his	  attention	  upon	  the	  ox	  at	  all,	  or	  that	  he	  picks	  a	  knife	  over	  a	  spoon	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  task	  are	  instances	  of	  rationality.	  	  44	  Chris	  Fraser	  makes	  a	  similar	  point	  in	  “Psychological	  Emptiness	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi,”	  Asian	  Philosophy	  18,	  no.	  2	  (2008),	  123-­‐147.	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literary	  masterpiece	  that	  displays	  an	  impressive	  penchant	  for	  poetry,	  drama,	  storytelling,	  and	  metaphor.	  If	  we	  are	  having	  difficulty	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  text,	  the	  aesthetic	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Zhuangzi	  illustrate	  its	  meaning	  might	  be	  a	  good	  place	  to	  start.	  	  While	  the	  indeterminate	  nature	  of	  the	  text	  can	  be	  used	  as	  evidence	  for	  an	  interpretation,	  it	  also	  problematizes	  claims	  that	  Zhuangzi	  offers	  a	  single	  systematic	  ethical	  vision.	  The	  text	  supports	  a	  number	  of	  ideas,	  themes,	  and	  motifs,	  and	  keeping	  in	  line	  with	  this	  quality	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  this	  project	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  deriving	  a	  systematic,	  coherent,	  Zhuangzian	  philosophy.	  A	  more	  appropriate	  way	  of	  approaching	  the	  text	  is	  to	  consider	  the	  various	  themes	  and	  ideas	  that	  it	  proffers	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  broadly	  related	  passages	  that	  touch	  on	  those	  themes	  or	  ideas.	  A	  professor	  once	  joked	  with	  me	  that	  the	  text	  reads	  as	  if	  someone	  told	  the	  various	  authors	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  “this	  week’s	  theme	  is	  chopped	  foot!”	  and	  they	  each	  came	  back	  with	  a	  story	  about	  a	  chopped	  foot	  convict.	  The	  interpretive	  point	  underlying	  this	  quip	  is	  that	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  is	  best	  approached	  by	  looking	  for	  related	  themes	  and	  thoughts.	  Again,	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  finding	  the	  essential	  common	  ground	  that	  ties	  these	  passages	  together,	  but	  in	  Wittgensteinian	  fashion	  looking	  at	  the	  family	  resemblances	  among	  passages.	  The	  broader	  philosophical	  context	  can	  help	  us	  to	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  the	  variously	  related	  ideas	  if	  we	  approach	  the	  text	  in	  this	  somewhat	  piecemeal	  fashion	  and	  avoid	  coherence	  claims	  which	  force	  an	  unwarranted	  framework	  upon	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  text,	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in	  which	  we	  either	  lose	  the	  significance	  of	  certain	  ideas	  or	  force	  them	  into	  alien	  categories.45	  Despite	  the	  problematic	  nature	  of	  assuming	  coherence,	  we	  can	  and	  should	  ask	  how	  passages	  are	  related,	  what	  themes	  emerge,	  and	  what	  are	  the	  philosophical	  implications	  of	  those	  themes.	  For	  this	  project	  this	  means	  asking	  how	  the	  aesthetic	  mode	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  functions	  in	  the	  text	  to	  suggest	  an	  ethical	  vision.	  Putting	  the	  Zhuangzi	  in	  conversation	  with	  the	  Western	  aesthetic	  tradition	  may	  be	  insightful.	  Aesthetics	  as	  an	  independent	  discipline	  emerges	  during	  the	  enlightenment	  and	  profoundly	  influences	  the	  way	  we	  think	  about	  the	  function	  of	  art	  in	  contemporary	  discourses.	  But	  the	  aesthetic	  dimensions	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  go	  beyond	  the	  concepts	  of	  disinterestedness	  and	  the	  disutility	  of	  art	  that	  are	  still	  pervasive	  in	  our	  approach	  to	  aesthetics.	  Familiarity	  with	  and	  a	  clearer	  understanding	  of	  certain	  themes	  in	  the	  Western	  aesthetic	  tradition	  can	  help	  illuminate	  a	  Zhuangzian	  aesthetic	  by	  way	  of	  contrast.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  responsible	  comparisons	  require	  that	  we	  attempt	  to	  understand	  the	  Zhuangzi	  with	  regard	  to	  its	  own	  philosophical	  context	  if	  we	  are	  to	  get	  a	  better	  sense	  of	  what	  the	  text	  has	  to	  offer	  and	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  temptation	  to	  read	  anachronistic	  themes	  into	  the	  text.	  Insofar	  as	  this	  project	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  intersection	  of	  aesthetics	  and	  
                                                45	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  a	  piecemeal	  approach	  to	  the	  Zhuangzi	  does	  not	  preclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  coherent	  vision.	  The	  fundamental	  problem	  is	  the	  a	  priori	  assumption	  that	  the	  text	  offers	  such	  a	  vision.	  While	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  may	  supply	  such	  a	  vision	  after	  all	  of	  the	  evidence	  is	  in,	  taking	  coherence	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  is	  problematic.	  A	  piecemeal	  approach	  to	  the	  text	  ought	  to	  help	  avoid	  the	  tendency	  to	  assume	  such	  systematicity.	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ethics,	  I	  intend	  to	  show	  that	  the	  implications	  of	  a	  certain	  model	  of	  Western	  aesthetics	  will	  clarify	  the	  limitations	  of	  that	  model	  to	  deal	  with	  or	  contribute	  to	  ethics,	  and	  moreover	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  use	  of	  aesthetics	  has	  something	  to	  offer	  this	  conversation.	  But	  are	  there	  features	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  that	  can	  overcome	  this	  divide?	  The	  Zhuangzi	  gives	  its	  reader	  a	  very	  different	  set	  of	  metaphors	  than	  its	  predecessors:	  traditional	  hierarchies	  are	  inverted,	  voices	  of	  wisdom	  are	  dispersed,	  and	  madmen	  are	  turned	  into	  sages.	  The	  text’s	  allegorical	  response	  to	  common	  rhetorical	  strategies	  of	  the	  day	  demonstrates	  a	  concern	  with	  overturning	  common	  assumptions	  about	  wisdom	  and	  the	  good	  life	  in	  the	  
Zhuangzi.	  The	  features	  by	  which	  we	  colloquially	  designate	  the	  text	  an	  aesthetic	  object	  work	  to	  indirectly	  paint	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  good	  life	  and	  prove	  to	  be	  an	  exercise	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  life	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  seems	  to	  be	  telling	  us	  about.	  On	  this	  account,	  the	  encounter	  with	  aesthetics	  is	  intimately	  related	  to	  subsequent	  vision	  of	  the	  good	  life.	  	  	  
5.	  Concerning	  Cross-­‐Cultural	  Comparison	  	  Making	  cross-­‐cultural	  comparisons	  requires	  navigation	  between	  two	  extremes.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  one	  must	  avoid	  over	  generalizations	  that	  border	  on	  essentialism	  of	  a	  tradition	  or	  culture.	  There	  are	  at	  least	  two	  problems	  with	  such	  essentializing.	  Firstly,	  reducing	  a	  tradition	  to	  fit	  the	  demands	  of	  an	  all-­‐encompassing	  cultural	  rubric	  would	  conceal	  interesting	  variations	  and	  ways	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in	  which	  thinkers	  buck	  cultural	  trends.	  For	  example,	  part	  of	  what	  makes	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  stand	  out	  is	  that	  it	  seems	  to	  reverse	  traditionally	  accepted	  hierarchies,	  venerating	  those	  who	  might	  ordinarily	  be	  seen	  as	  occupying	  lower	  rungs	  on	  the	  social	  ladder.	  This	  move	  sets	  the	  Zhuangzi	  apart	  from	  both	  the	  Confucian	  and	  earlier	  Daoist	  traditions.	  Responsible	  consideration	  of	  a	  tradition	  or	  culture	  means	  acknowledging	  the	  particularities	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  overall	  shape	  of	  that	  culture.	  Secondly,	  when	  generalizations	  are	  pushed	  to	  the	  extreme	  such	  essentializing	  supposes	  cultural	  incommensurability,	  and	  suggests	  that	  different	  cultures	  can	  never	  understand	  one	  another.	  Concerning	  the	  question	  of	  translatability,	  Zhang	  Longxi	  points	  out	  that	  we	  ought	  not	  naively	  assume	  that	  we	  can	  find	  identical	  terms;	  ‘Heaven’	  is	  not	  identical	  to	  Tian.46	  But	  this	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  Tian	  cannot	  be	  translated	  into	  something	  graspable	  by	  a	  foreign	  culture.	  Zhang’s	  point	  is	  that	  we	  do	  seem	  to	  be	  able	  to	  communicate	  across	  cultures	  even	  if	  the	  meaning	  of	  terms	  has	  no	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  correspondence,	  and	  that	  cultural	  incommensurability	  does	  not	  make	  a	  lot	  of	  sense	  given	  this	  communication.	  The	  possibility	  of	  translation	  does	  not	  entail	  the	  inverse	  claim	  that	  there	  are	  no	  meaningful	  differences	  across	  various	  cultures,	  which	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  other	  extreme	  to	  be	  avoided.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  one	  must	  avoid	  the	  opposite	  extreme	  of	  assuming	  that	  the	  problems,	  concepts	  and	  ideas	  that	  make	  up	  a	  tradition	  are	  
                                                46	  Zhang	  Longxi,	  “Translating	  Cultures:	  China	  and	  the	  West,”	  in	  Chinese	  
Thought	  in	  a	  Global	  Context:	  A	  Dialogue	  between	  Chinese	  and	  Western	  
Philosophical	  Approaches,	  ed.	  Karl-­‐Heinz	  Pohl	  (Brill,	  1999),	  29-­‐46.	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universals,	  which	  are	  unambiguously	  discernible	  in	  many	  or	  all	  traditions.	  Such	  problems,	  concepts	  and	  ideas	  arise	  in	  particular	  circumstances	  and	  in	  response	  to	  unique	  histories	  and	  influences.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  investigation	  of	  early	  Greek	  and	  Chinese	  science,	  G.E.R.	  Lloyd	  notes,	  	  	  …there	  is	  no	  straight	  equivalent	  to	  [the	  ancient	  Greek	  concept	  of]	  
phusis	  in	  classical	  Chinese.	  Of	  course	  a	  variety	  of	  terms…do	  service	  perfectly	  adequately…to	  express	  ideas	  where	  the	  English	  translation	  would	  be	  in	  terms	  of	  nature,	  the	  Greek	  in	  terms	  of	  phusis,	  or	  their	  cognates.	  Yet	  that	  is	  still	  not	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  a	  concept	  of	  nature	  in	  classical	  Chinese,	  just	  the	  one,	  nor	  that	  it	  was	  a	  major	  preoccupation.	  Rather,	  the	  evidence	  from	  ancient	  China	  shows	  how	  well	  they	  got	  along	  without	  any	  such	  central	  preoccupation.47	  	  Lloyd’s	  example	  demonstrates	  the	  importance	  of	  considering	  a	  concept’s	  context	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  naïve	  assimilation	  of	  one	  tradition	  to	  another.	  Much	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  we	  should	  acknowledge	  the	  possibility	  that	  there	  is	  no	  pre-­‐Qin	  concept	  of	  aesthetics,	  but	  rather	  a	  configuration	  of	  concepts	  that	  do	  similar	  work.	  	  
6.	  Plan	  of	  the	  Dissertation	  	  I	  have	  already	  laid	  out	  some	  methodological	  concerns	  about	  highlighting	  problems	  relative	  to	  a	  particular	  context.	  Chapter	  two	  will	  discuss	  in	  greater	  detail	  a	  prominent	  model	  in	  the	  Western	  aesthetic	  tradition,	  which	  gives	  rise	  to	  contemporary	  discussions	  about	  the	  relationship	  of	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics.	  This	  chapter	  primarily	  focuses	  on	  the	  
                                                47	  G.E.R.	  Lloyd,	  Adversaries	  and	  Authorities:	  Investigations	  into	  Ancient	  
Greek	  and	  Chinese	  Science	  (New	  York,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  6-­‐7.	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model	  of	  aesthetics	  that	  arises	  during	  the	  enlightenment,	  which	  sets	  various	  frameworks,	  themes	  and	  problematiques	  for	  subsequent	  evolution	  within	  the	  discipline.	  Clarifying	  some	  of	  these	  features	  of	  the	  discussions	  during	  the	  period	  in	  which	  aesthetics	  emerged	  as	  an	  independent	  field	  of	  inquiry	  will	  help	  us	  to	  later	  understand	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  Western	  aesthetic	  tradition	  may	  be	  limited	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  frame	  and	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  interrelation	  of	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi.	  Before	  addressing	  the	  aesthetic	  nature	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  chapter	  three	  will	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  its	  ethical	  aspects.	  Specifically,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  does	  offer	  a	  positive	  ethical	  vision	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  ming	  (明).	  The	  Zhuangzi	  recasts	  the	  concept	  in	  order	  to	  discuss	  the	  good	  life	  as	  something	  practical	  but	  indistinct,	  and	  that	  cannot	  be	  transmitted	  via	  linguistic	  instruction.	  The	  Zhuangzian	  good	  life	  resides	  in	  the	  cultivated	  practice	  of	  undermining	  one’s	  own	  beliefs	  and	  assumptions.	  This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  aesthetic	  dimensions	  of	  the	  text	  that	  are	  used	  to	  convey	  this	  ethical	  vision.	  Chapter	  four	  addresses	  the	  aesthetic	  features	  of	  the	  text,	  understood	  as	  a	  particular	  style,	  and	  the	  ways	  they	  respond	  to	  the	  wider	  philosophical	  context.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  however,	  uses	  these	  aesthetic	  features	  to	  indirectly	  communicate	  its	  ethical	  vision,	  by	  overturning	  commonly	  held	  beliefs	  and	  disrupting	  expectations.	  Such	  skillful	  use	  of	  these	  aesthetic	  strategies	  moreover	  suggests	  that	  the	  text	  itself	  is	  an	  exercise	  in	  the	  best	  kind	  of	  life	  it	  suggests.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  can	  be	  read	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  do	  what	  it	  says.	  Here	  the	  aesthetic	  features	  of	  the	  text	  are	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necessary	  for	  communicating	  the	  kind	  of	  ethical	  vision	  that	  is	  indirectly	  suggested.	  The	  concluding	  chapter	  will	  address	  potential	  concerns	  and	  objections,	  and	  also	  consider	  some	  implications	  of	  my	  research.	  My	  hope	  is	  that	  considering	  the	  aesthetic	  aspects	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  in	  a	  cross-­‐cultural	  setting	  I	  can	  add	  to	  the	  discussion	  on	  how	  aesthetics	  contributes	  to	  our	  ethical	  lives	  and	  the	  way	  we	  think	  about	  both	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics.	  The	  
Zhuangzi	  tells	  us	  a	  great	  many	  things,	  which	  is	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  it	  is	  so	  difficult	  to	  articulate	  a	  systematic	  philosophy	  from	  it.	  But	  how	  it	  conveys	  those	  things,	  the	  language	  it	  uses	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  spurs	  an	  ethical	  perspective	  may	  be	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  the	  broader	  conversations	  about	  the	  connection	  between	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics.	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CHAPTER	  TWO:	  EARLY	  PHILOSOPHICAL	  AESTHETICS:	  SOME	  INFLUENCES	  AND	  PROBLEMATIQUES	  	  	  If	  we	  are	  to	  address	  the	  aesthetic	  nature	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  a	  good	  place	  to	  start	  is	  within	  the	  discipline	  of	  philosophical	  aesthetics,	  which	  has	  greatly	  shaped	  how	  we	  understand	  aesthetic	  experience,	  the	  value	  of	  artwork,	  and	  artistic	  production.	  Investigating	  the	  themes	  and	  movements	  of	  a	  philosophical	  model	  of	  aesthetics	  has	  the	  added	  benefit	  of	  helping	  to	  keep	  one’s	  conceptual	  baggage	  in	  check	  when	  approaching	  texts	  and	  works	  outside	  of	  the	  dominant	  tradition.	  Moreover,	  understanding	  the	  influences	  and	  themes	  of	  that	  tradition	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  help	  us	  to	  evaluate	  the	  adequacy	  of	  that	  aesthetic	  framework	  for	  talking	  about	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  use	  of	  aesthetics.	  	  With	  these	  considerations	  in	  mind,	  this	  chapter	  will	  survey	  the	  landscape	  of	  eighteenth	  century	  aesthetics	  in	  which	  aesthetics	  as	  an	  independent	  discipline	  emerged	  and	  then	  go	  on	  to	  look	  at	  some	  implications	  and	  criticisms	  of	  this	  framework.	  This	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  earlier	  aesthetic	  frameworks,	  rather	  than	  contemporary	  ones,	  because	  the	  emergence	  of	  aesthetics	  as	  a	  discipline	  set	  problematiques,	  methods	  of	  investigation,	  themes,	  and	  ideas	  that	  have	  persisted	  and	  directed	  the	  development	  of	  aesthetics,	  profoundly	  influencing	  how	  we	  approach	  and	  understand	  art	  and	  aesthetics	  in	  contemporary	  discourse.	  An	  overarching	  theme	  we	  can	  discern	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  aesthetic	  discourse	  will	  be	  its	  movement	  away	  from	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moral	  concerns.	  Aesthetics	  and	  ethics	  are	  initially	  seen	  as	  complements,	  but	  as	  the	  importance	  of	  aesthetics	  is	  stressed	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  it	  ironically	  begins	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  irrelevant	  for	  daily	  life	  and	  consequently	  unimportant.	  	  
1.	  Beauty	  and	  the	  Early	  Metaphysical	  Influence	  	  A	  guiding	  concern	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  tradition	  was	  giving	  an	  account	  of	  beauty.	  Prior	  to	  its	  use	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  aesthetics,	  beauty	  was	  primarily	  a	  metaphysical	  designation	  relating	  to	  the	  contemplation	  of	  the	  harmony	  of	  the	  universe.	  In	  Christian	  thinking	  this	  very	  much	  meant	  the	  contemplation	  of	  God’s	  creations.	  Paul	  Oskar	  Kristeller	  notes	  that	  the	  Greek	  concept	  of	  kalon	  (and	  its	  Latin	  equivalent	  of	  pulchrum)	  was	  never	  neatly	  distinguished	  from	  the	  moral	  good,	  and	  we	  see	  this	  in	  Plato’s	  
Phaedrus	  and	  Symposium,	  which	  deal	  with	  the	  beautiful	  soul	  or	  intellect.	  Kristeller	  further	  suggests	  that	  for	  the	  Stoics,	  beauty	  was	  conceived	  of	  as	  moral	  goodness,	  itself	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  that	  which	  is	  useful.1	  During	  the	  medieval	  period,	  beauty	  maintained	  its	  close	  connection	  to	  moral	  goodness,	  and	  was	  a	  term	  primarily	  used	  to	  regard	  nature	  and	  God,	  as	  well	  as	  certain	  products.	  	  The	  development	  of	  this	  close	  relationship	  between	  beauty	  and	  the	  Good	  into	  the	  classical	  understanding	  of	  beauty	  is	  illustrated	  by	  the	  early	  
                                                1	  Paul	  Oskar	  Kristeller,	  “The	  Modern	  System	  of	  the	  Arts:	  A	  Study	  in	  the	  History	  of	  Aesthetics	  Part	  I,”	  Journal	  of	  the	  History	  of	  Ideas	  12,	  no.	  4	  (1951),	  499-­‐500.	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medieval	  philosopher	  Plotinus’	  metaphysical	  system.	  Here	  the	  Divine	  One	  emanates,	  thus	  creating	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  Intellect,	  which	  overflows	  creating	  the	  Soul,	  which	  includes	  the	  natural	  world.	  Descending	  from	  the	  One,	  each	  realm	  loses	  something	  of	  its	  completeness	  and	  reality,	  but	  still	  reflects	  its	  ultimate	  source.	  Plotinus	  explains	  that	  a	  sensuous	  object	  is	  beautiful	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  form	  or	  idea;	  in	  admiring	  a	  stone,	  we	  call	  it	  beautiful	  not	  for	  its	  material	  qualities,	  but	  for	  the	  form	  the	  sculpture	  imposes	  upon	  it,	  and	  so	  the	  form	  or	  idea	  can	  be	  said	  to	  cause	  an	  object’s	  beauty.	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  causes	  are	  greater	  than	  their	  effects,	  and	  since	  the	  cause	  of	  beauty	  in	  nature	  is	  the	  Idea	  or	  Intellect	  that	  precedes	  it,	  that	  cause	  must	  be	  more	  beautiful	  and	  more	  complete.	  In	  contemplating	  the	  beauty	  of	  the	  natural	  realm,	  we	  have	  a	  window	  into	  the	  beauty	  of	  Divine	  Intellect.2	  Augustine’s	  adoption	  of	  a	  Neo-­‐Platonic	  metaphysical	  framework	  means	  that	  he	  conceives	  of	  beauty	  similarly.	  For	  Augustine,	  beauty	  is	  a	  characteristic	  of	  the	  divine,	  and	  our	  ability	  to	  contemplate	  through	  sensuous	  experience	  of	  God’s	  creations	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  more	  perfect	  beauty	  of	  God.	  The	  apprehension	  of	  beauty	  forces	  one’s	  soul	  upward	  toward	  God,	  from	  which	  all	  things	  emanate	  –	  beauty	  brings	  one	  into	  a	  more	  intimate	  relationship	  with	  God.3	  Plotinus	  and	  
                                                2	  Plotinus:	  The	  Enneads,	  2nd	  ed.,	  trans.	  Stephen	  MacKenna	  	  (London:	  Faber	  and	  Faber	  Limited,	  1956)	  V.8.1.	  	  3	  See	  Joseph	  Anthony	  Mazzeo,	  “The	  Augustinian	  Conception	  of	  Beauty	  and	  Dante’s	  Convivio,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Aesthetics	  and	  Art	  Criticism	  15,	  no.	  4	  (1957),	  435–448.	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Augustine’s	  pulchrum	  theory	  of	  beauty	  is	  particularly	  influential	  in	  laying	  out	  a	  metaphysical	  framework	  that	  would	  shape	  rationalist	  aesthetic	  discourse.	  The	  Leibnizian	  rationalist	  Alexander	  Baumgarten	  developed	  the	  metaphysical	  distinction	  between	  an	  idea	  and	  its	  material	  representation	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century.	  In	  his	  early	  work,	  Reflections	  on	  
Poetry,	  Baumgarten	  distinguishes	  between	  things	  that	  can	  be	  known	  and	  things	  that	  are	  perceived.4	  He	  further	  differentiates	  between	  superior	  and	  inferior	  cognitive	  faculties	  that	  correspond	  respectively	  to	  those	  intellectual	  or	  conceptual	  representations	  and	  the	  aesthetic	  representations.5	  Intellectual	  representations	  consist	  of	  clear	  and	  general	  ideas,	  while	  sensory	  or	  aesthetic	  representations,	  are	  irreducibly	  complex,	  rich,	  and	  thus	  much	  more	  lively	  representations.	  Each	  cognitive	  faculty	  and	  corresponding	  representation	  has	  a	  claim	  to	  truth:	  while	  the	  intellect	  supplies	  us	  with	  the	  certainty	  of	  logical	  truths,	  aesthetic	  truths	  are	  merely	  probable	  since	  they	  cannot	  be	  subsumed	  under	  any	  intellectual	  concept,	  and	  are	  therefore	  confused.	  Intellectual	  representations	  serve	  as	  the	  foundation	  for	  knowledge,	  while	  the	  non-­‐conceptual	  and	  irreducible	  aesthetic	  representations	  serve	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  
                                                4	  Alexander	  Gottlieb	  Baumgarten,	  Reflections	  On	  Poetry,	  trans.	  Karl	  Aschenbrenner	  and	  William	  B.	  Holther	  (Berkley:	  University	  Of	  California	  Press,	  1954),	  §116.	  	  5	  It	  is	  in	  distinguishing	  between	  sensory	  or	  “aesthetic”	  representations	  and	  intellectual	  representations	  that	  Baumgarten	  coins	  the	  term	  “aesthetic”	  from	  which	  the	  discipline	  takes	  its	  name.	  For	  more	  on	  Baumgarten	  see	  Leonard	  P.	  Wessell’s,	  “Alexander	  Baumgarten’s	  Contribution	  to	  the	  Development	  of	  Aesthetics,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Aesthetics	  and	  Art	  Criticism	  30,	  no.	  3	  (1972),	  333–342.	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the	  experience	  of	  beauty.6	  While	  the	  logical	  truths	  of	  the	  intellect	  give	  us	  certainty,	  they	  are	  dry	  and	  not	  particularly	  pleasurable.	  But	  aesthetic	  truths	  do	  give	  us	  a	  sense	  of	  pleasure	  in	  all	  of	  their	  rich	  complexity.	  The	  perfected	  aesthetic	  idea	  represents	  the	  purposeful	  unity	  and	  harmony	  of	  the	  world	  –	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  contemplate	  the	  beauty	  of	  the	  world.7	  While	  Baumgarten	  was	  solidly	  in	  the	  rationalist	  camp,	  he	  sought	  to	  carve	  out	  a	  greater	  place	  for	  sensory	  experience	  within	  a	  metaphysical	  framework.	  	  Even	  in	  characteristically	  empiricist	  England	  we	  see	  the	  influence	  of	  metaphysical	  ideas	  about	  beauty.	  Locke’s	  student	  Shaftesbury’s	  major	  contributions	  to	  aesthetics	  take	  place	  within	  a	  conversation	  on	  the	  overlap	  of	  beauty	  and	  goodness.	  Shaftesbury	  writes,	  “(beauty)	  and	  good…are	  still	  one	  and	  the	  same.”8	  That	  is,	  the	  good	  life,	  as	  manifested	  by	  the	  virtuous	  person,	  is	  beautiful	  in	  that	  it	  is	  harmonious	  proportionate,	  and	  graceful.9	  The	  virtuous	  person	  is	  therefore	  a	  manifestation	  of	  God’s	  natural	  order.	  	  
                                                6	  Alexander	  Gottlieb	  Baumgarten,	  Aesthetica.	  Traieti	  cis	  (Viadrvm,	  1750),	  §423,	  424.	  Also	  see	  Mary	  J.	  Gregor,	  “Baumgarten’s	  Aesthetica”	  The	  
Review	  of	  Metaphysics	  (1983),	  357-­‐385,	  note	  32.	  	  	  7	  See	  Paul	  Guyer’s	  discussion	  of	  Baumgarten	  in	  “The	  Origin	  of	  Modern	  Aesthetics:	  1711-­‐1735,”	  in	  Values	  of	  Beauty:	  Historical	  Essays	  in	  Aesthetics	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  3–8.	  	  	  8	  Anthony	  Ashley	  Cooper,	  Earl	  of	  Shaftesbury,	  Characteristicks	  of	  Men,	  
Manners,	  Opinions,	  Times,	  Vol.	  2,	  ed.	  Douglas	  den	  Uyl,	  (Indianapolis:	  Liberty	  Fund,	  2001),	  223.	  	  9	  Jerome	  Stolnitz	  helpfully	  explains	  Shaftesbury’s	  dictum	  by	  drawing	  on	  Shaftesbury’s	  comments	  on	  the	  virtue	  of	  friendship:	  “Friendship	  (along	  with	  other	  modes	  of	  benevolence)	  is	  a	  harmony	  between	  human	  beings;	  by	  extension,	  it	  stands	  for	  a	  character	  and	  an	  entire	  life	  which	  are	  organized	  harmoniously.”	  See	  Stolnitz,	  “On	  the	  Significance	  of	  Lord	  Shaftesbury	  in	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Moreover,	  according	  to	  Shaftesbury,	  the	  virtuous	  person	  has	  a	  disinterested	  character;	  he	  is	  not	  motivated	  by	  the	  consequences	  of	  his	  actions,	  but	  rather	  appreciates	  the	  beauty	  of	  the	  Good	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  Shaftesbury’s	  conception	  of	  disinterestedness	  stands	  as	  a	  reaction	  against	  Hobbesian	  benevolence,	  which	  defines	  the	  Good	  as	  the	  object	  of	  desire,	  and	  benevolence	  the	  “desire	  of	  good	  to	  another.”10	  Hobbes	  definition	  of	  benevolence	  amounts	  to	  the	  desiring	  for	  another	  what	  one	  desires	  for	  oneself,	  but	  this	  definition	  implies	  that	  benevolence	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  pleasure	  one	  receives	  in	  exercising	  one’s	  power	  to	  do	  so.	  For	  Hobbes	  benevolence	  is	  ultimately	  self-­‐motivated.11	  In	  opposition	  to	  Hobbes,	  Shaftesbury	  holds	  that	  virtue	  can	  only	  be	  attained	  when	  we	  are	  not	  self-­‐motivated.	  This	  distinction	  might	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  giving	  to	  charity	  because	  one	  knows	  that	  one	  day	  he	  might	  require	  the	  aid	  of	  that	  charity	  in	  return,	  and	  giving	  to	  charity	  because	  to	  do	  so	  is	  good	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  The	  disinterested	  person	  appreciates	  the	  Good	  not	  because	  of	  something	  he	  gets	  out	  of	  it,	  but	  because	  of	  the	  balance	  and	  harmony,	  that	  is	  the	  beauty,	  that	  are	  intrinsic	  in	  that	  Good.	  Despite	  his	  metaphysical	  influences,	  Shaftesbury’s	  focus	  on	  the	  agent’s	  disinterested	  experience	  is	  
                                                                                                                                Modern	  Aesthetic	  Theory,”	  The	  Philosophical	  Quarterly	  11,	  no.	  43	  (1961),	  102.	   	  10	  Thomas	  Hobbes,	  “Leviathan,”	  in	  The	  English	  Works	  of	  Thomas	  
Hobbes	  of	  Malmesbury,	  Vol.	  3,	  ed.	  William	  Molesworth	  (London:	  Bohn,	  1839).	  	  11	  See	  D.D.	  Raphael,	  Hobbes:	  Morals	  and	  Politics	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  20004),	  43	  for	  an	  unpacking	  of	  this	  criticism.	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characteristic	  of	  the	  central	  concern	  of	  empiricist	  aestheticians	  concern	  with	  aesthetic	  experience	  or	  aesthetic	  response.	  	  Shaftesbury’s	  metaphysical	  commitments	  might	  put	  him	  closer	  to	  aesthetics’	  Neo-­‐Platonic	  forefathers	  than	  even	  the	  Leibnizian	  influenced	  Baumgarten.	  Although,	  arguably	  Baumgarten	  does	  more	  to	  liberate	  aesthetics	  from	  its	  metaphysical	  grounding	  by	  making	  it	  important	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  independently	  of	  its	  relation	  to	  an	  overarching	  spiritualized	  ideal.	  But	  the	  combination	  of	  1)	  emphasizing	  the	  value	  of	  aesthetic	  experience	  independent	  of	  its	  relationship	  to	  a	  larger	  metaphysical	  ideal,	  which	  is	  often	  cashed	  out	  in	  terms	  of	  God,	  or	  the	  Good,	  and	  2)	  the	  suggestion	  that	  aesthetic	  experience	  is	  independent	  of	  any	  extrinsic	  value	  places	  aesthetics	  in	  a	  position	  to	  be	  divorced	  or	  at	  least	  distanced	  from	  the	  moral	  discourse	  that	  previously	  accompanied	  it.	  In	  turning	  now	  to	  survey	  some	  empiricist	  contributions	  to	  the	  emerging	  field	  of	  aesthetics,	  we	  will	  see	  how	  their	  concern	  with	  aesthetic	  response	  further	  buttresses	  aesthetics’	  break	  with	  metaphysical	  and	  thus	  moral	  considerations.	  	  2.	  The	  Focus	  on	  Aesthetic	  Experience	  	  The	  empiricist	  emphasis	  on	  sensory	  experience	  translated	  into	  a	  concern	  with	  giving	  an	  account	  of	  aesthetic	  response	  that	  is	  aroused	  by	  beauty	  during	  the	  emergence	  of	  aesthetics,	  and	  moved	  to	  sever	  aesthetics	  from	  any	  necessary	  connection	  with	  ethical	  concerns.	  Shaftesbury’s	  disciple	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Francis	  Hutcheson	  was	  particularly	  instrumental	  in	  moving	  beauty	  away	  from	  its	  moral	  grounding,	  allowing	  it	  to	  be	  regarded	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  	  Hutcheson,	  like	  Shaftesbury,	  believed	  the	  disinterested	  agent’s	  sense	  of	  beauty	  was	  triggered	  by	  certain	  formal	  and	  harmoniously	  proportionate	  relationships.	  However,	  Shaftesbury’s	  metaphysical	  leanings	  prevent	  him	  from	  distinguishing	  between	  ideas	  in	  the	  mind	  and	  qualities	  in	  an	  object.	  This	  is	  because	  Shaftesbury’s	  Neo-­‐Platonic	  commitments	  oblige	  him	  to	  believe	  that	  insofar	  as	  all	  things	  descend	  from	  God	  or	  a	  divine	  overarching	  ideal,	  the	  idea	  of	  beauty	  that	  is	  aroused	  in	  one’s	  mind	  is	  ultimately	  indistinct	  from	  the	  beauty	  that	  exists	  ‘out	  there’	  in	  the	  world;	  both	  exist	  as	  a	  function	  of	  divine	  intellect	  or	  the	  mind.12	  The	  more	  empirically	  inclined	  Hutcheson,	  however,	  moves	  the	  aesthetic	  discussion	  away	  from	  its	  moral	  associations	  by	  denying	  the	  metaphysical	  supposition	  that	  beauty	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  mind	  or	  intellect	  that	  is	  correlated	  with	  an	  overarching	  spiritualized	  ideal.	  He	  conceived	  of	  aesthetic	  response	  as	  correlated	  with	  a	  sense	  faculty	  capable	  of	  perceiving	  beauty	  that	  is	  independent	  of	  reason	  or	  volition.	  That	  is,	  Hutcheson	  distinguished	  between	  cognitive	  or	  intellectual	  faculties,	  to	  which	  he	  supposed	  Shaftesbury	  reduced	  the	  entirety	  of	  beauty,	  and	  an	  independent	  faculty	  responsible	  for	  aesthetic	  experience.	  Under	  Hutcheson’s	  schema	  the	  
                                                12	  See	  Guyer’s	  discussion	  of	  Shaftesbury	  in	  “The	  Origin	  of	  Modern	  Aesthetics,”	  8-­‐12.	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pleasure	  of	  aesthetic	  response	  could	  not	  be	  reduced	  to	  the	  intellectual	  function	  of	  the	  mind.	  13	  Understanding	  aesthetic	  response	  as	  a	  sentiment	  that	  is	  indicative	  of	  beauty	  was	  an	  influential	  idea	  in	  burgeoning	  aesthetic	  discourse.	  Based	  on	  such	  a	  sentiment,	  how	  does	  one	  assess	  his	  aesthetic	  judgments?	  That	  is,	  what	  is	  the	  standard	  of	  taste?	  Though	  many	  enlightenment	  era	  aestheticians	  were	  discussing	  taste,	  Hume’s	  essay,	  “On	  the	  Standard	  of	  Taste,”	  is	  one	  of	  the	  more	  prominent	  contributions.	  According	  to	  Hume,	  taste	  is	  like	  any	  other	  sense	  faculty.	  Our	  senses	  agree	  on	  the	  responses	  of	  the	  palate,	  such	  as	  salty	  and	  sweet.	  But	  a	  sick	  person	  would	  not	  insist	  that	  his	  palate	  is	  capable	  of	  making	  good	  evaluations	  or	  responding	  accurately,	  since	  his	  fever	  affects	  his	  ability	  to	  taste	  food.	  The	  uniformity	  of	  responses	  indicates	  some	  perfect	  idea	  or	  standard	  or	  rule,	  by	  which	  we	  can	  evaluate	  individual	  sentiments,	  whether	  that	  standard	  is	  a	  salty	  taste	  or	  the	  idea	  of	  beauty.	  We	  reject	  the	  responses	  of	  defective	  sense	  faculties,	  and	  likewise	  reject	  the	  sentiments	  or	  judgments	  of	  taste	  that	  are	  unrefined.	  And	  so,	  the	  standard	  by	  which	  we	  confirm	  or	  reject	  sentiment	  is	  the	  uniform	  consensus	  of	  those	  with	  refined	  taste.14	  The	  movement	  of	  aesthetic	  inquiry	  toward	  experience	  and	  response	  coincides	  with	  a	  movement	  away	  from	  aesthetics’	  intimacy	  with	  ethical	  concerns.	  While	  Hutcheson	  did	  in	  fact	  include	  theological	  discussions	  in	  his	  
                                                13	  See	  Guyer’s	  discussion	  of	  Hutcheson	  in	  “The	  Origin	  of	  Modern	  Aesthetics,”	  12-­‐16.	  14	  David	  Hume,	  “On	  the	  Standard	  of	  Taste,”	  in	  Selected	  Essays,	  ed.	  Stephen	  Copley	  and	  Andrew	  Edgar	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1993)	  133-­‐153.	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aesthetic	  treatise,	  unlike	  Shaftesbury,	  he	  differentiated	  between	  the	  beautiful	  and	  the	  Good	  and	  conceived	  of	  beauty	  as	  a	  mind-­‐independent	  quality	  that	  caused	  an	  idea	  of	  beauty,	  which	  in	  turn	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  sentiment.	  Hume’s	  ethics	  are	  similar	  to	  his	  aesthetics	  in	  that	  they	  are	  both	  concerned	  with	  sentiment	  as	  grounds	  for	  each	  theory.	  However,	  his	  theological	  interests	  were	  predominantly	  in	  discrediting	  orthodox	  religious	  views.	  Because	  his	  ethics	  were	  decidedly	  anti-­‐rational,	  and	  not	  couched	  in	  a	  metaphysical	  framework,	  they	  are	  therefore	  not	  necessarily	  related	  to	  aesthetics	  in	  the	  way	  of	  his	  German	  and	  British	  precursors.15	  In	  short,	  as	  aesthetics	  emphasizes	  the	  role	  of	  the	  agent’s	  experience	  of	  beauty,	  it	  continued	  to	  move	  away	  from	  any	  necessary	  connection	  with	  morality.	  	  
3.	  Art	  and	  Artwork	  	  Another	  consideration	  for	  the	  development	  of	  aesthetics	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  object	  that	  we	  can	  call	  beautiful.	  What	  sorts	  of	  things	  are	  capable	  of	  producing	  the	  idea	  of	  beauty	  and	  the	  pleasurable	  sentiment	  that	  constitutes	  proper	  aesthetic	  response?	  Charles	  Batteux	  coins	  the	  term	  “Beaux	  Arts”	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  unity	  of	  poetry,	  painting,	  sculpture,	  and	  music.	  Batteux	  is	  among	  the	  first	  to	  organize	  the	  various	  ‘fine	  arts’	  around	  a	  single	  principle:	  art	  is	  the	  imitation	  of	  nature.	  For	  Batteux,	  the	  artwork	  consisted	  in	  the	  
                                                15	  Hume’s	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  are	  similar	  in	  that	  they	  are	  both	  concerned	  with	  sentiment.	  However,	  Hume	  makes	  not	  explicit	  connection	  between	  the	  two.	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synthesis	  of	  the	  most	  beautiful	  parts	  of	  nature	  into	  a	  sensuous	  representation	  of	  an	  idealized	  whole.	  16	  The	  association	  of	  nature	  and	  art	  is	  another	  nod	  to	  beauty’s	  metaphysical	  heritage.	  However,	  systems	  for	  organizing	  the	  arts	  go	  back	  much	  further	  than	  Batteux,	  and	  interestingly	  early	  systems	  categorized	  arts	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  natural	  or	  non-­‐human.	  It	  is	  after	  Plato	  during	  late	  antiquity	  in	  which	  we	  see	  the	  organization	  of	  various	  human	  arts	  and	  sciences	  into	  a	  preparatory	  curriculum	  aimed	  at	  producing	  articulate	  and	  knowledgeable	  citizens.	  These	  techne,	  often	  translated	  as	  ‘arts’,	  included	  various	  kinds	  of	  human	  activities;	  they	  were	  more	  related	  to	  human	  skill	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  combine	  an	  intellectual	  grasp	  of	  principles	  with	  practical	  understanding.	  In	  opposing	  art	  and	  nature,	  these	  Greek	  thinkers	  were	  more	  generally	  opposing	  human	  activities	  to	  the	  natural	  non-­‐human	  world.17	  To	  regard	  them	  as	  ‘arts’	  in	  the	  modern	  sense	  disregards	  their	  inclusion	  of	  what	  we	  might	  call	  crafts	  or	  sciences;	  in	  fact	  these	  ‘liberal	  arts’	  included	  grammar,	  rhetoric,	  dialectic,	  arithmetic,	  geometry,	  astronomy,	  and	  music.18	  Of	  these	  various	  human	  activities,	  Kristeller	  notes,	  	  	  
                                                16	  For	  more	  on	  Batteux	  see	  Ronald	  Grimsley	  and	  Henry	  B.	  Garland,	  The	  
Age	  of	  Enlightenment,	  1715-­‐1789	  (New	  York:	  Penguin,	  1979),	  392,	  and	  David	  Morgan,	  “Concepts	  of	  Abstraction	  in	  French	  Art	  Theory	  from	  the	  Enlightenment	  to	  Modernism,”	  Journal	  of	  the	  History	  of	  Ideas	  53,	  no.	  4	  (1992),	  669-­‐85.	  	  	  17	  Kristeller,	  “The	  Modern	  System	  of	  the	  Arts,”	  498-­‐99.	  	   18	  Ibid.,	  505.	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…	  ancient	  writers	  and	  thinkers,	  though	  confronted	  with	  excellent	  works	  of	  art	  and	  quite	  susceptible	  to	  their	  charm,	  were	  neither	  able	  nor	  eager	  to	  detach	  the	  aesthetic	  quality	  of	  these	  works	  of	  art	  from	  their	  intellectual,	  moral,	  religious	  and	  practical	  function	  or	  content,	  or	  to	  use	  such	  an	  aesthetic	  quality	  as	  a	  standard	  for	  grouping	  the	  fine	  arts	  together	  or	  for	  making	  them	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  philosophical	  interpretation.19	  	  	  These	  arts	  had	  an	  intended	  purpose:	  this	  early	  system	  of	  the	  arts	  developed	  in	  response	  to	  the	  demands	  for	  articulate	  and	  skilled	  citizens.	  Art	  was	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  skill	  –	  something	  that	  could	  be	  taught.	  	  Interestingly,	  this	  initial	  artistic	  system	  does	  not	  include	  painting,	  sculpture	  or	  other	  visual	  arts	  that	  we	  so	  often	  tend	  to	  think	  of	  as	  definitive	  examples	  of	  fine	  art.	  But	  the	  place	  of	  these	  sorts	  of	  practical	  arts	  is	  highlighted	  during	  the	  medieval	  period,	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  mechanical	  arts	  schema	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  liberal	  arts	  system.20	  Such	  mechanical	  arts	  included	  the	  broader	  categories	  of	  weaving,	  armament,	  commerce,	  agriculture,	  hunting,	  medicine,	  and	  theatrics,	  which	  could	  be	  further	  broken	  down	  to	  include	  stone	  masonry	  or	  even	  wrestling.21	  Painters	  and	  other	  “visual	  artists”	  were	  typically	  associated	  with	  the	  guilds	  whose	  
                                                19	  Ibid.,	  506.	  	  20	  During	  the	  early	  medieval	  period,	  the	  liberal	  arts	  are	  further	  categorized	  into	  the	  trivium	  and	  the	  quadrivium.	  The	  prior	  consisted	  of	  logic,	  grammar,	  and	  rhetoric,	  while	  the	  latter	  consisted	  of	  arithmetic,	  geometry,	  astronomy,	  and	  music	  theory.	  See	  Kristeller,	  “Modern	  System	  of	  the	  Arts”	  for	  more	  on	  this	  division.	  	   21	  See	  Larry	  Shiner’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  categories	  of	  mechanical	  arts	  as	  laid	  out	  by	  Hugh	  of	  St.	  Victor	  in	  The	  Invention	  of	  Art:	  Cultural	  History,	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2001),	  28-­‐29.	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work	  would	  have	  been	  categorized	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  mechanical	  arts.	  For	  example,	  painters	  belonged	  to	  the	  same	  guild	  as	  doctors	  and	  druggists.	  These	  individuals	  were	  not	  artists	  in	  the	  modern	  sense,	  but	  artificers	  or	  craftsmen	  who	  produced	  works	  or	  performed	  services	  in	  exchange	  for	  payment.	  They	  worked	  in	  the	  service	  and	  according	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  a	  patron.	  This	  service-­‐oriented	  aspect	  of	  the	  mechanical	  arts	  is	  one	  reason	  they	  might	  have	  been	  considered	  somewhat	  inferior	  to	  the	  liberal	  arts.22	  And	  yet,	  though	  the	  old	  arts	  schemas	  underwent	  changes	  in	  which	  the	  various	  arts	  were	  categorized	  and	  distinguished,	  Kristeller	  notes,	  “for	  Aquinas	  shoemaking,	  cooking	  and	  juggling,	  grammar	  and	  arithmetic	  are	  no	  less	  and	  in	  no	  other	  sense	  artes	  than	  painting	  and	  sculpture,	  poetry	  and	  music.”23	  Despite	  the	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  arts	  were	  distinguished	  from	  one	  another,	  all	  arts	  were	  regarded	  as	  teachable	  skills,	  and	  could	  not	  yet	  be	  differentiated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  those	  criteria	  that	  defined	  a	  ‘fine	  arts’	  category.	  It	  is	  during	  the	  Renaissance	  that	  we	  see	  painting	  begin	  to	  gain	  in	  prestige,	  and	  thus	  differentiated	  from	  other	  guild	  and	  mechanical	  arts.	  Leonardo	  da	  Vinci	  argued	  for	  the	  priority	  of	  painting	  by	  demonstrating	  its	  scientific	  integrity,	  and	  therefore	  its	  relevance	  to	  other	  liberal	  arts,	  such	  as	  mathematics,	  astronomy,	  and	  musical	  theory.24	  We	  also	  see	  the	  grouping	  
                                                22	  Shiner	  argues	  that	  the	  differentiation	  of	  the	  various	  kinds	  of	  arts	  and	  the	  eventual	  emergence	  of	  a	  concept	  of	  the	  fine	  arts	  is	  a	  function	  of	  class.	  See	  The	  Invention	  of	  Art.	  	  23	  Kristeller,	  “Modern	  System	  of	  the	  Arts,”	  509.	  24	  Leonardo	  da	  Vinci,	  Paragone:	  A	  Comparison	  of	  the	  Arts	  by	  Leonardo	  
da	  Vinci,	  ed.	  Irma	  A	  Richter	  (London,	  1949).	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together	  of	  music,	  poetry,	  and	  painting	  as	  the	  proper	  pursuits	  of	  the	  courtier.25	  Larry	  Shiner	  lists	  the	  emergence	  of	  genres	  such	  as	  the	  artist’s	  biography	  and	  the	  self-­‐portrait,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  court	  artist	  as	  contributing	  factors	  to	  the	  increasing	  prestige	  of	  the	  visual	  arts.26	  	  And	  at	  the	  same	  time	  paintings	  began	  to	  be	  included	  in	  collections	  along	  side	  scientific	  curiosities.	  As	  the	  visual	  arts	  began	  to	  join	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  liberal	  arts,	  we	  finally	  see	  the	  grouping	  together	  of	  music,	  poetry,	  painting	  and	  other	  visual	  arts	  that	  are	  so	  often	  the	  exemplars	  of	  fine	  art.	  However,	  these	  categories	  still	  occupied	  the	  same	  register	  as	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  During	  the	  seventeenth	  century	  the	  arts	  and	  sciences	  that	  were	  part	  of	  a	  liberal	  arts	  schema	  part	  ways.	  With	  the	  writings	  of	  Galileo	  and	  Descartes	  there	  is	  a	  measurable	  progress	  in	  the	  acquisition	  of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  there	  is	  awareness	  that	  the	  progress	  of	  literary,	  musical,	  and	  visual	  arts	  cannot	  be	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  same	  manner.	  Citing	  the	  writings	  of	  Charles	  Perrault,	  Kristeller	  explains	  that	  “at	  least	  in	  the	  case	  of	  poetry	  and	  eloquence,	  where	  everything	  depends	  on	  talent	  and	  taste,	  progress	  cannot	  be	  asserted	  with	  the	  same	  confidence	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  sciences	  which	  depend	  on	  measurement.”27	  The	  arts	  and	  sciences	  part	  ways	  in	  part	  because	  of	  differing	  standards	  of	  measuring	  progress.	  And	  finally	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  Batteux	  coins	  the	  term	  ‘beaux	  arts’,	  often	  translated	  
                                                                                                                                	  25	  Kristeller,	  “Modern	  System	  of	  the	  Arts,”	  517.	  	  26	  Shiner,	  The	  Invention	  of	  Art,	  38-­‐45.	  	  27	  Kristeller,	  “Modern	  System	  of	  the	  Arts,”	  526-­‐27.	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as	  fine	  arts,	  and	  unifies	  the	  arts	  according	  to	  a	  singular	  principle,	  which	  is	  rooted	  in	  imitation	  of	  nature.	  	   Overtime,	  artwork	  comes	  to	  mean	  something	  that	  could	  be	  contrasted	  with	  both	  craft	  and	  science,	  which	  offered	  either	  products	  for	  consumption	  or	  easily	  quantifiable	  progress.	  Art	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  comes	  to	  be	  characterized	  by	  its	  dis-­‐utility.	  On	  this	  model	  craft	  products,	  which	  are	  meant	  for	  consumption,	  are	  evaluated	  according	  to	  their	  fitness	  for	  some	  goal	  or	  end.	  A	  knife,	  for	  example,	  is	  a	  good	  knife	  insofar	  as	  it	  suited	  to	  execute	  various	  chopping	  tasks.	  Were	  we	  to	  encounter	  a	  crooked	  dull	  knife,	  that	  is	  particularly	  badly	  suited	  for	  chopping	  we	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  say	  it	  is	  so	  bad,	  we	  cannot	  even	  call	  it	  a	  knife;	  part	  of	  the	  way	  we	  understand	  a	  knife	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  fitness	  for	  a	  certain	  use.	  In	  contrast,	  artwork	  is	  not	  meant	  for	  consumption	  or	  use,	  so	  much	  as	  it	  is	  meant	  for	  aesthetic	  contemplation,	  which	  arouses	  a	  pleasurable	  sentiment	  or	  impresses	  upon	  the	  audience	  the	  idea	  of	  beauty.	  Accordingly,	  it	  requires	  a	  disinterested	  attitude	  in	  the	  observer	  in	  order	  to	  properly	  ascertain	  the	  artwork.	  That	  is,	  the	  observer	  does	  not	  value	  it	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  fit	  for	  some	  end,	  but	  rather	  is	  regarded	  as	  valuable	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  –	  that	  is,	  for	  its	  own	  sake.	  Because	  of	  art’s	  character	  of	  disutility	  many	  will	  ground	  a	  definition	  of	  art	  in	  nature.	  After	  all,	  we	  appreciate	  a	  beautiful	  sunset	  for	  no	  other	  reason	  than	  its	  beauty	  –	  the	  appreciation	  of	  nature	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  proportion	  and	  harmony	  has	  no	  practical	  consequences	  or	  benefits.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  why	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Batteux	  suggests	  that	  the	  fine	  arts	  are	  categorized	  thusly	  because	  they	  imitate	  nature,	  and	  why	  Kant	  suggests	  that	  natural	  beauty	  is	  even	  higher	  than	  manmade	  artworks.28	  Moreover,	  the	  alignment	  of	  artwork	  with	  nature	  recalls	  the	  metaphysical	  heritage	  of	  beauty	  in	  which	  contemplation	  of	  the	  beauty	  of	  nature	  is	  a	  means	  to	  grasping	  some	  spiritualized	  idea.	  If	  nature	  is	  a	  material	  representation	  of	  that	  ideal	  which	  is	  good	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  nature	  must	  likewise	  be	  disinterested.	  The	  association	  of	  nature	  and	  art	  coopts	  that	  quality	  of	  disinterestedness	  for	  the	  artwork.	  	  
4.	  Implications	  and	  Criticisms	  of	  Aesthetic	  Discourse	  	  An	  important	  implication	  of	  the	  foregoing	  brief	  overview,	  and	  one	  that	  attests	  to	  the	  relevancy	  of	  eighteenth	  century	  aesthetics	  today,	  is	  the	  autonomy	  of	  art.	  This	  is	  the	  supposition	  that	  art	  is	  somehow	  independent	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  constraints	  on	  other	  kinds	  of	  objects	  and	  activities.	  But	  this	  autonomous	  feature	  has	  prevented	  meaningful	  attempts	  at	  reconciling	  the	  gap	  between	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  that	  developed	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century.	  Despite	  its	  contemporary	  influence,	  the	  twentieth	  century	  has	  seen	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  criticism	  of	  this	  autonomous	  model	  of	  art.	  Merleau-­‐Ponty,	  Dewey,	  Bourdieu,	  Danto,	  and	  others	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  have	  challenged	  the	  
                                                28	  In	  §42	  of	  the	  Critique	  of	  Judgment,	  Kant	  suggests	  that	  appreciation	  of	  the	  beautiful	  can	  aid	  in	  moral	  character.	  But	  that	  this	  is	  primarily	  limited	  to	  natural	  beauty	  since	  manmade	  works	  are	  produced	  with	  the	  interest	  in	  bringing	  about	  aesthetic	  response.	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aesthetic	  tradition	  by	  pointing	  out	  art	  is	  a	  function	  of	  different	  social,	  cultural,	  and	  historical	  practices	  and	  values.	  	  	  
4.1	  Artistic	  Autonomy	  and	  Ethical	  Considerations	  	  The	  autonomous	  view	  of	  art	  has	  wielded	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  influence	  in	  subsequent	  developments	  of	  aesthetic	  theory.	  It	  was	  embodied	  in	  Clive	  Bell’s	  conception	  of	  significant	  form.	  Bell	  rejected	  the	  idea	  that	  aesthetic	  value	  could	  lay	  in	  anything	  other	  than	  a	  work’s	  formal	  properties	  and	  consequently	  rejected	  representational	  works	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  we	  find	  them	  valuable	  for	  the	  conceptual	  content	  they	  attempt	  to	  communicate	  and	  not	  their	  formal	  properties.	  Conceptual	  content	  such	  as	  moral	  concerns	  distracts	  from	  the	  artwork’s	  form	  and	  diminishes	  the	  possibility	  of	  eliciting	  a	  truly	  aesthetic	  emotion.	  Art	  ought	  to	  be	  independent	  from	  both	  conceptual	  content	  and	  concrete	  human	  considerations.	  Consequently	  Bell	  notes	  that	  art	  “is	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  moralist.”29	  More	  moderate	  positions	  both	  within	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  emerged	  in	  response	  to	  this	  radically	  autonomous	  conception	  of	  art,	  seeking	  to	  put	  aesthetic	  and	  ethical	  considerations	  back	  in	  conversation.	  Virtue	  ethicist	  Michael	  Slote	  permits	  the	  coexistence	  of	  both	  aesthetic	  and	  moral	  virtues.	  Taking	  up	  an	  example	  from	  Bernard	  Williams,	  Slote	  points	  out	  that	  even	  though	  Gauguin	  committed	  the	  obviously	  immoral	  act	  of	  deserting	  his	  family	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  his	  talent	  for	  painting	  in	  Tahiti,	  we	  
                                                29	  Bell,	  Art,	  20.	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still	  admire	  his	  artistic	  single-­‐mindedness.	  Gauguin	  exhibits	  an	  admirable	  immorality.	  This	  fact	  explains	  why	  we	  have	  such	  complex	  feelings	  regarding	  Gauguin	  –	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  we	  admire	  his	  passionate	  pursuit	  of	  an	  aesthetic	  good	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  all	  other	  concerns,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  we	  are	  repulsed	  by	  the	  reckless	  abandonment	  of	  his	  family.30	  In	  his	  rejection	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  moral	  considerations	  always	  trump	  other	  sorts	  of	  consideration,	  Slote	  shows	  how	  both	  aesthetic	  and	  moral	  values	  coexist,	  thereby	  eliciting	  complex	  and	  varying	  responses	  from	  an	  audience.	  Within	  mainstream	  aesthetics	  James	  C.	  Anderson	  and	  Jeffrey	  T.	  Dean	  etch	  out	  a	  position	  they	  call	  “moderate	  autonomism.”31	  In	  opposition	  to	  Bell,	  Anderson	  and	  Dean	  do	  not	  deny	  that	  works	  of	  art	  can	  and	  should	  be	  evaluated	  ethically	  or	  have	  some	  ethical	  content.	  But	  repulsion	  from	  a	  work	  based	  on	  its	  moral	  content	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  its	  aesthetic	  evaluation.	  For	  example,	  the	  controversy	  over	  Huck	  Finn	  is	  not	  regarding	  its	  aesthetic	  value	  –	  those	  who	  would	  not	  let	  their	  children	  read	  the	  book	  do	  so	  because	  of	  its	  morally	  questionable	  perspective.32	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  while	  ethical	  
                                                30	  Michael	  Slote,	  “Admirable	  Immorality”	  in	  Goods	  and	  Virtues	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1983),	  77-­‐108.	  	  31	  Anderson	  and	  Dean’s	  “moderate	  autonomism”	  comes	  from	  Noel	  Carroll’s	  article	  “Moderate	  Moralism,”	  in	  which	  Carroll	  argues	  again	  positions	  he	  terms	  “radical	  autonomism”	  and	  “moderate	  autonomism.”	  Carroll	  suggests	  that	  aesthetic	  failure	  in	  a	  work,	  particularly	  in	  literature,	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  ethical	  flaws.	  See	  “Moderate	  Moralism,”	  223-­‐238.	  	  32	  James	  C.	  Anderson	  and	  Jeffrey	  T.	  Dean,	  “Moderate	  Autonomism,”	  
The	  British	  Journal	  of	  Aesthetics	  38,	  no.	  2	  (1998),	  150-­‐166.	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considerations	  have	  a	  place	  in	  aesthetic	  discourse,	  the	  two	  are	  conceptually	  distinct	  realms,	  with	  no	  points	  of	  overlap.	  The	  idea	  of	  the	  conceptual	  distinctness	  of	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics	  as	  it	  is	  deployed	  in	  the	  above	  outlined	  positions	  is	  rooted	  in	  an	  understanding	  of	  aesthetics	  as	  having	  no	  external	  aims	  and	  in	  aesthetic	  appreciation	  as	  being	  free	  from	  the	  external	  influences.	  While	  we	  may	  permit	  the	  possibility	  of	  ethical	  evaluation	  of	  a	  work,	  such	  activity	  is	  not	  aesthetic	  activity.	  Here	  we	  see	  the	  disinterested	  quality	  of	  enlightenment	  era	  aesthetics	  take	  a	  new	  form	  in	  contemporary	  scholarship	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  ‘conceptual	  distinctness.’	  For	  both	  Anderson	  and	  Dean	  and	  Slote	  aesthetic	  and	  ethical	  perspectives	  are	  treated	  like	  hats	  that	  can	  only	  be	  worn	  one	  at	  a	  time:	  if	  we	  are	  entertaining	  an	  aesthetic	  perspective,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  approach	  a	  work	  ethically,	  and	  vice	  versa.33	  Rather	  than	  developing	  an	  interesting	  and	  meaningful	  conversation	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  two	  might	  be	  engaged	  in	  conversation,	  such	  an	  approach	  reifies	  the	  distinction.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  there	  have	  been	  more	  meaningful	  attempts	  to	  bring	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics	  together.	  Marcia	  Eaton	  has	  convincingly	  argued	  that	  the	  cases	  in	  which	  we	  have	  two	  distinct	  experiences	  upon	  encountering	  an	  artwork	  are	  rare	  (that	  is,	  one	  aesthetic	  and	  one	  moral	  experience),	  and	  that	  aesthetic	  perception	  of	  some	  works	  does	  in	  fact	  change	  given	  additional	  moral	  information.	  For	  Eaton,	  moral	  appreciation	  conditions	  aesthetic	  
                                                33	  Marcia	  Eaton	  uses	  Wittgenstein’s	  duck-­‐rabbit	  in	  order	  to	  criticize	  this	  kind	  of	  “separatist”	  approach.	  See	  Eaton	  “Integrating	  the	  Aesthetic	  and	  the	  Moral,”	  Philosophical	  Studies	  67,	  no.	  2	  (1992),	  219-­‐240.	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appreciation.34	  Scott	  Stroud’s	  Deweyan	  reconstruction	  of	  an	  aesthetic	  ethics	  is	  another	  insightful	  resource	  for	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  intersection	  of	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics.	  Stroud	  argues	  that	  aesthetic	  experience	  itself	  is	  morally	  cultivating,	  insofar	  as	  it	  invites	  attentiveness	  to	  concrete	  particulars	  and	  continual	  adjust	  to	  an	  environment.35	  Stroud’s	  work	  strongly	  resonates	  with	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  emphasis	  on	  continual	  readjustment	  to	  the	  changing	  situation,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  three.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Eaton	  and	  Stroud’s	  arguments	  either	  dispense	  with	  or	  redefine	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  aesthetic	  disinterestedness,	  thereby	  circumventing	  an	  understanding	  of	  art	  as	  autonomous,	  and	  are	  consequently	  less	  aligned	  with	  the	  dominant	  aesthetic	  discourse.	  
	  4.2	  The	  Decontextualization	  of	  Art	  	  In	  observing	  art,	  we	  tend	  to	  imagine	  the	  designation	  by	  which	  we	  understand	  something	  as	  art	  to	  have	  always	  been	  there.	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  when	  we	  observe	  something	  like	  a	  tribal	  mask	  or	  some	  other	  ancient	  ‘artwork’	  within	  a	  museum	  or	  art	  exhibition;	  we	  suppose	  that	  that	  work	  occupies	  a	  place	  of	  privilege	  within	  the	  museum	  because	  it	  is	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  ordinary	  objects	  or	  events	  that	  populate	  our	  everyday	  
                                                34	  Eaton,	  “Integrating	  the	  Aesthetic	  and	  the	  Moral.”	  	  35	  Scott	  Stroud,	  John	  Dewey	  and	  the	  Artful	  Life	  (University	  Park,	  PA:	  Pennsylvania	  State	  University	  Press,	  2011).	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experience.	  Their	  independent	  status	  as	  objects	  divorced	  from	  daily	  life	  reifies	  the	  modern	  notion	  of	  fine	  art	  as	  serving	  no	  external	  function	  and	  having	  no	  extrinsic	  value.	  Consequently,	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  understands	  the	  museum	  as	  a	  double	  edged	  sword:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  offers	  a	  history	  of	  artifacts,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  those	  artifacts	  having	  been	  divorced	  from	  the	  original	  conditions	  in	  which	  they	  were	  produced	  are	  experienced	  as	  “dead	  productions.”36	  	  Of	  course	  we	  know	  at	  some	  level	  that	  those	  tribal	  masks	  we	  might	  see	  on	  display	  in	  the	  museum	  had	  definite	  social	  and	  religious	  roles	  within	  a	  culture	  and	  were	  typically	  not	  made	  as	  objects	  for	  aesthetic	  appreciation	  alone	  or	  that	  Albrecht	  Dürer’s	  controversial	  self-­‐portrait	  in	  which	  he	  depicts	  himself	  in	  Christ-­‐like	  position	  betrays	  a	  connection	  to	  certain	  social	  and	  historical	  conditions37;	  that	  art	  is	  produced	  within	  a	  matrix	  of	  social,	  cultural,	  and	  historical	  values.	  However,	  the	  quality	  of	  disutility	  that	  characterizes	  the	  artwork	  also	  leads	  an	  audience	  to	  disregard	  those	  conditions	  in	  appreciating	  the	  work.	  We	  suppose	  that	  art	  should	  be	  autonomous	  and	  independent	  of	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  it	  originated	  and	  existing	  only	  for	  its	  own	  sake.	  John	  Dewey	  explains,	  “In	  common	  conception,	  the	  work	  of	  art	  is	  often	  identified	  with	  the	  building,	  book,	  painting	  or	  statue	  in	  its	  existence	  apart	  from	  human	  
                                                36	  Merleau-­‐Ponty,	  “Indirect	  Language	  and	  the	  Voices	  of	  Silence,”	  in	  
Signs,	  trans.	  Richard	  C.	  McCleary	  (Northwestern	  University	  Press:	  1964),	  62.	  	  37	  Albrecht	  Dürer,	  Self-­‐Portrait	  with	  Fur-­‐Trimmed	  Robe,	  1500.	  Limewood,	  67.1cm	  x	  48.9cm.	  Alte	  Pinakotheck,	  Munich,	  Germany.	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experience.”38	  The	  point	  is	  that	  the	  shoemaker’s	  production	  of	  shoes	  and	  the	  sculptor’s	  production	  of	  a	  statue	  are	  not	  fundamentally	  different.39	  They	  are	  both	  functions	  of	  everyday	  experience	  and	  yet	  the	  modern	  understanding	  of	  fine	  art	  imagines	  art	  as	  objects	  or	  events	  presented	  for	  aesthetic	  appreciation	  and	  divorced	  from	  any	  social	  or	  historical	  context.	  Dewey	  would	  like	  to	  say	  that	  art	  is	  concomitant	  with	  daily	  life	  insofar	  as	  it	  emerges	  from	  within	  and	  responds	  to	  concrete	  social	  and	  historical	  conditions.	  A	  decontextualized	  or	  ahistorical	  approach	  to	  art	  creates	  distance	  between	  audience	  and	  artwork,	  as	  art	  becomes	  something	  that	  is	  removed	  from	  and	  more	  than	  likely	  irrelevant	  to	  one’s	  everyday	  life.	  	  	  
4.3	  Determining	  Aesthetic	  Standards	  	  Pierre	  Bourdieu’s	  sociological	  critique	  of	  ahistorical	  acts	  of	  perception	  and	  evaluation	  suggests	  that	  these	  acts	  both	  produce	  and	  are	  the	  product	  of	  practices	  that	  sustain	  different	  social,	  economic,	  and	  cultural	  classes.	  Privileged	  groups	  delimit	  the	  kinds	  of	  practices	  and	  attitudes	  that	  constitute	  what	  Arthur	  Danto	  terms	  the	  “Artworld”:	  the	  overlapping	  matrices	  of	  art	  theory,	  history,	  economy,	  and	  authorities	  that	  that	  make	  the	  idea	  of	  art	  
                                                38	  John	  Dewey,	  Art	  as	  Experience,	  (New	  York:	  Perigee:	  1980),	  3.	  	  39	  In	  attempting	  to	  likewise	  unmask	  the	  artificial	  distinction	  between	  art	  and	  craft,	  Pierre	  Bourdieu	  writes,	  “the	  basis	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  works	  of	  art	  and	  ordinary	  objects	  is	  none	  other	  than	  an	  institution…”	  (The	  
Rules	  of	  Art,	  trans.	  Susan	  Emanuel	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  1996),	  287).	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possible.	  Individuals	  who	  occupy	  a	  position	  of	  power	  within	  that	  web	  generate	  or	  perpetuate	  artistic	  theories	  that	  delineate	  the	  standards	  by	  which	  something	  can	  be	  called	  art.	  40	  As	  Danto	  points	  out:	  “What	  in	  the	  end	  makes	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  Brillo	  box	  and	  a	  work	  of	  art	  consisting	  of	  a	  Brillo	  Box	  is	  a	  certain	  theory	  of	  art.”41	  Bourdieu’s	  point	  is	  that	  the	  privileged	  members	  within	  a	  subsection	  of	  society	  set	  the	  aesthetic	  standards	  based	  on	  their	  own	  experience,	  thus	  universalizing	  that	  experience.	  This	  is	  particularly	  visible	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  aesthetic	  disinterestedness	  that	  characterizes	  the	  ideal	  art	  observer.	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  only	  the	  aristocratic	  elite	  of	  the	  seventeenth	  and	  eighteenth	  century	  that	  would	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  devote	  a	  portion	  of	  time	  to	  the	  contemplation	  of	  artwork	  solely	  for	  pleasure	  –	  those	  “who	  are	  able	  to	  boast	  an	  art	  of	  living	  freed	  from	  the	  utilitarian	  and	  basely	  material	  ends	  to	  which	  ‘vulgar’	  people	  sacrifice	  themselves.”42	  Even	  in	  the	  above	  narrative	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  fine	  arts,	  we	  see	  that	  during	  the	  renaissance	  music,	  poetry,	  and	  painting	  become	  the	  proper	  pursuits	  of	  the	  courtier	  in	  distinction	  from	  the	  mechanical	  arts	  and	  craft.43	  This	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  Dewey’s	  pointing	  out	  that	  there	  is	  a	  feeling	  that	  associating	  art	  with	  everyday	  experience	  would	  
                                                40	  Arthur	  Danto,	  “The	  Artworld,”	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  61,	  no.	  19	  	  (1964),	  571-­‐584.	  	  	   41	  Ibid.,	  581.	  	  42	  Bourdieu,	  The	  Rules	  of	  Art,	  293.	  	  43	  Kristeller,	  “Modern	  System	  of	  the	  Arts,”	  517.	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somehow	  denigrate	  its	  status.44	  Disinterestedness	  becomes	  the	  standard	  for	  aesthetic	  perception	  as	  a	  product	  of	  the	  aristocratic	  circumstances	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  discipline.	  This	  naturally	  excludes	  those	  “vulgar	  people”	  who	  cannot	  devote	  themselves	  to	  such	  practices.	  Bourdieu	  suggests	  that	  taste	  itself	  is	  a	  function	  of	  different	  class	  distinctions;	  while	  the	  standards	  effected	  by	  the	  artworld	  suggest	  otherwise	  in	  proffering	  disinterestedness	  as	  a	  generalizable	  standard	  of	  aesthetic	  perception,	  Bourdieu	  explains,	  	  	   One	  may,	  in	  effect,	  suggest	  that	  two	  persons	  possessing	  each	  a	  different	  habitus,	  not	  being	  exposed	  to	  the	  same	  situation	  and	  to	  the	  same	  stimulations,	  do	  not	  hear	  the	  same	  music	  and	  do	  not	  see	  the	  same	  painting	  since	  they	  construe	  them	  differently,	  and	  so	  they	  are	  bound	  to	  bring	  forth	  different	  value	  judgments.45	  	  	  Consequently,	  tastes	  forged	  in	  groups	  that	  are	  not	  granted	  access	  to	  the	  artworld	  are	  dismissed	  as	  vulgar	  or	  uncultured.	  Privileged	  groups	  establish	  standards	  based	  on	  their	  own	  aesthetic	  experience	  that	  preclude	  underprivileged	  groups	  from	  participating	  in	  art	  and	  furthermore	  reject	  those	  groups	  as	  having	  unrefined	  tastes.	  	  
4.4	  The	  “Ideology	  of	  Creation”	  and	  Passivity	  of	  the	  Audience	  	  Here	  we	  should	  also	  consider	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  ideal	  disinterested	  observer	  and	  his	  counterpart,	  the	  artist-­‐genius.	  A	  disinterested	  
                                                44	  Dewey,	  Art	  as	  Experience,	  20.	  	  45	  Bourdieu,	  The	  Rules	  of	  Art,	  298-­‐99.	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attitude	  requires	  that	  evaluation	  or	  apprehension	  of	  an	  artwork	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  audience’s	  social	  context,	  history,	  or	  any	  other	  contingent	  feature	  of	  one’s	  existence.	  Instead	  one	  must	  rely	  on	  the	  sort	  of	  pure	  experience	  of	  the	  artwork	  itself.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  anyone	  can	  enjoy	  art,	  regardless	  of	  gender,	  age,	  or	  status.	  Rather,	  it	  presupposes	  that	  an	  individual	  can	  step	  out	  of	  these	  contingent	  factors	  that	  shape	  his	  existence	  in	  the	  world.	  A	  disinterested	  attitude	  requires	  that	  the	  audience,	  in	  order	  to	  properly	  ascertain	  the	  artwork,	  set	  aside	  those	  distinguishing	  features	  and	  become	  a	  maximally	  general	  blank	  slate	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  the	  pure	  aesthetic	  experience.	  Ideally	  two	  members	  of	  an	  audience,	  without	  personal	  details	  or	  inclinations,	  are	  qualitatively	  identical.	  Those	  who	  cannot	  conceive	  of	  themselves	  independently	  of	  these	  sorts	  of	  contingent	  features	  are	  inept	  at	  aesthetic	  appreciation.	  The	  audience	  is	  both	  passive,	  in	  that	  it	  does	  not	  act	  upon	  a	  work	  but	  is	  receptive	  to	  the	  experience	  foisted	  upon	  it,	  and	  general,	  in	  that	  ideally	  the	  audience	  erases	  any	  distinguishing	  features	  in	  order	  to	  be	  receptive	  to	  that	  experience.	  The	  artist,	  in	  contrast,	  is	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  rare	  and	  unique	  creator,	  who	  naturally	  and	  without	  critical	  reflection	  manifests	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  universe	  in	  his	  work	  to	  be	  received	  by	  the	  audience.	  The	  artist	  understood	  as	  this	  sort	  of	  genius	  is	  a	  common	  thread,	  touched	  upon	  by	  the	  likes	  of	  Batteux,	  Kant,	  and	  Schopenhauer,	  whom	  might	  best	  summarize	  the	  attitude	  regarding	  the	  genius	  when	  he	  writes,	  “Whereas	  to	  the	  ordinary	  man	  his	  faculty	  of	  knowledge	  is	  a	  lamp	  that	  lights	  his	  path,	  to	  the	  man	  of	  genius	  it	  is	  the	  sun	  that	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reveals	  the	  world.”46	  The	  artist	  understood	  as	  genius	  possesses	  qualities	  and	  talents	  over	  and	  above	  that	  of	  the	  ordinary	  individual.	  M.H.	  Abrams	  explains,	  “even	  the	  originality	  of	  a	  genius	  is	  explained	  in	  large	  part	  by	  his	  possessing	  the	  zeal	  and	  acuity	  to	  invent	  (in	  the	  root	  sense	  of	  ‘discover’)	  aspects	  of	  the	  universe	  and	  of	  human	  nature	  hitherto	  overlooked,	  and	  the	  imaginative	  ingenuity	  to	  combine	  and	  express	  familiar	  elements	  in	  new	  and	  surprising	  ways.”47	  This	  conception	  of	  the	  artist	  undoubtedly	  has	  theological	  overtones,	  as	  it	  comes	  to	  prominence	  during	  the	  enlightenment’s	  humanizing	  of	  all	  things	  formerly	  divine.	  Where	  once	  God	  was	  the	  ultimate	  creator,	  and	  his	  creations	  a	  window	  into	  the	  divine	  principles	  of	  the	  universe,	  now	  the	  artist	  is	  tasked	  with	  manifesting	  those	  principles	  of	  the	  universe	  in	  some	  sensible	  form.	  Fundamentally	  independent,	  the	  artist	  is	  free	  from	  constraints,	  such	  as	  the	  dependence	  upon	  a	  commission,	  patron,	  guild,	  or	  even	  a	  long	  process	  of	  development	  such	  as	  an	  apprenticeship	  in	  which	  one	  acquires	  and	  perfects	  certain	  skills.	  Bourdieu	  refers	  to	  it	  as	  the	  “ideology	  of	  creation,”	  which	  “directs	  the	  gaze	  toward	  the	  apparent	  producer-­‐painter,	  composer,	  writer,”	  noting	  that	  such	  ideology	  “prevents	  us	  asking	  who	  has	  created	  this	  ‘creator’	  and	  the	  magic	  power	  of	  transubstantiation	  with	  which	  the	  ‘creator’	  is	  endowed.”48	  
                                                46	  Arthur	  Schopenhauer,	  The	  World	  as	  Will	  and	  Representation,	  vol.	  I,	  trans.	  E.F.J.	  Payne	  (New	  York:	  Dover	  Publications,	  1969),	  188.	  	  47	  M.H.	  Abrams,	  The	  Mirror	  and	  the	  Lamp:	  Romantic	  Theory	  and	  the	  
Critical	  Tradition	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1953),	  42.	  	  48	  Bourdieu,	  The	  Rules	  of	  Art,	  168.	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The	  artist	  understood	  as	  mysteriously	  endowed	  creator	  and	  authority	  means	  that	  he	  is	  able	  to	  freely	  determine	  his	  work.	  The	  disinterested	  audience,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  must	  passively	  receive	  a	  ready-­‐made	  experience.	  The	  implication	  of	  such	  a	  model	  of	  artist	  and	  audience	  is	  that	  if	  the	  audience	  does	  not	  have	  such	  an	  experience,	  ultimately	  she	  is	  at	  fault	  for	  not	  appropriately	  divesting	  herself	  of	  the	  contingent	  features	  that	  might	  block	  the	  experience.	  We	  can	  imagine	  the	  bumbling	  tourist	  couple	  in	  an	  art	  museum	  standing	  before	  Jasper	  Johns’	  Flag,	  pronouncing	  loudly	  to	  one	  another,	  “I	  don’t	  get	  it!”	  while	  the	  quiet	  aesthetes	  silently	  condemn	  the	  couple	  as	  uncultured	  or	  uneducated.	  The	  supposition	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  content	  or	  meaning	  behind	  the	  artwork	  that	  the	  properly	  disposed	  audience	  would	  apprehend.	  Artistic	  independence	  means	  that	  the	  artist	  is	  not	  responsible	  for	  the	  audience’s	  failure	  to	  apprehend	  the	  artwork’s	  idea	  or	  content.	  Instead,	  failure	  to	  grasp	  the	  artwork	  implies	  an	  audience	  shortcoming.49	  And	  so,	  although	  some	  of	  us	  have	  found	  ourselves	  standing	  before	  an	  artwork	  baffled	  by	  its	  meaning,	  we	  tend	  to	  be	  reluctant	  to	  say	  so.	  The	  ideology	  of	  creation	  perpetuates	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  artist	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  content	  of	  his	  work	  and	  the	  passivity	  of	  the	  audience	  in	  terms	  of	  apprehension	  and	  evaluation	  of	  works	  of	  art,	  
                                                                                                                                	  49	  At	  this	  juncture	  the	  modern	  artist	  might	  object	  that	  his	  work	  has	  no	  content	  or	  meaning.	  Kasimir	  Malevich,	  for	  example,	  called	  on	  the	  artist	  to	  portray	  pure	  subjective	  feeling	  that	  exists	  prior	  to	  theoretical	  content.	  His	  
Black	  Square	  (1913)	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  expressing	  a	  lack	  of	  conceptual	  content	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  communication	  of	  pure	  feeling.	  Malevich	  indeed	  wrote	  an	  entire	  manifesto	  explaining	  that	  the	  meaning	  behind	  his	  artwork	  was	  that	  there	  was	  no	  meaning.	  See	  Malevich,	  The	  Non-­‐Objective	  World,	  trans.	  by	  Howard	  Dearstyne	  (Chicago:	  Paul	  Theobald	  and	  Company,	  1959).	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ultimately	  putting	  the	  artist	  beyond	  reproach	  and	  tending	  toward	  aesthetic	  elitism.	  	  
5.	  Conclusion	  	  The	  criticisms	  of	  Dewey,	  Bourdieu,	  Mereleau-­‐Ponty,	  and	  others	  aim	  at	  the	  metaphysical	  structures	  that	  underpin	  much	  of	  eighteenth	  century	  aesthetics,	  which	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  ideal	  of	  art	  as	  autonomous.	  Particularly,	  the	  search	  for	  the	  essence	  of	  art	  has	  contributed	  to	  privilege	  the	  metaphysical	  idea	  over	  its	  sensible	  representation,	  and	  correspondingly	  the	  artist	  over	  the	  audience,	  while	  supposing	  that	  the	  work	  of	  art	  itself	  is	  meant	  only	  for	  disinterested	  contemplation.	  Additionally,	  Bourdieu	  unmasks	  the	  empiricist	  attempt	  to	  universalize	  taste	  as	  a	  sociological	  phenomenon.	  	  This	  ahistorical	  model	  of	  aesthetics	  has	  potentially	  undesirable	  characteristics	  on	  multiple	  levels.	  Artworks	  are	  presented	  independently	  of	  their	  context,	  which	  might	  ordinarily	  supply	  us	  with	  meaning	  or	  facilitate	  understanding.	  Depriving	  the	  audience	  of	  her	  context	  doubly	  compounds	  the	  difficult	  task	  of	  apprehending	  these	  works.	  She	  is	  given	  the	  impossible	  task	  of	  divesting	  herself	  of	  any	  contingent	  features	  that	  would	  interrupt	  the	  aesthetic	  experience,	  which	  means	  that	  when	  she	  cannot	  facilitate	  the	  appropriate	  response	  to	  the	  work	  she	  is	  ultimately	  at	  fault.	  This	  generates	  a	  kind	  of	  elitism,	  in	  which	  the	  inevitable	  inability	  to	  apprehend	  the	  artwork	  in	  the	  prescribed	  manner	  is	  chalked	  up	  to	  bad	  taste	  or	  a	  lack	  of	  refinement.	  This	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also	  has	  implications	  for	  ethical	  evaluations	  of	  the	  work,	  such	  as	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  overlap	  between	  aesthetic	  and	  ethical	  concerns.	  Moreover	  the	  genius-­‐artist	  is	  beyond	  reproach,	  and	  offense	  or	  criticism	  of	  the	  work	  can	  be	  brushed	  off	  as	  the	  audience	  simply	  not	  ‘getting	  it’.	  These	  criticisms	  point	  to	  a	  widening	  gap	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics.	  By	  perpetuating	  elitism	  and	  its	  own	  irrelevancy	  for	  daily	  life,	  aesthetics	  has	  become	  an	  undesirable	  and	  gratuitous	  discipline.	  Where	  at	  one	  time	  it	  was	  closely	  united	  with	  ethics,	  aesthetics	  has	  come	  to	  assume	  the	  position	  of	  extraneous	  sidekick	  to	  the	  much	  more	  serious	  and	  important	  work	  of	  ethics.	  	  	  	   A	  number	  of	  influential	  themes	  and	  problematiques	  emerged	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  philosophical	  aesthetics	  as	  a	  discipline	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  that	  continue	  to	  shape	  how	  we	  understand	  art	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  aesthetic.	  After	  surveying	  this	  landscape	  and	  taking	  into	  account	  its	  criticisms	  and	  potential	  shortcomings,	  we	  can	  now	  ask	  about	  its	  relevance	  for	  framing	  the	  Zhuangzi.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  is,	  by	  many	  standards	  of	  the	  dominant	  aesthetic	  tradition,	  an	  aesthetic	  object	  for	  its	  masterful	  use	  of	  literary	  language,	  and	  is	  classed	  with	  other	  great	  literary	  works	  that	  stand	  alongside	  great	  paintings,	  musical,	  and	  poetic	  endeavors.	  Of	  course,	  the	  text	  originates	  far	  outside	  of	  that	  Western	  aesthetic	  tradition,	  with	  its	  earlier	  strata	  cohering	  sometime	  in	  the	  4th	  century	  BCE	  during	  the	  Warring	  States	  period	  in	  China.	  Even	  if	  we	  are	  to	  judge	  the	  text	  by	  the	  standards	  of	  its	  own	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philosophical	  context,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  does	  stand	  out	  for	  its	  novel	  responses	  to	  various	  Warring	  States	  rhetorical	  and	  literary	  strategies.	  	  But	  despite	  its	  original	  conditions	  and	  complex	  history,	  we	  do	  tend	  to	  think	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  as	  a	  work	  of	  art.	  Considering	  it	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  dominant	  aesthetic	  tradition	  will	  help	  us	  to	  understand	  in	  what	  ways	  a	  Zhuangzian	  aesthetic	  departs	  from	  that	  tradition,	  which	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  quality	  of	  autonomy.	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  when	  assessing	  the	  relationship	  between	  aesthetics	  and	  ethics	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi.	  Most	  importantly	  for	  the	  concerns	  of	  this	  project,	  it	  will	  also	  mean	  assessing	  the	  text’s	  relationship	  with	  ethics,	  since	  in	  large	  part	  the	  identity	  of	  aesthetics	  is	  formed	  in	  its	  move	  away	  from	  ethics.	  The	  aesthetic	  aspects	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  seem	  to	  indirectly	  hint	  at	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  good	  life.	  And	  so	  with	  this	  aesthetic	  tradition	  in	  mind	  we	  can	  now	  turn	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  to	  firstly	  understand	  its	  vision	  of	  the	  good	  life,	  and	  secondly,	  understand	  how	  its	  aesthetic	  dimensions	  are	  relevant	  to	  that	  ethical	  vision.	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CHAPTER	  THREE:	  AN	  ETHICS	  OF	  MING	  (明)	  	  The	  Zhuangzi	  has	  oft	  been	  touted	  as	  a	  relativist	  discourse,	  with	  Chad	  Hansen	  famously	  arguing	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  ought	  to	  be	  grouped	  with	  the	  logic	  favoring	  Neo-­‐Mohists.1	  Hansen	  was	  rightly	  reacting	  to	  the	  tendency	  of	  earlier	  scholars	  who,	  when	  confronted	  with	  such	  a	  heady	  text,	  relegated	  it	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  mysticism.	  But	  while	  Hansen	  ushered	  in	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  critical	  approaches	  to	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  we	  are	  still	  grappling	  with	  how	  to	  reconcile	  the	  text’s	  remarks	  on	  the	  relative	  nature	  of	  judgments	  with	  imagery	  that	  suggests	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  ethics.	  My	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  explicate	  the	  singular	  ethical	  vision	  of	  the	  text.	  I	  have	  already	  detailed	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  an	  over	  emphatic	  drive	  for	  coherence	  among	  the	  many	  different	  facets	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi.2	  The	  poly-­‐vocal	  nature	  of	  the	  text	  means	  that	  its	  ethical	  content	  can	  be	  understood	  from	  multiple	  perspectives.	  Rather	  than	  attempting	  to	  explicate	  the	  text’s	  singular	  vision	  or	  message,	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  looking	  for	  broadly	  related	  themes	  and	  ideas	  within	  the	  Zhuangzi	  that	  offer	  ethical	  insights.	  This	  chapter	  will	  show	  how	  a	  group	  of	  voices	  within	  the	  text	  demonstrate	  shared	  ethical	  concerns,	  without	  precluding	  the	  possibility	  of	  understanding	  the	  text	  from	  different	  vantage	  points.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  a	  Zhuangzian	  ethics	  can	  be	  understood	  through	  the	  epistemic	  and	  
                                                1	  Chad	  Hansen	  “The	  Tao	  of	  Tao	  in	  Chuang-­‐Tzu,”	  Experimental	  Essays	  in	  
Zhuangzi,	  ed.	  Victor	  Mair	  (Honolulu:	  University	  of	  Hawaii	  Press,	  1983),	  24-­‐55.	   	  2	  See	  pages	  23-­‐53	  of	  chapter	  one	  in	  this	  dissertation.	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ethical	  concept	  of	  ming	  (明).	  Ming	  stands	  opposed	  to	  the	  tendency	  to	  suppose	  one’s	  judgments	  are	  objective	  presentations	  of	  reality.	  Those	  who	  suppose	  that	  the	  heart-­‐mind	  is	  the	  ultimate	  faculty	  of	  self-­‐cultivation	  find	  themselves	  committed	  to	  their	  judgments	  and	  beliefs	  in	  a	  way	  that	  limits	  how	  they	  understand	  the	  world.	  Proper	  self-­‐cultivation,	  and	  accordingly	  the	  best	  way	  of	  life,	  is	  unbounded	  and	  realized	  through	  the	  sagely	  practice	  of	  ming,	  which	  is	  indistinct.	  The	  Zhuangzi’s	  remarks	  on	  the	  practice	  of	  making	  distinctions,	  which	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  heart-­‐mind,	  has	  often	  been	  used	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  claiming	  that	  the	  text	  either	  offers	  a	  relativist	  or	  amoral	  vision.	  However,	  looking	  at	  the	  heart-­‐mind	  and	  its	  relationship	  with	  ming,	  and	  the	  project	  of	  self-­‐cultivation,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  interested	  in	  limiting	  the	  role	  of	  the	  heart-­‐mind	  rather	  than	  rejecting	  it	  outright.	  	  	  
1.	  The	  Problem	  with	  Amorality	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  	  	  Interpretations	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  as	  a	  treatise	  on	  relativism	  continue	  to	  abound	  with	  those	  such	  as	  Brook	  Ziporyn	  suggesting	  that	  the	  Zhuangzian	  perspective	  is	  a	  more	  efficacious	  perspective,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  not	  fundamentally	  different	  in	  nature	  than	  any	  other	  perspective.3	  The	  tension	  between	  relativist	  and	  skeptical	  strands	  of	  thought	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  what	  is	  clearly	  approbation	  for	  certain	  ways	  of	  life	  on	  the	  other	  has	  led	  many	  
                                                3	  Brook	  Ziporyn,	  “How	  Many	  are	  the	  Ten	  Thousand	  Things	  and	  I?”	  in	  
Hiding	  in	  the	  World:	  Uneven	  Discourses	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  ed.	  Scott	  Cook	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  2003),	  33-­‐63.	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scholars	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  simply	  amoral.	  Robert	  Eno	  argues	  that	  Zhuangzi	  was	  only	  a	  relativist	  with	  respect	  to	  skill	  performance	  or	  ‘know-­‐how’;	  all	  skill-­‐based	  activities	  will	  serve	  as	  a	  conduit	  for	  one	  to	  harmonize	  by	  nature,	  but	  none	  is	  better	  than	  the	  other.4	  Lee	  Yearley	  likewise	  distinguishes	  between	  skill-­‐based	  performances	  and	  goal-­‐guided	  processes	  and	  correlates	  the	  former	  with	  the	  radically	  reoriented	  approach	  that	  characterizes	  the	  sage.	  Yet	  Yearley	  concludes	  that	  the	  ultimate	  spiritual	  state	  is	  amoral.5	  Thomas	  Radice	  also	  argues	  against	  a	  strictly	  relativist	  interpretation	  and	  instead	  argues	  that	  the	  Zhuangzian	  sage	  is	  concerned	  with	  survival.6	  Radice	  goes	  on	  to	  conclude	  that	  since	  the	  text	  is	  most	  concerned	  with	  survival	  that	  it	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  amoral.	  It	  seems	  that	  in	  trying	  to	  reconcile	  the	  relativist	  themes	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  with	  its	  ethical	  overtones,	  we	  have	  been	  forced	  into	  arguing	  for	  the	  strange	  proposition	  that	  the	  best	  way	  of	  living,	  according	  to	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  is	  one	  that	  transcends	  morality.	  How	  can	  it	  be	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  makes	  a	  prescription	  about	  the	  good	  life	  that	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  morality?	  	  Part	  of	  the	  problem	  has	  to	  do	  with	  an	  extremely	  narrow	  construal	  of	  how	  we	  understand	  ethics	  and	  morality.	  If	  morality	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  system	  of	  special	  obligations	  that	  must	  be	  fulfilled,	  then	  no,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  does	  not	  offer	  us	  a	  morality.	  Jung	  H.	  Lee	  explains	  that	  such	  an	  impoverished	  
                                                4	  Eno,	  “Cook	  Ding’s	  Dao.”	  
	  5	  Yearley,	  “Zhuangzi’s	  Understanding	  of	  Skillfulness,”	  152-­‐182.	  	  6	  Radice,	  “Clarity	  and	  Survival	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi.”	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understanding	  of	  morality	  “fails	  to	  appreciate	  the	  normative	  dimensions	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  because	  it	  reduces	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  moral	  to	  superficial	  distinctions	  about	  relative	  value	  rather	  than	  imagining	  the	  many	  ways	  that	  Daoist	  texts	  like	  the	  Zhuangzi	  express	  a	  normative	  sense	  of	  life	  or	  more	  simply	  a	  morality.”7	  Admittedly,	  both	  Radice	  and	  Yearley	  briefly	  qualify	  their	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “amoral”:	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  suggestions	  are	  amoral	  if	  we	  judge	  them	  according	  to	  normal	  moral	  standards	  –	  although,	  neither	  explains	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  normal	  or	  traditional	  moral	  standards,	  nor	  offers	  a	  framework	  in	  morality’s	  place	  by	  which	  we	  can	  understand	  the	  normative	  dimensions	  of	  the	  text.	  If	  the	  primary	  concern	  of	  those	  such	  as	  Eno,	  Yearley,	  and	  Radice	  is	  to	  distance	  the	  Zhuangzi	  from	  the	  wrongheaded	  assumption	  that	  the	  text	  offers	  a	  coherent	  system	  of	  moral	  principles,	  without	  denying	  that	  it	  also	  offers	  up	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  good	  life,	  then	  they	  ought	  to	  suggest	  some	  other	  way	  by	  which	  we	  can	  understand	  that	  normativity.	  	  Here	  Bernard	  Williams’s	  distinction	  between	  morality	  and	  ethics	  may	  be	  useful.	  Rule-­‐based	  moral	  theories	  that	  provide	  a	  decision	  procedure	  for	  deducing	  correct	  moral	  behavior	  are	  limited	  in	  what	  they	  can	  accomplish.	  Ethical	  concerns,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  radically	  contingent	  upon	  different	  histories,	  social,	  and	  religious	  contexts	  –	  they	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  single	  general	  pattern.8	  By	  pointing	  out	  the	  relative	  nature	  of	  knowledge	  claims	  and	  
                                                7	  Lee,	  The	  Ethical	  Foundations	  of	  Early	  Daoism,	  21.	  	  8	  Bernard	  Williams,	  “Morality,	  the	  Peculiar	  Institutions”	  in	  Ethics	  and	  
the	  Limits	  of	  Philosophy	  (Taylor	  and	  Francis,	  2006),	  174-­‐196.	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doctrines,	  Zhuangzi	  undermines	  his	  philosophical	  opponents’	  claims	  to	  have	  access	  to	  some	  absolute	  moral	  doctrine,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  preclude	  the	  text	  from	  offering	  a	  positive	  vision.	  If	  moral	  claims	  are	  limited,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  offering	  a	  broader	  ethics	  in	  which	  the	  development	  of	  certain	  skills	  allows	  the	  sagely	  individual	  to	  adapt	  and	  respond	  to	  whatever	  is	  called	  for	  by	  the	  situation	  at	  hand.	  	   The	  above	  referenced	  ‘amoral’	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  want	  to	  deny	  the	  normative	  dimension	  of	  the	  text.	  Likewise,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  text	  does	  offer	  an	  positive	  ethical	  vision,	  and	  outlines	  better	  and	  worse	  ways	  of	  living	  which	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  contrast	  between	  
shifei	  (是非),	  which	  were	  commonly	  used	  to	  designate	  what	  is	  affirmed	  and	  what	  is	  denied	  or	  what	  is	  ‘right’	  and	  what	  is	  ‘wrong’,	  and	  ming	  (明),	  a	  cultivated	  practice	  associated	  with	  the	  good	  life.	  However,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  opens	  its	  criticism	  of	  shifei	  judgments	  in	  the	  Qiwulun	  chapter	  with	  a	  different	  contrast	  that	  indicates	  an	  underlying	  ethical	  position:	  “Great	  knowledge	  is	  broad	  and	  unhurried;	  small	  knowledge	  is	  cramped	  and	  busy.	  Great	  words	  are	  clear	  and	  limpid,	  little	  words	  are	  shrill	  and	  quarrelsome.”9	  These	  verses	  form	  rhyming	  couplets,	  the	  first	  of	  which	  reads:	  大知閑閑，小知閒閒	  (dazhi	  xian	  
xian,	  xiao	  zhi	  jianjian).	  Some	  have	  used	  the	  overlapping	  semantic	  scope	  of	  
xian閑	  and	  jian	  閒 to	  argue	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  sees	  great	  knowledge	  and	  
                                                9	  Zhuangzi	  2.51,	  Watson	  37.	  大知閑閑，小知閒閒；大言炎炎，小言
詹詹。	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small	  knowledge	  as	  essentially	  equivalent	  ideas,	  and	  that	  ultimately	  the	  text	  is	  proffering	  a	  relativist	  position.10	  However,	  the	  phrases	  “great	  knowledge”	  and	  “small	  knowledge”	  are	  used	  in	  the	  immediately	  prior	  chapter	  in	  a	  way	  which	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  a	  meaningful	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  in	  a	  more	  clear	  cut	  way:	  “small	  knowledge	  does	  not	  measure	  up	  to	  great	  knowledge,	  fewer	  years	  do	  not	  measure	  up	  to	  many	  years.”11	  Here	  buji	  (不及)	  means	  “does	  not	  measure	  up	  to”	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  “is	  not	  as	  good	  as”;	  we	  can	  thus	  infer	  that	  small	  knowledge	  is	  less	  desirable	  than	  great	  knowledge,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  living	  few	  years	  is	  less	  desirable	  than	  living	  many	  years.	  The	  
Zhuangzi	  frequently	  refers	  to	  the	  ideal	  of	  living	  out	  one’s	  natural	  lifespan,	  as	  opposed	  to	  having	  it	  cut	  short	  by	  some	  non-­‐natural	  intervention,	  such	  as	  war.	  If	  living	  a	  natural	  lifespan	  is	  presumed	  better,	  then	  great	  knowledge	  too	  is	  presumed	  better	  than	  small	  knowledge.	  Looking	  at	  this	  distinction,	  we	  should	  infer	  that	  Zhuangzi	  clearly	  thinks	  there	  are	  better	  and	  worse	  ways	  to	  live.	  Zhuangzi	  is	  not	  a	  relativist	  on	  this	  matter,	  although	  he	  does	  make	  a	  point	  about	  the	  perspectival	  nature	  of	  judgments	  in	  his	  critique	  of	  those	  who	  suppose	  the	  heart-­‐mind	  is	  the	  ultimate	  faculty	  of	  self-­‐cultivation.	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  ethical	  vision,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
                                                10	  See	  Paul	  Kjellberg’s	  translation:	  “Zhuangzi”	  in	  Classical	  Readings	  in	  
Chinese	  Philosophy,	  2nd	  edition,	  ed.	  Philip	  J.	  Ivanhoe	  &	  Bryan	  Van	  Norden	  (Indianapolis:	  Hackett	  Publishing,	  2005),	  208-­‐254.	  	  11	  Zhuangzi	  1.11,	  Watson	  30.	  小知不及大知，小年不及大年	  (xiao	  zhi	  
buji	  da	  zhi,	  xiao	  nian	  buji	  da	  zhi).	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understand	  its	  criticism	  of	  taking	  the	  heart-­‐mind	  (xin	  心)	  as	  one’s	  guide,	  which	  has	  inspired	  many	  an	  ‘amoral’	  interpretation.	  12	  	  
2.	  The	  Relative	  Nature	  of	  Shifei	  Judgments	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  the	  Heart-­‐Mind	  	  	   As	  the	  seat	  of	  intellectual	  activity	  and	  critical	  reflection,	  the	  heart-­‐mind	  is	  responsible	  for	  affirming	  and	  denying	  different	  claims,	  beliefs	  and	  feelings.	  The	  heart-­‐mind	  is	  the	  source	  that	  issues	  judgments,	  known	  as	  shi	  (
是)	  and	  fei	  (非).	  One	  of	  Mencius’	  four	  incipient	  moral	  feelings,	  for	  example,	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  heart	  of	  shifei.	  According	  to	  Mencius’	  moral	  program,	  through	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  heart-­‐mind,	  this	  feeling	  develops	  into	  Confucian	  virtue	  of	  wisdom	  (zhi知).	  The	  heart-­‐mind	  discriminates	  between	  ‘this’	  and	  ‘that’	  as	  well	  as	  ‘right’	  and	  ‘wrong’.	  Thus,	  when	  I	  shi	  something,	  I	  am	  affirming	  it	  as	  a	  belief,	  and	  when	  I	  fei	  something	  I	  am	  denying	  it	  as	  being	  the	  case.	  For	  example	  I	  can	  ‘shi’	  this	  horse,	  thereby	  affirming	  that	  it	  is	  a	  horse.	  But	  this	  implies	  that	  whatever	  I	  have	  not	  affirmed	  as	  this	  horse	  is	  not	  this	  horse	  (I	  have	  ‘fei’-­‐ed	  or	  denied	  that	  these	  non-­‐this	  horse	  things	  are	  a	  horse).	  This	  likewise	  applies	  to	  making	  evaluative	  judgments	  in	  which	  one	  might	  affirm	  the	  Confucian	  moral	  doctrine,	  and	  deny	  the	  Mohist	  moral	  doctrine.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  criticizes	  this	  practice	  of	  making	  distinctions:	  in	  affirming	  or	  denying	  a	  thing	  I	  am	  demarcating	  it	  from	  other	  things,	  and	  
                                                12	  To	  convey	  both	  cognitive	  and	  affective	  connotations	  of	  xin	  (心)	  I	  translate	  it	  as	  ‘heart-­‐mind.’	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therefore	  presupposing	  certain	  standards	  by	  which	  I	  can	  make	  such	  demarcations.	  Any	  shifei	  judgment	  that	  one	  makes	  presupposes	  some	  standard	  by	  which	  one	  can	  make	  that	  judgment.	  But	  those	  standards	  themselves	  are	  judgments,	  which	  have	  been	  affirmed	  or	  denied	  (e.g.	  this	  is	  the	  standard,	  that	  is	  not	  the	  standard).	  Thus,	  the	  standards	  which	  have	  been	  affirmed	  presuppose	  some	  other	  standard,	  which	  justify	  one’s	  affirming	  them	  –	  and	  of	  course	  those	  standards	  are	  judgments	  which	  presuppose	  another	  set	  of	  standards,	  so	  on	  and	  so	  forth.	  The	  heart-­‐mind,	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  responsible	  for	  making	  distinctions	  or	  judgments,	  is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  judgments	  as	  well	  as	  the	  standards	  by	  which	  we	  make	  subsequent	  judgments.13	  Therefore,	  claims	  established	  by	  the	  heart-­‐mind	  are	  dependent	  upon	  perspective	  of	  the	  individual	  who	  establishes	  them,	  since	  that	  individual	  also	  establishes	  the	  criteria	  by	  which	  he	  evaluates	  those	  claims.	  	  Insofar	  as	  shifei	  judgments	  and	  the	  criteria	  by	  which	  we	  make	  them	  are	  dependent	  upon	  a	  particular	  perspective,	  such	  claims	  are	  shifting	  linguistic	  categories	  rather	  than	  objective	  truths.	  For	  example,	  from	  where	  I	  
                                                13	  The	  Zhuangzi	  effectively	  points	  out	  the	  issue	  with	  supposing	  there	  is	  one	  foundation	  standard	  or	  state	  that	  exists	  prior	  to	  everything	  else	  in	  2.79:	  有始也者，有未始有始也者，有未始有夫未始有始也者。“There	  is	  ‘beginning’,	  there	  is	  ‘not	  yet	  having	  begun	  having	  a	  beginning.’	  There	  is	  “there	  not	  yet	  having	  begun	  to	  be	  that	  ‘not	  yet	  having	  begun	  having	  a	  beginning’”	  (Translation	  Graham,	  Chuang-­‐Tzu,	  55).	  Every	  time	  we	  try	  to	  establish	  that	  fundamental	  beginning	  point,	  we	  necessarily	  give	  rise	  to	  two	  things,	  and	  must	  look	  back	  to	  find	  the	  fundamental	  thing	  that	  is	  prior	  to	  that	  distinction	  we’ve	  just	  made.	  But	  again,	  establishing	  that	  beginning	  point	  gives	  rise	  to	  two	  things,	  such	  that	  we	  are	  forced	  into	  a	  pointless	  infinite	  regress,	  when	  searching	  for	  some	  independently	  existing	  beginning	  point.	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stand	  I	  might	  affirm	  that	  a	  particular	  object	  is	  near.	  But	  from	  much	  farther	  away,	  you	  might	  regard	  it	  as	  far	  away.	  Near	  and	  far,	  like	  shi	  and	  fei,	  are	  not	  fixed	  categories.	  ‘Right’	  and	  ‘wrong’	  could	  always	  be	  some	  other	  way	  contingent	  upon	  a	  different	  perspective.	  Thus	  we	  have	  shi	  and	  fei	  of	  the	  Confucians	  and	  the	  Mohists:	  “What	  one	  calls	  right	  the	  other	  calls	  wrong;	  what	  one	  calls	  wrong	  the	  other	  calls	  right.”14	  The	  Confucians	  and	  Mohists	  are	  no	  different	  than	  the	  monkeys	  who	  demand	  a	  greater	  share	  of	  nuts	  in	  the	  morning:	  
狙公賦芧，⽈曰：「朝三⽽而暮四，」眾狙皆怒。⽈曰：「然則朝四⽽而暮三
，」眾狙皆悅。名實未虧⽽而喜怒為⽤用，亦因是也。	  	  When	  the	  monkey	  trainer	  was	  handing	  out	  acorns	  he	  said,	  “You	  get	  three	  in	  the	  morning	  and	  four	  at	  night.”	  This	  made	  all	  the	  monkeys	  furious.	  “Well,	  then,”	  he	  said,	  “you	  get	  four	  in	  the	  morning	  at	  three	  at	  night.”	  The	  monkeys	  were	  all	  delighted.	  There	  was	  no	  change	  in	  the	  reality	  behind	  the	  words,	  and	  yet	  the	  monkeys	  responded	  with	  joy	  and	  anger.15	  	  Their	  quarrels	  are	  essentially	  over	  shifting	  linguistic	  categories.	  Neither	  can	  be	  ultimately	  proclaimed	  ‘right’	  since	  each	  claim	  is	  justified	  according	  to	  the	  criteria	  by	  which	  it	  is	  judged	  to	  be	  so.	  The	  Confucians	  and	  the	  Mohists	  disagree	  because	  they	  are	  playing	  by	  different	  sets	  of	  rules,	  according	  to	  which	  both	  of	  their	  claims	  are	  justified.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  disparaging	  the	  relative	  nature	  of	  evaluative	  claims	  and	  judgments	  themselves;	  after	  all,	  we	  all	  make	  a	  great	  
                                                14	  Zhuangzi	  2.64,	  Watson	  39.	  故有儒墨之是非，以是其所非而非其所
是。	   	  15	  Zhuangzi	  2.70,	  Watson	  41.	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many	  judgments	  on	  a	  daily	  basis	  without	  significant	  consequences.	  For	  example,	  I	  may	  judge	  soup	  to	  be	  a	  better	  lunch	  than	  noodles	  on	  Tuesday,	  without	  committing	  myself	  to	  a	  rigid	  belief	  system.	  It	  is	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  mistaken	  supposition	  that	  one’s	  judgments	  correspond	  to	  an	  objective	  reality.	  This	  attitude	  is	  perpetuated	  in	  assuming	  that	  the	  heart-­‐mind	  is	  the	  ultimate	  faculty	  of	  self-­‐cultivation.	  In	  focusing	  exclusively	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  heart-­‐mind’s	  capacity	  to	  discern	  among	  things,	  one	  puts	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  faith	  in	  what	  it	  establishes.	  In	  discriminating	  ‘right’	  from	  ‘wrong’	  one	  universalizes	  those	  judgments	  and	  imagines	  that	  they	  correspond	  to	  an	  objective	  reality.	  The	  Confucians	  and	  Mohists	  disagree	  because	  they	  each	  suppose	  they	  are	  judging	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  objective	  standards,	  and	  thereby	  prescribe	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  moral	  and	  even	  epistemic	  criteria	  for	  everyone.	  These	  entrenched	  beliefs	  then	  lead	  a	  person	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	  world	  around	  him,	  when	  that	  world	  does	  not	  conform	  to	  his	  belief-­‐structure,	  and	  with	  other	  individuals	  and	  groups	  that	  likewise	  do	  not	  share	  his	  valuations	  and	  perspective.	  The	  condition	  of	  the	  common	  man	  who	  takes	  the	  heart-­‐mind	  as	  his	  guide	  is	  one	  of	  continual	  conflict	  as	  he	  strives	  to	  affirm	  his	  position.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  Zhuangzi	  rejects	  the	  heart-­‐mind	  as	  the	  faculty	  associated	  with	  self-­‐cultivation	  or	  the	  best	  way	  to	  live.	  Through	  the	  mouth	  of	  Confucius,	  the	  text	  proclaims	  that	  we	  must	  “fast	  the	  heart-­‐mind.”16	  




This	  “fasting”	  of	  the	  heart-­‐mind	  has	  often	  been	  interpreted	  as	  an	  attack	  on	  rationality,	  conceptual	  thinking	  or	  intellect.	  Graham	  writes,	  “Like	  all	  great	  anti-­‐rationalists,	  Zhuangzi	  has	  his	  reasons	  for	  not	  listening	  to	  reason.”17	  And	  Yuet	  Keung	  Lo,	  in	  passing,	  notes,	  “the	  Daoists	  would	  block	  all	  conduits	  of	  perception	  and	  intellect	  to	  create	  a	  twilight	  zone	  within	  their	  own	  minds.”18	  The	  suggestion	  is	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  attacks	  the	  heart-­‐mind	  because	  reason	  or	  rationality	  leads	  us	  astray.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  text	  completely	  disavows	  the	  use	  of	  one’s	  heart-­‐mind.19	  Again	  through	  the	  mouth	  of	  Confucius,	  the	  text	  outlines	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  ways	  of	  living:	  “Don’t	  listen	  with	  your	  ears,	  listen	  with	  your	  heart-­‐mind	  (xin	  心).	  No,	  don’t	  listen	  with	  your	  heart-­‐mind,	  but	  listen	  with	  your	  qi	  (氣).”20	  The	  least	  desirable	  mode	  of	  living	  is	  to	  go	  by	  one’s	  ears,	  or	  merely	  by	  what	  one	  hears	  and	  accepts	  without	  critical	  reflection.	  21	  To	  go	  by	  one’s	  heart-­‐mind	  means	  that	  one	  has	  exercised	  
                                                17	  A.C.	  Graham,	  Disputers	  of	  the	  Tao	  (LaSalle,	  IL:	  Open	  Court	  Publishing,	  1989),	  176.	  	  18	  Yuet	  Keung	  Lo,	  “To	  Use	  or	  Not	  to	  Use:	  The	  Idea	  of	  Ming	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi,”	  Monumenta	  Serica	  47	  (1999),	  159.	  	  	  19	  Erin	  Cline	  argues	  that	  ethical	  behavior	  depends	  upon	  using	  the	  heart-­‐mind	  like	  a	  mirror,	  and	  that	  the	  text	  does	  not	  unilaterally	  reject	  all	  capacities	  of	  the	  heart-­‐mind,	  including	  “cognitive,	  affective,	  intentional,	  and	  volitional	  powers…”	  (“Mirrors,	  Minds,	  and	  Metaphors,”	  Philosophy	  East	  and	  
West	  58,	  no.	  3	  (2008),	  339).	  	  20	  Zhuangzi	  4.147,	  Watson	  57-­‐58.	  無聽之以耳而聽之以心，無聽之以
心而聽之以氣！	  	  21	  Based	  on	  this	  passage’s	  affinity	  with	  Mencius	  2A2,	  I	  agree	  with	  Nivison	  and	  Slingerland’s	  suggestion	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  rejection	  of	  what	  is	  heard	  is	  a	  rejection	  of	  tenaciously	  held	  beliefs	  that	  are	  not	  critically	  reviewed.	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that	  critical	  reflection	  with	  respect	  to	  his	  beliefs,	  and	  this	  is	  more	  desirable	  than	  going	  by	  one’s	  ears	  alone	  (although	  it	  is	  certainly	  not	  the	  best	  way	  of	  living).	  	  	   The	  instrumental	  value	  of	  the	  heart-­‐mind	  is	  illustrated	  by	  the	  text’s	  comments	  on	  Hui	  Shi:	  Zhuangzi	  does	  seem	  to	  admire	  Hui	  Shi’s	  intellectual	  acumen,	  by	  referring	  to	  Hui	  Shi’s	  knowledge	  as	  “close	  to	  perfection.”22	  However,	  the	  text	  laments	  the	  fact	  that	  Hui	  Shi	  “abused	  and	  dissipated	  his	  talents.”	  This	  implies	  that	  Hui	  Shi’s	  intellectual	  abilities	  were	  desirable,	  but	  that	  Hui	  Shi	  failed	  to	  “show	  greater	  respect	  for	  the	  Way,”	  and	  thus	  his	  “accomplishments	  from	  the	  point	  of	  the	  view	  of	  the	  Way	  of	  Heaven	  and	  earth,	  they	  seem	  like	  the	  exertions	  of	  a	  mosquito	  or	  a	  gnat	  –	  of	  what	  use	  are	  they	  to	  other	  things?”23	  Hui	  Shi	  is	  only	  concerned	  with	  the	  development	  of	  his	  skills	  at	  disputation	  and	  therefore	  is	  only	  concerned	  with	  cultivating	  his	  heart-­‐mind.	  The	  intellectual	  nature	  of	  the	  heart-­‐mind	  means	  it	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  overturning	  what	  one	  “hears,”	  or	  what	  is	  blindly	  accepted.	  The	  heart-­‐mind	  supplies	  the	  skills	  to	  critically	  assess	  one’s	  beliefs	  and	  thus	  move	  past	  a	  
                                                                                                                                See	  Robert	  Nivison,	  “Philosophical	  Volunteerism”	  in	  The	  Ways	  of	  
Confucianism:	  Investigations	  in	  Chinese	  Philosophy	  	  (LaSalle,	  IL:	  Open	  Court	  Publishing,	  1996),	  121-­‐32,	  and	  Slingerland,	  Effortless	  Action,	  184.	  	  22	  Zhuangzi	  2.74,	  Watson	  42.	  In	  speaking	  of	  three	  masters	  in	  which	  Hui	  Shi	  is	  included,	  the	  text	  proclaims,	  三子之知幾乎	  	  23	  Zhuangzi	  33.1112,	  Watson	  377.	  由天地之道觀惠施之能，其猶一蚉
一虻之勞者也。其於物也何庸！夫充一尚可，曰愈貴道，幾矣！	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phase	  of	  merely	  going	  by	  what	  one	  hears.	  Zhuangzi	  does	  not	  lament	  Hui	  Shi’s	  use	  of	  the	  heart-­‐mind;	  he	  is,	  after	  all,	  able	  to	  critically	  reflect	  upon	  beliefs	  and	  dissect	  them	  in	  various	  ways.	  Hui	  Shi	  never	  blindly	  follows	  doctrines.	  Rather,	  the	  text	  laments	  that	  Hui	  Shi	  is	  only	  concerned	  with	  developing	  intellectual	  acumen	  in	  order	  to	  excel	  at	  disputation	  –	  he	  never	  gets	  beyond	  using	  the	  heart-­‐mind.	  	  Additionally,	  in	  surveying	  the	  representations	  of	  sagely	  characters	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  we	  do	  see	  them	  making	  judgments	  and	  distinctions.	  While	  Cook	  Ding	  is	  effortlessly	  butchering	  an	  ox,	  he	  must	  draw	  on	  the	  concepts	  that	  enable	  him	  to	  distinguish	  his	  knife	  from	  a	  spoon,	  and	  thereby	  choose	  the	  tool	  that	  will	  permit	  him	  to	  cut	  up	  the	  ox.24	  Furthermore,	  without	  common	  concepts	  and	  judgments,	  friendships,	  such	  as	  that	  of	  Zisang	  Hu,	  Meng	  Zifan,	  and	  Ziqin	  Zhang,	  would	  have	  no	  foundation.	  Some	  bare	  level	  of	  concept	  application	  and	  the	  corresponding	  ability	  to	  make	  judgments	  is	  required	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  forming	  relationships.25	  Cook	  Ding	  and	  the	  friendships	  featured	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  do	  draw	  on	  concepts	  and	  make	  choices.	  But	  that	  they	  make	  choices	  does	  not	  commit	  us	  to	  saying	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  advocating	  rationality,	  or	  going	  by	  one’s	  heart-­‐mind,	  as	  the	  primary	  mode	  of	  self-­‐cultivation.	  It	  is	  entirely	  possible	  to	  hold	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  allows	  for	  concept	  application	  and	  issuing	  judgments	  but	  that	  the	  good	  life	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  mere	  rational	  deliberation.	  The	  Zhuangzi’s	  criticisms	  of	  the	  heart-­‐
                                                24	  Zhuangzi	  3.115-­‐124,	  Watson	  50-­‐51.	  	  25	  Zhuangzi	  6.264,	  Watson	  86.	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mind	  do	  not	  take	  aim	  at	  heart-­‐mind’s	  intellectual	  capacity.	  On	  the	  contrary	  –	  proper	  use	  of	  that	  faculty	  is	  at	  least	  unproblematic,	  as	  with	  Cook	  Ding	  and	  the	  three	  friends,	  and	  at	  best	  instrumentally	  valuable,	  as	  with	  Hui	  Shi.	  	  	  The	  Zhuangzi	  is	  rejecting	  a	  way	  of	  life	  in	  which	  one	  elevates	  his	  judgments	  to	  the	  level	  of	  doctrine,	  thereby	  claiming	  a	  broader	  scope	  than	  that	  to	  which	  he	  is	  entitled.	  This	  is	  why,	  in	  its	  criticism,	  the	  text	  exclaims,	  “If	  a	  man	  sleeps	  in	  a	  damp	  place,	  his	  back	  aches	  and	  he	  ends	  up	  half	  paralyzed,	  but	  is	  this	  true	  of	  a	  loach?	  If	  he	  lives	  in	  a	  tree,	  he	  is	  terrified	  and	  shakes	  with	  fright,	  but	  is	  this	  true	  of	  a	  monkey?	  Of	  these	  three	  creatures,	  then,	  which	  one	  knows	  the	  proper	  place	  to	  live?”26	  What	  is	  ‘right’	  from	  one	  perspective	  may	  not	  be	  applicable	  in	  all	  circumstances.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  is	  concerned	  about	  the	  tendency	  toward	  over	  confidence	  in	  one’s	  capacity	  to	  make	  ‘correct’	  distinctions,	  when	  in	  fact	  these	  distinctions	  are	  not	  reflective	  of	  some	  mind-­‐independent	  state	  of	  affairs.	  Ultimately	  this	  can	  lead	  to	  undesirable	  consequences;	  using	  the	  text’s	  example,	  if	  the	  loach	  tried	  to	  enforce	  his	  standards	  upon	  a	  man,	  the	  man	  would	  end	  up	  half	  paralyzed!	  This	  is	  why	  the	  text	  associates	  the	  emphasis	  on	  correct	  distinctions	  with	  petty	  or	  small	  knowledge	  (xiao	  zhi小知)	  –	  such	  judgments	  are	  narrow.	  The	  individual	  who	  subscribes	  to	  them	  limits	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  he	  can	  understand	  and	  consequently	  respond	  to	  the	  world	  around	  him.	  




3.	  The	  Zhuangzi’s	  Appropriation	  of	  Ming	  (明)	  	  The	  Zhuangzi,	  via	  Confucius,	  rejects	  the	  emphasis	  on	  correct	  distinction	  and	  judgments	  as	  issued	  by	  the	  heart-­‐mind,	  saying,	  “Don’t	  listen	  with	  your	  ears,	  listen	  with	  your	  heart-­‐mind.	  No,	  don’t	  listen	  with	  your	  heart-­‐mind,	  but	  listen	  with	  your	  qi.”27	  In	  this	  progression,	  going	  by	  one’s	  qi	  is	  suggested	  as	  the	  best	  way	  to	  live.	  But	  the	  movement	  away	  from	  exclusively	  being	  guided	  by	  the	  discriminatory	  heart-­‐mind	  and	  toward	  a	  better	  way	  to	  live	  one’s	  life	  is	  voiced	  by	  a	  number	  of	  sagely	  characters	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi:	  In	  chapter	  three,	  Cook	  Ding’s	  sagely	  advice	  suggests	  going	  by	  one’s	  shen	  (神).	  Likewise,	  the	  Bellstand	  Maker	  Qing	  explains	  that	  he	  is	  merely	  examining	  the	  “heavenly	  nature”	  (tian	  xing	  天性	  )	  of	  things.	  But	  insofar	  as	  this	  best	  mode	  of	  living	  is	  a	  rejection	  of	  a	  disposition	  engendered	  by	  emphasizing	  the	  heart-­‐mind’s	  ability	  to	  make	  distinctions,	  it	  might	  best	  be	  looked	  at	  in	  terms	  of	  
ming	  (明),	  which	  the	  Zhuangzi	  explicitly	  holds	  up	  in	  contrast	  to	  shifei	  distinctions:	  	  
道隱於小成，言隱於榮華。故有儒墨之是非，以是其所非而非其所是。
欲是其所非而非其所是，則莫若以明。	  	  When	  the	  Way	  relies	  on	  little	  accomplishments	  and	  words	  rely	  on	  vain	  show,	  then	  we	  have	  the	  rights	  and	  wrongs	  (shifei	  是非)	  of	  the	  Confucians	  and	  Mohists.	  What	  one	  calls	  right	  the	  other	  calls	  wrong;	  
                                                27	  Zhuangzi	  4.147,	  Watson	  57-­‐58.	  無聽之以耳而聽之以心，無聽之以
心而聽之以氣！	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what	  one	  calls	  wrong	  the	  other	  calls	  right.	  But	  if	  we	  want	  to	  right	  their	  wrongs	  and	  wrong	  their	  rights,	  then	  the	  best	  thing	  to	  use	  is	  clarity	  (ming).28	  	   The	  concept	  of	  ming	  is	  built	  upon	  the	  metaphor	  of	  light.	  Lo	  points	  out	  that	  the	  Erya	  (爾雅)	  dictionary	  defines	  ming	  as	  “bright”	  (lang朗),	  and	  the	  compound	  mingming	  as	  “to	  examine	  meticulously”	  (cha察).	  Lo	  concludes	  that	  ming	  refers	  to	  a	  “quality	  of	  brilliance.”29	  An	  analogy	  is	  illustrative	  in	  here:	  if	  someone	  turns	  the	  lights	  on,	  illuminating	  a	  dark	  room,	  I	  can	  then	  see	  the	  room	  clearly.	  Moreover,	  I	  can	  distinguish	  a	  path	  around	  the	  room,	  so	  that	  I	  do	  not	  bump	  into	  the	  bed	  or	  fall	  into	  a	  closet.	  Because	  I	  can	  see	  things	  clearly,	  I	  can	  now	  conduct	  my	  affairs	  properly.	  Lo	  further	  contends	  that	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  a	  sagely	  quality,	  ming	  holds	  certain	  moral	  connotations.30	  Just	  as	  when	  the	  lights	  are	  turned	  on	  and	  I	  can	  conduct	  my	  affairs	  properly,	  the	  illuminated	  person	  can	  see	  the	  right	  way	  to	  live	  one’s	  life.	  For	  example,	  Mencius	  says,	  	  
設為庠序學校以教之…皆所以明人倫也。人倫明於上，小民親於下。	  	  Gardens,	  courses,	  learning	  and	  schools	  were	  set	  up	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  education…	  they	  were	  all	  used	  to	  illuminate	  (ming)	  human	  roles.	  When	  the	  human	  roles	  are	  illuminated	  (ming)	  above,	  the	  common	  people	  will	  follow	  below.31	  	  
                                                28	  Zhuangzi	  2.63,	  Watson	  39.	  	  	  29	  Lo,	  “To	  Use	  or	  Not	  to	  Use,”	  150.	  	  30	  Ibid.,	  150-­‐53.	  	  31	  Mencius	  3A3.10,	  Van	  Norden	  67.	  Mencius	  citations	  refer	  to	  A	  
Concordance	  to	  the	  Mengzi	  (孟子逐字索引),	  ed.	  D.C.	  Lau,	  Ho	  Che	  Wah	  and	  Chen	  Fong	  Ching.	  ICS	  series	  (Hong	  Kong:	  Commercial	  Press,	  1995).	  Mencius	  translations	  from	  Bryan	  Van	  Norden’s	  Mengzi:	  With	  Selections	  from	  
Traditional	  Commentaries	  (Indianapolis:	  Hackett	  Publishing,	  2008).	  
 84 
	  Here	  Mencius	  is	  suggesting	  that	  when	  the	  rulers	  clarify	  ethical	  relationships	  among	  families,	  then	  those	  previously	  unaware	  will	  become	  enlightened	  regarding	  ethical	  conduct.	  	  The	  use	  of	  ming	  in	  educational	  contexts	  suggests	  that	  it	  has	  both	  moral	  and	  epistemic	  connotations.	  A	  teacher	  illuminates	  his	  student	  moving	  him	  from	  a	  lower	  epistemic	  rung	  to	  a	  higher	  one.	  He	  turns	  on	  the	  light,	  so	  to	  speak,	  so	  that	  the	  student	  can	  clearly	  see	  the	  right	  way	  to	  live.	  32	  The	  epistemic	  connotations	  of	  ming	  link	  it	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  making	  distinctions:	  in	  clarifying	  the	  right	  way	  to	  live	  or	  the	  correct	  moral	  doctrine,	  one	  distinguishes	  it	  from	  what	  it	  is	  not.	  Returning	  again	  to	  the	  illuminated	  room	  analogy,	  when	  the	  light	  is	  on	  I	  can	  distinguish	  between	  the	  bed	  and	  the	  table,	  from	  where	  to	  walk	  and	  where	  not	  to	  walk.	  For	  the	  sage	  this	  means	  he	  can	  distinguish	  right	  from	  wrong,	  and	  the	  correct	  moral	  doctrine	  from	  the	  incorrect	  one.	  Karyn	  Lai	  and	  Wai	  Wai	  Chiu	  make	  an	  interesting	  observation	  about	  the	  use	  of	  ming	  to	  characterize	  fa	  (法)	  or	  standards	  in	  the	  Mozi.	  They	  take	  this	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  ming’s	  epistemic	  connotations.	  The	  Mozi	  reads:	  	  
今天下之士君子之書，不可勝載，言語不可盡計…其於仁義則大相
遠…其於仁義則大相遠也。何以知之？曰我得天下之明法以度之。	  	  
                                                                                                                                	  32	  Karyn	  Lai	  and	  Wai	  Wai	  Chiu,	  helpfully	  suggest	  that	  the	  teacher	  enlightens	  and	  thereby	  moves	  the	  student	  from	  a	  lower	  epistemic	  rung	  to	  a	  higher	  one.	  See	  Lai	  and	  Chiu,	  “Ming	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  Neipian”	  Journal	  of	  
Chinese	  Philosophy	  40,	  no.	  3-­‐4	  (2013),	  527-­‐543.	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Now	  the	  books	  of	  the	  world’s	  officers	  and	  gentlemen	  cannot	  be	  completely	  recorded	  and	  their	  doctrines	  cannot	  be	  completely	  enumerated…	  they	  are	  a	  long	  way	  from	  benevolence	  and	  rightness.	  How	  do	  I	  know	  this?	  I	  say	  it	  is	  because	  I	  have	  the	  clearest	  standard	  (明
法)	  in	  the	  world	  to	  evaluate	  them	  with.33	  	  Lai	  and	  Chiu	  explain,	  “For	  the	  Mohists,	  the	  clearest	  standard	  is	  also	  the	  correct	  one	  as	  it	  can	  guide	  a	  person’s	  practice	  most	  reliably.	  It	  implies	  that	  one	  who	  is	  guided	  by	  an	  unclear	  standard	  is	  confused…that	  is,	  wrong.”	  34	  
Ming	  designates	  an	  ethical	  and	  epistemic	  status	  associated	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  clear	  distinctions.	  Knowing	  the	  best	  way	  to	  live	  and	  consequently	  self-­‐cultivation	  consist	  in	  apprehending	  the	  correct	  distinctions.	  In	  this	  sense,	  
ming	  is	  the	  activity	  of	  making	  something	  clear	  through	  handing	  down	  the	  correct	  distinctions.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  plays	  on	  the	  use	  ming	  in	  this	  common	  way.	  For	  example,	  in	  describing	  the	  skills	  of	  Zhao	  Wen,	  Master	  Kuang,	  and	  Huizi,	  we	  read:	  “What	  they	  liked,	  they	  tried	  to	  make	  clear	  (明).	  What	  was	  not	  clear	  they	  tried	  to	  make	  clear	  (明),	  and	  so	  they	  ended	  in	  the	  foolishness	  of	  ‘hard’	  and	  ‘white’.”35	  Here	  ‘hard’	  and	  ‘white’	  refer	  to	  Gongsun	  Long’s	  famous	  claim	  “a	  white	  horse	  
                                                33	  Mozi	  26.8,	  Johnston	  243.	  Mozi	  Yinde	  墨子引得	  (A	  Concordance	  to	  Mo	  
Tzu),	  Harvard-­‐Yenching	  Institute	  Sinological	  Index	  Series,	  Supplement	  no.	  21	  (Cambridge	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1956).	  All	  translations	  of	  the	  Mozi	  are	  from	  The	  Mozi:	  A	  Complete	  Translation,	  trans.	  Ian	  Johnston	  (New	  York,	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  	  	  
 34	  Lai	  and	  Chiu,	  “Ming	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  Neipian,”	  529.	  Ming	  is	  the	  quality	  of	  a	  sage	  that	  designates	  an	  ethical	  and	  epistemic	  status	  associated	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  clear	  distinctions.	  	  	  35	  Zhuangzi	  2.74,	  based	  on	  Watson	  42.	  欲以明之。彼非所明而明之，
故以堅白之昧終。	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is	  not	  a	  horse.”36	  The	  Zhuangzi	  regards	  this	  kind	  of	  statement	  as	  representative	  of	  a	  class	  of	  thinkers	  that	  engaged	  in	  rhetoric	  as	  a	  frivolous	  show	  of	  their	  skill	  at	  making	  distinctions	  that	  result	  in	  bizarre	  conclusions,	  and	  is	  therefore	  using	  ming	  in	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  it	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  practice	  of	  making	  distinctions	  as	  a	  means	  of	  discerning	  the	  best	  way	  of	  life.37	  Using	  their	  extensive	  knowledge,	  these	  three	  masters	  sought	  to	  edify	  others	  by	  distinguishing	  the	  object	  of	  their	  respective	  interests.	  However,	  the	  text	  points	  out	  that	  although	  they	  aimed	  at	  clarity	  this	  task	  devolved	  into	  meaningless	  choplogic;	  the	  Zhuangzi	  sees	  them	  as	  practicing	  a	  kind	  of	  false	  
ming	  that	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  striving	  to	  distinguish	  an	  object.	  The	  text	  undermines	  the	  assumption	  that	  striving	  to	  affirm	  or	  distinguish	  a	  thing	  will	  have	  a	  positive	  outcome.	  However,	  it	  continues,	  	  
                                                36	  The	  Zhuangzi	  regards	  Gongsun	  Long’s	  famous	  claim	  “a	  white	  horse	  is	  not	  a	  horse”	  (白馬非馬)	  as	  nonsense.	  See	  “Gongsunlongzi”	  公孫龍子	  in	  
Concordances	  to	  the	  Kongcongzi,	  Dengxizi,	  Yinwenzi,	  Gongsunlongzi	  (孔叢子逐
字索引、鄧析子逐字索引、尹文子逐字索引、公孫龍子逐字索引),	  ed.	  D.C.	  Lau,	  Ho	  Che	  Wah	  and	  Chen	  Fong	  Ching.	  ICS	  series	  (Hong	  Kong:	  Commercial	  Press,	  1998).	  For	  a	  translation	  of	  the	  Gongsun	  Longzi	  see	  Readings	  in	  Classical	  




是故滑疑之耀，聖人之所圖也。為是不用而寓諸庸，此之謂以明。	  	  Can	  these	  men	  be	  said	  to	  have	  attained	  completion?	  If	  so,	  then	  so	  have	  all	  the	  rest	  of	  us.	  Or	  can	  they	  not	  be	  said	  to	  have	  attained	  completion?	  If	  so,	  then	  neither	  we	  nor	  anything	  else	  have	  ever	  attained	  it.	  The	  torch	  of	  chaos	  and	  doubt	  –	  this	  is	  what	  the	  sage	  steers	  by.	  So	  he	  does	  not	  use	  things	  but	  relegates	  all	  to	  the	  constant.	  This	  is	  what	  it	  means	  to	  use	  clarity	  (明).38	  	  Here	  the	  Zhuangzi	  dispenses	  with	  the	  conventional	  sense	  of	  ming,	  and	  ironically	  recasts	  it	  as	  something	  dark	  and	  obscure.	  For	  Zhuangzi,	  knowledge	  of	  the	  best	  way	  of	  living	  and	  self-­‐cultivation	  does	  not	  reside	  in	  the	  attempt	  to	  affirm	  or	  distinguish	  by	  making	  correct	  judgments.	  	  
3.1	  Undermining	  Sages,	  Teachers,	  and	  Books	  	  The	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Zhuangzi	  undermines	  the	  understanding	  of	  
ming	  in	  terms	  of	  making	  distinction	  is	  played	  out	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways,	  not	  least	  among	  them	  is	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  derision	  of	  traditional	  sources	  of	  illumination	  such	  as	  sages,	  teachers,	  and	  ancient	  books.	  39	  These	  sources	  might	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  standards	  by	  which	  one	  can	  make	  judgments.	  Particularly	  in	  early	  Warring	  States	  texts	  the	  sage	  kings,	  Yao	  (堯),	  Shun	  (舜),	  
                                                38	  Zhuangzi	  2.75,	  Watson	  42.	  	  	  39	  The	  Warring	  States	  textualists	  are	  particularly	  fond	  of	  citing	  ancient	  books	  (especially	  the	  Shijing	  (詩經))	  as	  purveyors	  of	  wisdom,	  and	  the	  
Zhuangzi’s	  criticism	  may	  more	  or	  less	  be	  directed	  at	  them.	  See	  Analects	  8.8,	  16.13,	  and	  17.9,	  and	  Mencius	  3A3	  for	  examples	  of	  appeals	  to	  books.	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and	  Yu	  (禹)	  were	  upheld	  as	  models	  of	  political	  ingenuity	  and	  moral	  wisdom.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  Analects	  Confucius	  references	  the	  music	  of	  the	  sage	  king	  Shun,	  exclaiming,	  “I	  never	  imagined	  that	  music	  could	  be	  so	  sublime!”40	  Later,	  when	  asked	  by	  Yan	  Yuan	  how	  the	  government	  should	  be	  administered,	  Confucius	  responds,	  “Follow	  the	  calendar	  of	  Xia,	  travel	  in	  the	  carriages	  of	  the	  Shang,	  and	  clothe	  yourselves	  in	  the	  ceremonial	  caps	  of	  the	  Zhou.	  As	  for	  music,	  listen	  only	  to	  the	  Shao	  and	  Wu.”41	  Here	  Shao	  (韶)	  refers	  to	  the	  music	  of	  the	  sage	  king	  Shun.	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  we	  should	  concern	  ourselves	  with	  the	  kind	  of	  music	  with	  which	  Shun	  concerned	  himself.	  Shun	  serves	  as	  a	  standard	  by	  which	  we	  can	  judge	  the	  quality	  and	  kind	  of	  music,	  and	  is	  therefore	  a	  source	  of	  instruction	  or	  a	  guide	  for	  making	  judgments.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Mozi	  critiques	  the	  Confucian	  emphasis	  on	  music,	  explaining,	  “The	  decrees	  of	  the	  sage-­‐kings	  were	  aimed	  at	  reducing	  excesses…the	  sages	  had	  music,	  but	  very	  little,	  which	  is	  tantamount	  to	  not	  having	  it.”42	  So	  while	  the	  sage	  kings	  are	  used	  as	  models	  by	  which	  we	  can	  judge	  conduct	  or	  doctrines,	  
                                                40	  Analects	  7.14,	  Slingerland,	  68.	  	  不圖為樂之至於斯也！All	  Analects	  citations	  refer	  to	  A	  Concordance	  to	  the	  Lunyu	  (論語逐字索引),	  ed.	  D.C.	  Lau,	  Ho	  Che	  Wah	  and	  Chen	  Fong	  Ching.	  ICS	  series	  (Hong	  Kong:	  Commercial	  Press,	  1995),	  and	  all	  translations	  are	  Edward	  Slingerland’s	  from	  Confucius	  Analects:	  
With	  Selections	  from	  Traditional	  Commentaries,	  trans.	  Edward	  Slingerland	  (Indianapolis:	  Hackett	  Publishing,	  2003).	  	  	  41	  Analects	  15.11,	  Slingerland,	  178.	  行夏之時，乘殷之輅，服周之冕，
樂則韶舞。	  	  42	  Mozi	  7.3,	  Johnston,	  51.	  聖王之命也，多寡之...今聖有樂而少，此亦
無也。	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they	  are	  appropriated	  and	  exploited	  by	  rival	  philosophical	  schools	  in	  service	  of	  very	  different	  ideas.43	  The	  Zhuangzi	  makes	  fun	  of	  these	  shifting	  interpretations	  of	  the	  sage	  kings	  by	  reimagining	  the	  traditional	  stories	  in	  absurd	  ways.	  Chapter	  one,	  
xiaoyaoyou,	  retells	  the	  traditional	  legend	  of	  Yao	  ceding	  the	  empire	  to	  Shun.44Here	  Yao	  attempts	  to	  cede	  the	  empire	  to	  the	  hermit	  Xu	  You	  (許由),	  who	  rejects	  the	  offer.45	  This	  allegory	  is	  of	  course	  a	  parody,	  with	  Yao	  as	  the	  target	  of	  the	  joke.	  The	  story	  begins	  familiar	  enough	  with	  Yao	  ceding	  the	  throne	  to	  the	  most	  worthy	  in	  the	  kingdom,	  but	  takes	  an	  ironic	  turn	  when	  the	  
                                                43	  While	  these	  sages	  have	  been	  variously	  cast	  as	  the	  progenitors	  of	  culture,	  the	  inventors	  of	  standards,	  and	  more	  or	  less	  those	  who	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  civilized	  society,	  they	  do	  not	  belong	  to	  a	  systematic	  mythology	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  classical	  Greek	  or	  Roman	  gods.	  Derk	  Bodde	  explains	  that	  there	  is	  no	  “integrated	  body	  of	  mythological	  materials.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  these	  materials	  are	  usually	  so	  fragmentary	  and	  episodic	  that	  even	  the	  reconstruction	  from	  them	  of	  individual	  myths	  –	  let	  alone	  an	  integrated	  system	  of	  myths	  –	  is	  exceedingly	  difficult”	  (see	  “Myths	  of	  Ancient	  China,”	  in	  
Mythologies	  of	  the	  Ancient	  World,	  ed.	  Samuel	  Noah	  Kramer	  (New	  York:	  Anchor	  Books,	  1989),	  370).	  The	  pervasiveness	  of	  the	  sage	  mythology	  in	  combination	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  clearly	  defined	  roles	  makes	  the	  sages	  well	  suited	  to	  be	  trotted	  out	  in	  support	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  positions.	  In	  fact,	  the	  sage	  mythology	  is	  perpetuated	  by	  the	  appropriation	  of	  sagely	  authority	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  strategy.	  As	  such,	  the	  sage	  kings	  are	  invented	  and	  reinvented	  as	  they	  are	  utilized	  in	  different	  capacities	  to	  support	  different	  views	  and	  thus	  acquire	  a	  sort	  of	  mytho-­‐historical	  character.	  	  44	  For	  the	  traditional	  story	  see	  Shangshu	  (尚書),	  “Yao	  Dian”	  (堯典)	  in	  James	  Legge’s,	  Chinese	  Classics:	  with	  a	  Translation,	  Critical	  and	  Exegetical	  
Notes,	  Prolegomena,	  and	  Copious	  Index,	  Vol.	  3,	  Part	  I	  (Londom:	  Trübner	  &	  Co.,	  1865),	  113,	  and	  Analects	  20.1.	  	  45	  Chapter	  28,	  Rangwang	  (讓王),	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  as	  a	  collection	  of	  takes	  on	  the	  legends	  of	  Yao	  ceding	  the	  throne	  to	  Shun,	  and	  Shun	  ceding	  the	  throne	  to	  Yu.	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。	  	  You	  govern	  the	  world	  and	  the	  world	  is	  already	  well	  governed.	  Now	  if	  I	  take	  your	  place,	  will	  I	  be	  doing	  it	  for	  a	  name?	  But	  name	  is	  only	  the	  guest	  of	  reality	  –	  will	  I	  be	  doing	  it	  so	  I	  can	  play	  the	  part	  of	  a	  guest?	  When	  the	  tailor-­‐bird	  builds	  her	  nest	  in	  the	  deep	  wood,	  she	  uses	  no	  more	  than	  one	  branch.	  When	  the	  mole	  drinks	  at	  the	  river,	  he	  takes	  no	  more	  than	  a	  bellyful.	  Go	  home	  and	  forget	  the	  matter,	  my	  lord.	  I	  have	  no	  use	  for	  the	  rulership	  of	  the	  world.	  Though	  the	  cook	  may	  not	  run	  his	  kitchen	  properly,	  the	  priest	  and	  the	  impersonator	  of	  the	  dead	  at	  the	  sacrifice	  do	  not	  leap	  over	  the	  wine	  casks	  and	  sacrificial	  stands	  and	  go	  take	  his	  place.46	  	  	  Xu	  You	  is	  suggesting	  that	  Yao’s	  passing	  of	  the	  thrown	  to	  Xu	  You	  is	  merely	  a	  change	  in	  name	  or	  title,	  and	  that	  it	  would	  not	  affect	  the	  actual	  state	  of	  affairs	  –	  these	  distinctions	  and	  designations	  are	  arbitrary.47	  While	  the	  rhetorical	  styling	  of	  this	  passage	  undermines	  sagely	  authority	  by	  ironically	  making	  Yao	  out	  as	  the	  moral	  dolt,	  the	  content	  of	  Xu	  You’s	  criticism	  foreshadows	  the	  arguments	  of	  the	  Qiwulun	  chapter,	  in	  which	  the	  text	  points	  out	  that	  shifei	  
                                                46	  Zhuangzi	  1.24,	  Watson	  32-­‐33.	  The	  last	  line	  of	  this	  passage	  refers	  to	  ritual	  practice	  in	  which	  each	  participant	  has	  a	  specific	  role	  to	  play.	  Brook	  Ziporyn	  has	  a	  good	  explanation	  of	  this	  line	  in	  his	  translation,	  Zhuangzi:	  The	  
Essential	  Writings	  with	  Selections	  from	  Traditional	  Commentaries	  (Indianapolis:	  Hackett	  Publishing,	  2009),	  20,	  fn	  14.	  	  47	  There	  are	  a	  few	  different	  lines	  of	  interpretation	  regarding	  the	  positive	  point	  Xu	  You	  is	  trying	  to	  make.	  Ziporyn	  suggests	  that	  abandoning	  one’s	  role	  would	  lead	  to	  bigger	  problems	  (See	  Zhuangzi,	  20,	  fn	  14.),	  while	  Graham	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  distinctions	  are	  ultimately	  arbitrary	  and	  so	  there	  is	  no	  point	  in	  making	  the	  change	  (See	  Chuang-­‐Tzu,	  45,	  note).	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distinctions	  and	  their	  corresponding	  linguistic	  categories	  are	  dependent	  upon	  the	  perspective	  of	  an	  individual,	  and	  are	  thus	  not	  objective	  representations	  of	  the	  world.	  If	  language	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  objective	  representation,	  that	  is,	  if	  it	  cannot	  make	  a	  thing	  clear,	  then	  any	  sort	  of	  linguistic	  instruction	  aimed	  at	  clarification	  is	  doomed	  to	  failure.	  	   This	  seems	  to	  be	  why	  the	  Zhuangzi	  pokes	  fun	  both	  at	  teachers	  and	  ancient	  books,	  both	  of	  which	  might	  ordinarily	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  sources	  of	  instruction	  for	  self-­‐cultivation.	  For	  example,	  the	  text	  regularly	  undermines	  Confucius,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  sources	  of	  moral	  instruction	  in	  classical	  China.48	  In	  contrast,	  the	  former	  convict	  Wang	  Tai	  (王駘),	  who	  neither	  teaches	  nor	  discusses,	  is	  held	  up	  as	  positive	  model	  of	  wisdom.	  Of	  Wang	  Tai,	  Confucius	  says,	  “This	  gentleman	  is	  a	  sage.	  It’s	  just	  that	  I’ve	  been	  tardy	  and	  haven’t	  gone	  to	  see	  him	  yet.”	  It	  is	  because	  Wang	  Tai	  refrains	  from	  engaging	  in	  linguistic	  instruction	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  making	  distinctions	  that	  his	  students	  “go	  to	  him	  empty	  and	  come	  home	  full.”49	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  here	  that	  while	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  rejects	  ming	  as	  the	  transmission	  of	  wisdom	  through	  linguistic	  instruction,	  it	  does	  say	  that	  ming	  has	  something	  to	  do	  with	  having	  models	  to	  emulate.	  	  It	  explains,	  “Men	  do	  not	  mirror	  themselves	  in	  running	  water	  –	  they	  mirror	  themselves	  in	  still	  water.	  Only	  what	  is	  still	  can	  still	  the	  stillness	  of	  
                                                48	  The	  portrayal	  of	  Confucius	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  an	  interesting	  area	  of	  research,	  about	  which	  much	  could	  be	  said.	  A.C.	  Graham	  offers	  a	  few	  words	  on	  the	  matter	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  his	  translation	  (Chuang-­‐Tzu,	  15-­‐19).	  	  49	  Zhuangzi	  5.187-­‐193,	  Watson	  68.	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other	  things.”50	  The	  true	  models	  of	  illumination	  are	  like	  still	  water,	  as	  opposed	  to	  those	  who	  constantly	  strive	  to	  assert	  and	  distinguish	  the	  right	  way	  of	  living	  or	  correct	  moral	  doctrine.	  Zhuangzi,	  like	  many	  other	  Warring	  States	  textualists,	  acknowledges	  that	  exemplars	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  source	  of	  illumination,	  but	  ultimately	  denies	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  this	  way	  of	  life	  through	  clear-­‐cut	  instructions.51	  	  	   Likewise	  the	  Zhuangzi	  criticizes	  the	  transmission	  of	  wisdom	  via	  books.	  Wheelwright	  Bian	  (輪扁)	  boldly	  criticizes	  his	  lord,	  Duke	  Huan	  for	  seeking	  moral	  instruction	  in	  books	  that	  contain	  the	  words	  of	  the	  sages52:	  	   	  
                                                50	  Zhuangzi	  5.193,	  Watson	  69.	  人莫鑑於流水而鑑於止水，唯止能止眾
止。	   	  51	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘textualists’	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  group	  of	  thinkers	  most	  readily	  associated	  with	  the	  Shi	  (士)	  class	  in	  Warring	  States	  period	  China.	  Shi	  in	  fact	  has	  a	  wide	  semantic	  scope	  designating	  administrators,	  technical	  experts,	  scholar-­‐teachers	  and	  more.	  Yuri	  Pines	  combats	  the	  wide	  semantic	  scope	  by	  talking	  about	  the	  “intellectual	  shi”	  as	  those	  whom	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  literati	  class	  will	  eventually	  yield	  the	  master	  texts	  we	  are	  familiar	  with	  today	  (See	  Envisioning	  Eternal	  Empire	  (2009)	  pp.	  115-­‐184).	  Similarly,	  Mark	  Lewis	  refers	  to	  this	  class	  as	  the	  “schoolmen,”	  (Writing	  and	  
Authority	  in	  Early	  China	  (1999)	  pp	  53-­‐94).	  In	  fact,	  the	  shi	  were	  not	  only	  the	  class	  with	  which	  we	  associate	  master	  texts,	  but	  there	  were	  also	  responsible	  for	  of	  technical	  and	  divination	  treatises,	  performed	  administrative	  and	  ritual	  duties,	  proffered	  military	  advice,	  and	  more.	  








可傳也死矣，然則君之所讀者，古人之糟魄已夫！	  	   “I	  look	  at	  it	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  my	  own	  work.	  When	  I	  chisel	  a	  wheel,	  if	  the	  blows	  of	  the	  mallet	  are	  too	  gentle,	  the	  chisel	  slides	  and	  won’t	  take	  hold.	  But	  if	  they’re	  too	  hard,	  it	  bites	  in	  and	  won’t	  budge.	  Not	  too	  gentle,	  not	  too	  hard	  –	  you	  can	  get	  it	  in	  your	  hand	  and	  feel	  it	  in	  your	  mind.	  You	  can’t	  put	  it	  into	  words,	  and	  yet	  there’s	  a	  knack	  to	  it	  somehow.	  I	  can’t	  teach	  it	  to	  my	  son,	  and	  he	  can’t	  learn	  it	  from	  me.	  So	  I’ve	  along	  for	  seventy	  years	  and	  at	  my	  age	  I’m	  still	  chiseling	  wheels.	  When	  the	  men	  of	  old	  died,	  they	  took	  with	  them	  the	  things	  that	  couldn’t	  be	  handed	  down.	  So	  what	  you	  are	  reading	  there	  maybe	  be	  nothing	  but	  the	  chaff	  and	  dregs	  of	  the	  men	  of	  old.”	  53	  	  Through	  the	  mouth	  of	  Wheelwright	  Bian,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  demonstrating	  that	  mere	  instruction	  cannot	  bring	  about	  self-­‐cultivation	  –	  it	  does	  not	  really	  illuminate	  the	  best	  way	  of	  living.	  Self-­‐cultivation	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  practice	  rather	  than	  instruction,	  and	  ming	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  doing	  rather	  than	  saying.	  For	  example,	  I	  can	  tell	  my	  little	  sister	  how	  to	  ride	  a	  bicycle,	  but	  that	  certainly	  
                                                53	  Zhuangzi	  13.490-­‐491,	  Watson	  152-­‐53.	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does	  not	  mean	  she	  can	  do	  it	  –	  she	  must	  practice	  riding	  the	  bicycle	  herself.54	  Through	  diligent	  practice	  of	  riding	  a	  bicycle,	  one	  is	  able	  to	  perfect	  that	  skill	  to	  a	  point	  at	  which	  bicycle	  riding	  comes	  naturally	  and	  the	  task	  can	  be	  performed	  without	  critical	  reflection	  upon	  it.	  Through	  practice,	  one	  is	  in	  a	  sense	  transformed	  into	  a	  natural	  bike	  rider.	  	  	  
3.2	  Ming	  as	  Cultivated	  Practice	  	  The	  Zhuangzi	  makes	  regular	  use	  of	  knack	  stories	  to	  illustrate	  ming	  as	  a	  skill	  that	  is	  cultivated	  through	  practice.	  Cook	  Ding	  (庖丁)	  might	  be	  the	  most	  famous	  representative	  of	  these	  skill	  stories.	  Cook	  Ding	  recounts	  the	  development	  of	  his	  skill	  saying,	  “When	  I	  first	  began	  cutting	  up	  oxen,	  all	  I	  could	  see	  was	  the	  ox	  itself.	  After	  three	  years	  I	  no	  longer	  saw	  the	  whole	  ox.	  And	  now	  –	  now	  I	  go	  at	  it	  by	  spirit	  and	  don’t	  look	  with	  my	  eyes.”55	  Similarly,	  the	  Bellstand	  Maker	  Qing’s	  (梓慶)	  skill	  is	  such	  that	  “people	  wonder	  if	  the	  results	  were	  not	  made	  by	  spirits.”	  These	  craftsmen	  undertake	  exceedingly	  difficult	  tasks	  with	  such	  grace	  and	  ease	  that	  they	  seem	  almost	  as	  if	  they	  have	  
                                                54	  For	  Zhuangzi,	  real	  ming	  cannot	  be	  acquired	  through	  instruction	  or	  through	  seeking	  clarity,	  but	  instead	  must	  come	  from	  practice.	  This	  does	  not	  preclude	  the	  possibility	  that	  for	  Zhuangzi,	  like	  other	  textualists	  of	  his	  time,	  the	  ming	  person	  affected	  the	  illumination	  of	  those	  around	  him.	  Chris	  Fraser	  explains	  this	  effect	  on	  other	  in	  terms	  of	  De	  (德),	  see	  “Wandering	  the	  Way:	  A	  Eudaimonistic	  Approach	  to	  the	  Zhuangzi,”	  Dao	  13,	  no.	  4	  (2014),	  541-­‐565.	  	  55	  Zhuangzi	  3.119;	  Watson	  50-­‐51.	  始臣之解牛之時，所見無非〔全〕
牛者。三年之後，未嘗見全牛也。方今之時，臣以神遇而不以目視	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superhuman	  powers.	  Indeed	  that	  kind	  of	  cultivated	  display	  is	  very	  different	  from	  what	  the	  common	  person	  can	  hope	  to	  accomplish	  –	  Ding	  and	  Qing	  are	  virtuosos	  who	  are	  able	  to	  intuit	  and	  follow	  the	  natural	  patterns	  that	  present	  themselves	  either	  in	  an	  ox	  or	  in	  a	  tree,	  while	  a	  common	  craftsman	  might	  be	  bogged	  down	  in	  analysis	  of	  ox	  and	  tree	  parts.	  	  Eno	  suggests	  that	  in	  making	  use	  of	  these	  skill	  analogies	  Zhuangzi	  is	  distinguishing	  between	  two	  kinds	  of	  knowledge:	  fact	  knowledge	  and	  practical	  knowledge;	  the	  former	  Zhuangzi	  disparages	  and	  the	  latter	  he	  praises.	  56	  In	  denying	  the	  role	  of	  any	  sort	  of	  theoretical	  knowledge	  or	  concept	  application	  that	  might	  be	  associated	  with	  fact	  knowledge,	  Eno	  oversimplifies	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  vision	  of	  sagacity.	  As	  I	  have	  already	  mentioned,	  Cook	  Ding	  and	  other	  skilled	  individuals	  on	  some	  levels	  do	  engage	  with	  what	  Eno	  calls	  “fact-­‐Knowledge,”	  however	  their	  skillful	  activity	  cannot	  be	  wholly	  attributed	  to	  mere	  fact	  knowledge.	  The	  Zhuangzi’s	  point	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  the	  good	  life	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  theoretical	  knowledge,	  and	  not	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  dispense	  with	  making	  judgments	  altogether.	  Some	  amount	  of	  instruction	  must	  be	  present	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  from	  which	  a	  person	  develops	  his	  talents.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  upon	  beginning	  his	  apprenticeship	  someone	  would	  have	  explained	  the	  best	  way	  to	  butcher	  an	  ox,	  however	  Cook	  Ding	  does	  not	  achieve	  that	  skill	  until	  he	  is	  able	  to	  transcend	  those	  instructions.	  Thus,	  fact-­‐knowledge	  would	  only	  be	  problematic	  for	  individuals	  who	  cannot	  transcend	  it,	  such	  as	  the	  disputation	  loving	  Hui	  Shi.	  In	  these	  cases	  fact	  knowledge	  
                                                56	  Eno,	  “Cook	  Ding’s	  Dao.”	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constrains	  one’s	  perspective,	  and	  represents	  the	  world	  through	  a	  narrow	  framework	  that	  is	  constituted	  by	  the	  set	  of	  beliefs	  and	  judgments	  that	  one	  suspects	  are	  objective.	  Practical	  knowledge,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  difficult	  to	  explain.	  We	  are	  not	  likely	  able	  to	  replicate	  the	  virtuoso’s	  performance	  merely	  by	  following	  his	  instructions.	  Rather,	  skillful	  craftsmen	  transcend	  the	  kind	  of	  distinctions	  that	  clarify	  a	  practice	  in	  theoretical	  terms,	  and	  are	  free	  from	  the	  constraints	  of	  a	  set	  of	  instructions.	  Here	  we	  might	  imagine	  two	  different	  musicians:	  one	  who	  selects	  a	  piece	  of	  music	  and	  plays	  it,	  and	  another	  who	  improvises	  a	  song	  as	  though	  the	  music	  were	  a	  natural	  extension	  of	  herself.	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  the	  music	  is	  a	  set	  of	  instructions	  for	  a	  song	  that	  confine	  the	  musician	  to	  execute	  a	  performance	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  The	  second	  is	  able	  to	  naturally	  perform	  her	  skill	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  not	  limited	  by	  a	  musical	  score	  that	  exists	  independently	  of	  her.	  	  While	  the	  skill	  stories	  cast	  ming	  as	  a	  cultivated	  practice,	  (as	  opposed	  to	  the	  transmission	  of	  wisdom	  through	  written	  or	  oral	  instruction)	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  seem	  to	  cast	  it	  as	  something	  fundamentally	  natural.	  In	  colloquial	  language	  we	  might	  refer	  to	  a	  graceful	  display	  of	  skill	  by	  saying	  that	  it	  is	  the	  craftsman’s	  ‘second	  nature’,	  because	  one	  is	  not	  born	  able	  to	  ride	  bicycles,	  dismember	  oxen,	  or	  carve	  bellstands.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  often	  speaks	  of	  self-­‐cultivation	  as	  a	  process	  of	  “forgetting,”	  or	  an	  all-­‐together	  lack	  of	  knowing	  or	  doing	  as	  means	  of	  returning	  to	  an	  original	  natural	  state.57	  In	  an	  imagined	  
                                                57	  For	  other	  examples	  linking	  sagacity	  and	  forgetting	  or	  the	  lack	  of	  knowledge/wisdom	  see	  Watson	  46-­‐49,	  54-­‐58,	  78,	  88,	  97.	  In	  Guo	  see	  2.97-­‐108,	  4.131-­‐150,	  6.229-­‐232,	  6.274-­‐275,	  7.306.	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conversation,	  Yan	  Hui	  explains	  his	  progress	  to	  Confucius,	  exclaiming	  that	  he	  has	  forgotten	  (wang	  忘)	  the	  Confucian	  doctrines	  of	  benevolence	  and	  righteousness	  (renyi	  仁義)	  and	  the	  Confucian	  practices	  of	  rites	  and	  music	  (liyue	  禮樂).	  Yan	  Hui	  finally	  says	  that	  he	  can	  sit	  and	  forget	  everything,	  and	  explains	  what	  he	  means,	  saying,	  	  	  
墮肢體，黜聰明，離形去知，同於大通，此謂坐忘。	  	  I	  smash	  up	  my	  limbs	  and	  body,	  drive	  out	  perception	  and	  intellect,	  cast	  off	  form,	  do	  away	  with	  understanding,	  and	  make	  myself	  identical	  with	  the	  Great	  Thoroughfare.	  This	  is	  what	  I	  mean	  by	  sitting	  down	  and	  forgetting	  everything.58	  	  	  Yan	  Hui’s	  “forgetting”	  describes	  a	  reversion	  to	  a	  more	  basic	  condition	  that	  precedes	  the	  artificial	  attitudes	  about	  right	  and	  wrong	  that	  characterize	  the	  common	  man.59	  This	  might	  be	  classified	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  anti-­‐teleological	  understanding	  of	  ethical	  development	  in	  that	  the	  best	  way	  of	  life	  consists	  in	  forgetting	  social	  mores,	  traditional	  moral	  lessons,	  and	  even	  ones	  own	  body.	  Rather	  than	  nurturing	  and	  developing	  an	  ethical	  disposition,	  the	  Zhuangzian	  sage	  reverts	  to	  a	  fundamentally	  natural	  state.	  At	  first	  glance	  this	  sort	  of	  anti-­‐teleological	  rhetoric	  seems	  contrary	  to	  understanding	  ming	  as	  a	  cultivated	  sort	  of	  skill.	  In	  fact,	  when	  asked	  how	  he	  
                                                                                                                                	  58	  Zhuangzi	  6.284;	  Watson	  90.	  	  	  59	  Slingerland	  interprets	  Yan	  Hui’s	  forgetting	  and	  the	  Bellmaker	  Qing’s	  preparation	  for	  work	  as	  indications	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  self-­‐forgetting	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  one	  transcends	  the	  distinctions	  that	  constitute	  one’s	  preferences,	  beliefs	  etc.	  He	  argues	  that	  this	  sort	  of	  “forgetting”	  is	  built	  on	  the	  metaphor	  of	  an	  empty	  container	  (Effortless	  Action,	  175-­‐216).	  	  
 98 
developed	  such	  skill,	  Cook	  Ding	  exclaims,	  “What	  I	  care	  about	  is	  the	  Way,	  which	  goes	  beyond	  skill,”	  after	  which	  Lord	  Wen	  Hui	  to	  which	  Cook	  Ding	  is	  speaking	  concludes,	  “I	  have	  heard	  the	  words	  of	  Cook	  Ding	  and	  learned	  how	  to	  care	  for	  life!”60	  	  Lord	  Wen	  Hui	  is	  not	  impressed	  in	  the	  end	  with	  Cook	  Ding’s	  particular	  ability	  to	  butcher	  an	  ox,	  but	  rather	  learns	  how	  to	  care	  for	  life	  by	  observing	  Ding’s	  skillful	  refrain	  from	  imposing	  distinctions	  on	  his	  environment	  as	  he	  interacts	  with	  it.	  What	  is	  remarkable	  about	  the	  craftsmen	  who	  have	  cultivated	  great	  skill	  is	  that	  the	  cultivation	  of	  that	  skill	  rests	  in	  the	  repeal	  of	  layers	  of	  accumulated	  judgments	  that	  make	  up	  a	  narrow	  frame	  through	  which	  a	  person	  encounters	  the	  world.	  Qing	  describes	  his	  process	  of	  bellstand	  making:	  	  
必齊以靜心。齊三日，而不敢懷慶賞爵祿；齊五日，不敢懷非譽巧拙
；齊七日，輒然忘	  吾有四枝形體也。當是時也，無公朝，其巧專而
外骨消	  	   I	  always	  fast	  in	  order	  to	  still	  my	  heart-­‐mind.	  When	  I	  have	  fasted	  for	  three	  days,	  I	  no	  longer	  have	  any	  thought	  of	  congratulations	  or	  rewards,	  of	  titles	  or	  stipends.	  When	  I	  have	  fasted	  for	  five	  days,	  I	  no	  longer	  have	  any	  thought	  of	  praise	  or	  blame,	  of	  skill	  or	  clumsiness.	  And	  when	  I	  have	  fasted	  for	  seven	  days,	  I	  am	  so	  still	  that	  I	  forget	  I	  have	  four	  limbs	  and	  a	  form	  and	  body.	  By	  that	  time,	  the	  ruler	  and	  his	  court	  no	  longer	  exist	  for	  me.	  My	  skill	  is	  concentrated	  and	  all	  outside	  distractions	  fade	  away.61	  	  Qing’s	  description	  of	  his	  skill	  riffs	  off	  of	  Yan	  Hui’s	  process	  of	  forgetting,	  as	  they	  both	  “fast	  the	  heart-­‐mind”	  and	  resultantly	  achieve	  an	  enlightened	  
                                                60	  Zhuangzi	  3.117-­‐124,	  Watson	  50-­‐51.	  	  61	  Zhuangzi	  19.658-­‐659,	  Watson	  205-­‐206.	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state.62	  Both	  are	  letting	  go	  of	  the	  judgments	  that	  frame	  how	  one	  perceives	  the	  world;	  that	  is,	  they	  are	  not	  being	  guided	  by	  the	  heart-­‐mind.	  Ming	  then	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  cultivated	  naturalness,	  in	  which	  one	  must	  act	  against	  the	  sedimented	  layers	  of	  judgments,	  distinctions,	  and	  beliefs	  in	  order	  to	  return	  to	  a	  more	  natural	  state.	  	  	   So	  the	  ultimate	  state	  is	  one	  in	  which	  one	  is	  free	  from	  the	  bondage	  of	  his	  judgments	  and	  beliefs	  that	  he	  might	  otherwise	  suppose	  correspond	  to	  the	  way	  things	  really	  are.	  Such	  an	  attitude	  limits	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  one	  can	  see	  the	  world,	  resulting	  in	  small	  knowledge	  (xiao	  zhi	  小知).	  Ming,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  associated	  with	  great	  knowledge	  (da	  zhi	  	  ⼤大知),	  which	  is	  unrestricted	  –	  the	  transformed	  person	  is	  no	  longer	  limited	  by	  a	  stringent	  commitment	  to	  a	  belief	  system.	  Having	  moved	  beyond	  the	  desire	  to	  instill	  one’s	  beliefs	  and	  judgments	  upon	  situations	  and	  people	  around	  him,	  the	  cultivated	  person	  is,	  in	  a	  sense,	  above	  the	  fray.	  From	  this	  position	  above	  it	  all,	  he	  understands	  that	  such	  judgments	  and	  beliefs	  are	  not	  fixed	  representations	  of	  some	  fundamental	  reality	  –	  that	  things	  could	  always	  be	  different.	  The	  opening	  chapter	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  sets	  the	  tone	  for	  understanding	  self-­‐cultivation	  as	  
                                                62	  Chapter	  19,	  Dasheng	  (達生),	  in	  which	  Bellstand	  Maker	  Qing	  makes	  an	  appearance	  was	  not	  likely	  written	  by	  the	  historical	  Zhuang	  Zhou,	  but	  was	  rather	  inspired	  by	  the	  writings	  of	  the	  Inner	  Chapters.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  author	  of	  chapter	  19,	  the	  text	  has	  historically	  been	  taken	  as	  a	  whole	  to	  express	  the	  philosophy	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  and	  passages	  such	  as	  this	  are	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  themes	  of	  the	  Inner	  Chapters.	  For	  more	  on	  the	  stratification	  of	  the	  text	  see	  A.C.	  Graham’s	  “How	  Much	  of	  ‘Chuang-­‐Tzu’	  did	  Chuang-­‐Tzu	  Write?”	  in	  Studies	  in	  Classical	  Chinese	  Thought,	  ed.	  Henry	  Rosemont	  and	  Benjamin	  Schwartz	  (American	  Academy	  of	  Religion,	  1979),	  459-­‐502.	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freedom	  from	  limiting	  belief	  systems	  in	  its	  narrative	  of	  the	  tiny	  cicada	  and	  turtledove	  being	  incapable	  of	  comprehending	  the	  flight	  of	  the	  enormous	  Peng	  bird.	  The	  Peng	  bird,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  flies	  so	  high	  that	  when	  looking	  down	  all	  it	  sees	  is	  blue.63	  From	  this	  view,	  the	  Peng	  bird	  regards	  the	  things	  on	  the	  ground	  as	  the	  same,	  and	  as	  such	  has	  no	  allegiance	  to	  any	  of	  them.	  Real	  
ming	  cannot	  be	  made	  into	  an	  object	  of	  knowledge	  to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  other	  sorts	  of	  objects;	  it	  is	  a	  practice	  in	  which	  one	  is	  free	  from	  the	  restraints	  of	  commitment	  to	  a	  particular	  belief-­‐system.	  	  
3.3	  Mirroring	  the	  Natural	  Patterns	  
 
 
Ming	  is	  part	  of	  a	  matrix	  of	  concepts	  that	  describe	  the	  heart-­‐mind	  as	  a	  mirror:	  still	  water	  or	  a	  mirror	  are	  capable	  of	  reflecting	  light	  and	  therefore	  illuminating	  what	  surrounds	  them.	  Likewise	  the	  Zhuangzi	  explains	  that	  the	  sage	  does	  not	  proceed	  by	  making	  distinctions,	  but	  rather	  “illuminates	  (zhao	  
照)	  all	  in	  the	  light	  of	  heaven.”64	  The	  sage	  sheds	  light	  onto	  things,	  and	  consequently	  occupies	  a	  higher	  epistemic	  position,	  but	  does	  so	  in	  a	  very	  different	  way	  than	  those	  who	  suppose	  enlightenment	  entails	  mere	  linguistic	  instruction;	  rather,	  the	  sage’s	  illumination	  is	  like	  the	  illumination	  of	  a	  mirror.	  The	  text	  exclaims,	  “The	  sage	  uses	  his	  heart-­‐mind	  like	  a	  mirror,”65	  and	  “The	  
                                                63	  Zhuangzi	  1.1-­‐9,	  Watson	  29-­‐31.	  	  	  64	  Zhuangzi	  2.66,	  Watson	  40.	  	  65	  Zhuangzi	  9.302,	  Watson	  97.	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sage’s	  heart-­‐mind	  in	  stillness	  is	  the	  mirror	  of	  heaven	  and	  earth,	  the	  glass	  of	  the	  ten	  thousand	  things.”66	  Instead	  of	  attempting	  to	  reify	  distinctions,	  the	  sagely	  heart-­‐mind	  is	  described	  as	  “going	  after	  nothing,	  welcoming	  nothing,	  responding	  but	  not	  storing.”67	  A	  mirror	  is	  incapable	  of	  freezing	  an	  image,	  or	  reflecting	  only	  a	  single	  frame	  –	  it	  is	  broad	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  reflects	  everything	  that	  passes	  before	  it	  without	  judgment.	  But	  additionally,	  the	  mirror	  responds	  to	  the	  changes	  around	  it	  by	  reflecting	  those	  changes	  back	  into	  the	  world.	  It	  follows	  the	  standards	  and	  affirmations	  that	  are	  put	  in	  front	  of	  it,	  without	  holding	  onto	  those	  standards	  and	  attempting	  to	  apply	  them	  in	  a	  different	  context.	  A	  mirror	  responds	  to	  a	  situation,	  but	  does	  not	  intervene.	  Likewise,	  the	  sage	  responds	  to	  the	  standards	  dictated	  by	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  he	  finds	  himself,	  without	  imposing	  his	  own	  beliefs,	  feelings	  and	  judgments.	  Moreover,	  the	  act	  of	  mirroring	  is	  located	  within	  the	  heart-­‐mind68,	  which	  suggests	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  envisions	  better	  and	  worse	  ways	  to	  use	  one’s	  heart-­‐mind,	  rather	  than	  an	  outright	  rejection	  of	  it.	  	   The	  story	  of	  Ai	  Tai	  Tuo	  (哀駘它)	  is	  illustrative	  here:	  Ai	  Tai	  Tuo	  rejects	  Duke	  Ai	  of	  Lu’s	  offer	  to	  hand	  over	  the	  government.	  Ai	  is	  by	  all	  accounts	  ugly,	  dumb	  and	  without	  position,	  yet	  people	  are	  drawn	  to	  him,	  and	  the	  Duke	  trusts	  
                                                                                                                                	  66	  Zhuangzi	  13.457,	  Watson	  142.	  	  67Zhuangzi	  9.302,	  Watson	  97.	  	  	  68	  Erin	  Cline	  makes	  this	  observation	  in	  “Mirrors,	  Minds,	  and	  Metaphors,”	  337-­‐357.	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                                                69	  Zhuangzi	  5.206-­‐216,	  Watson	  72-­‐74.	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He	  too	  [the	  sage]	  recognizes	  a	  ‘this,’	  but	  a	  ‘this’	  which	  is	  also	  ‘that,’	  a	  ‘that’	  which	  is	  also	  ‘this.’	  His	  ‘that’	  has	  both	  a	  right	  and	  a	  wrong	  in	  it;	  his	  ‘this’	  too	  has	  both	  a	  right	  and	  a	  wrong	  in	  it.	  So,	  in	  fact,	  does	  he	  still	  have	  a	  ‘this’	  and	  a	  ‘that’?	  Or	  does	  he	  in	  fact	  no	  longer	  have	  a	  ‘this’	  and	  ‘that’?	  A	  state	  in	  which	  ‘this’	  and	  ‘that’	  no	  longer	  find	  their	  opposites	  is	  called	  the	  hinge	  of	  the	  Way.	  When	  the	  hinge	  is	  fitted	  into	  the	  socket,	  it	  can	  respond	  endlessly.	  Its	  right	  then	  is	  a	  single	  endlessness	  and	  its	  wrong	  too	  is	  a	  single	  endlessness.	  So,	  I	  say,	  the	  best	  thing	  to	  use	  is	  clarity	  (ming).	  70	  	  Like	  a	  hinge	  in	  a	  socket,	  Ai	  Tai	  Tuo	  is	  able	  to	  effortlessly	  adjust	  to	  whatever	  set	  of	  standards	  he	  finds	  himself	  in.	  Ming	  avoids	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  going	  by	  one’s	  
shifei	  judgments,	  by	  shedding	  light	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  those	  judgments,	  which	  are	  not	  fundamentally	  fixed	  or	  universally	  correct.	  	  
4.	  Conclusion	  	  	   In	  trying	  to	  reconcile	  relativist	  or	  skeptical	  themes	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  rush	  to	  classify	  the	  text	  or	  its	  message	  as	  “amoral.”	  Problematically	  this	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  no	  normative	  dimension	  of	  the	  text,	  despite	  approbation	  of	  some	  ways	  of	  living	  over	  others.	  But	  we	  can	  locate	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  relativistic	  remarks	  within	  a	  broader	  ethics,	  in	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  ming	  is	  recast	  to	  subvert	  hard	  and	  fast	  distinctions	  that	  are	  dependent	  upon	  an	  individual’s	  perspective,	  and	  thus	  to	  loosen	  one’s	  grip	  on	  the	  belief	  systems	  that	  arise	  from	  those	  distinctions.	  The	  obfuscation	  of	  traditional	  moral	  boundaries	  and	  epistemic	  distinctions	  emphasizes	  a	  way	  of	  living	  that	  is	  deeply	  entrenched	  in	  practice	  and	  intelligent	  responsiveness	  to	  
                                                70	  Zhuangzi	  2.66,	  Watson	  40.	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the	  changing	  natural	  and	  social	  patterns.	  The	  Zhuangzi’s	  ethical	  vision	  is	  one	  in	  which	  we	  stand	  above	  the	  fray	  of	  those	  arguing	  and	  striving	  to	  affirm	  their	  judgments	  and	  belief	  systems.	  	   At	  this	  point	  the	  relativist	  will	  usually	  argue	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  merely	  offering	  another	  perspective,	  which	  cannot	  be	  justified	  over	  and	  above	  any	  other	  perspective.	  By	  his	  own	  logic	  Zhuangzi	  must	  admit	  that	  his	  ethical	  vision	  is	  no	  better	  or	  worse	  than	  the	  Confucian	  or	  Mohists’	  vision.	  If	  we	  suppose	  that	  Zhuangzi	  is	  attempting	  to	  be	  consistent	  with	  what	  he	  says	  we	  must	  therefore	  ultimately	  regard	  Zhuangzi	  as	  a	  relativist.	  The	  objection	  goes	  that	  Zhuangzi,	  in	  proposing	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  good	  life,	  is	  engaging	  in	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  shi	  and	  fei	  activity	  as	  those	  he	  criticizes.	  	  To	  this	  objection	  I	  would	  firstly	  note	  that	  while	  the	  ethical	  agent	  does	  not	  experience	  the	  good	  life	  in	  a	  linguistically	  codified	  way,	  there	  is	  nothing	  that	  precludes	  it	  from	  being	  described	  thusly.	  It	  does	  seem	  possible	  to	  describe	  the	  good	  life	  in	  shifei	  terms	  by	  making	  certain	  distinctions,	  although	  the	  good	  life	  is	  not	  experienced	  in	  those	  terms.	  Consequently,	  for	  one	  who	  lives	  out	  the	  Zhuangzian	  ethical	  vision	  shifei	  activity	  is	  not	  constitutive	  of	  the	  good	  life.71	  So	  while	  his	  philosophical	  rivals	  take	  certain	  shifei	  judgments	  as	  their	  guides	  and	  find	  themselves	  continually	  striving	  for	  self-­‐cultivation	  against	  his	  environment,	  the	  Zhuangzian	  sage	  takes	  it	  easy	  and	  gracefully	  glides	  through	  life.	  Secondly,	  we	  should	  note	  that	  while	  the	  Zhuangzi	  gives	  an	  account	  of	  the	  good	  life,	  it	  does	  not	  set	  a	  fixed	  shi	  or	  fei	  by	  which	  we	  can	  
                                                71	  I	  am	  grateful	  for	  Loy	  Hui-­‐Chieh	  for	  this	  insight.	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determine	  it.	  That	  is,	  it	  does	  not	  offer	  much	  in	  the	  way	  of	  direct	  linguistic	  instruction	  that	  strives	  to	  affirm	  a	  doctrine.	  Here	  we	  ought	  to	  consider	  the	  style	  of	  the	  text,	  which	  reinforces	  its	  vision	  of	  the	  good	  life	  as	  one	  that	  does	  not	  rigidly	  adhere	  to	  a	  belief-­‐system.	  Instead	  of	  clear	  linguistic	  instructions	  the	  Zhuangzi	  supplies	  the	  reader	  with	  illustrations	  of	  sagely	  activity,	  aphorisms,	  and	  vignettes.	  The	  stylistic	  choices	  of	  the	  text	  lead	  us	  to	  wonder	  if	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  trying	  to	  accomplish	  aesthetically	  what	  it	  cannot	  accomplish	  through	  philosophical	  or	  rhetorical	  argumentation.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  consider	  certain	  aesthetic	  dimensions	  of	  the	  text	  and	  how	  they	  communicate	  an	  ethical	  vision.	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CHAPTER	  FOUR:	  THE	  ROLE	  OF	  AESTHETICS	  IN	  THE	  ZHUANGZI	  	  	  	   So	  far	  this	  project	  has	  considered	  some	  themes	  and	  implications	  of	  an	  influential	  model	  of	  aesthetics,	  noting	  that	  aesthetics	  emerges	  as	  an	  independent	  field	  of	  inquiry	  as	  it	  moves	  away	  from	  moral	  concerns.	  As	  has	  been	  shown,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  good	  life,	  and	  this	  ethical	  vision	  is	  well	  summed	  up	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  ming	  (明).	  The	  Zhuangzi	  reimagines	  ming	  as	  a	  cultivated	  practice	  in	  which	  one	  loosens	  his	  commitments	  to	  the	  beliefs	  he	  establishes.	  The	  way	  in	  which	  the	  text	  utilizes	  aesthetics	  is	  important	  for	  its	  ethical	  vision,	  and	  moreover	  distinguishes	  a	  Zhuangzian	  aesthetic	  from	  the	  dominant	  model	  of	  aesthetics	  in	  the	  Western	  tradition.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  firstly	  identify	  which	  aspects	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  I	  take	  to	  be	  aesthetic,	  and	  then	  discuss	  how	  those	  aspects	  communicate	  and	  reinforce	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  ethical	  vision.	  	  
1.	  Aesthetics	  and	  Style	  	  Stemming	  from	  its	  association	  with	  the	  sensuous	  representation	  of	  an	  idea,	  aesthetics	  is	  often	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  style,	  or	  how	  some	  task	  is	  executed	  or	  performed.	  The	  style	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  indeed	  one	  of	  its	  most	  unique	  features.	  The	  text	  makes	  liberal	  use	  of	  allegory,	  metaphor,	  juxtaposition,	  paradox,	  humour,	  and	  montage,	  moving	  from	  vignette	  to	  vignette,	  sometimes	  abruptly	  and	  seemingly	  without	  a	  connection	  to	  what	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came	  before	  and	  what	  happens	  after.	  The	  text	  opens	  with	  the	  transformation	  of	  an	  unusual	  fish	  into	  an	  enormous	  soaring	  bird,	  and	  then	  proceeds	  to	  retell	  the	  familiar	  story	  of	  Yao	  ceding	  the	  empire	  to	  Shun,	  in	  which	  Shun	  is	  replaced	  with	  a	  hermit.	  The	  relationship	  between	  such	  passages	  is	  not	  immediately	  clear	  as	  the	  reader	  is	  redirected	  from	  one	  vignette	  to	  another.	  Despite	  the	  stand-­‐alone	  quality	  of	  each	  episode,	  there	  is	  the	  vague	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  related.	  However,	  the	  audience	  is	  not	  immediately	  presented	  with	  a	  single	  unifying	  thread	  that	  explains	  that	  relation.	  Yet	  style	  alone	  is	  insufficient	  for	  distinguishing	  the	  Zhuangzi	  as	  offering	  an	  aesthetic.	  It	  is	  trivially	  true	  in	  some	  sense	  that	  all	  texts	  have	  certain	  style,	  but	  we	  do	  not	  think	  of	  all	  texts	  as	  having	  an	  aesthetic	  dimension.	  Even	  the	  quintessentially	  logical	  Mozi	  has	  stylistic	  elements	  that	  distinguish	  it	  from	  its	  contemporaries:	  it	  relies	  on	  essay-­‐like	  discourses	  that	  are	  couched	  within	  teaching	  scenes,	  and	  notably	  makes	  use	  of	  many	  craft	  analogies	  that	  support	  its	  emphasis	  on	  standardizing	  moral	  doctrines;	  yet	  no	  one	  has	  spoken	  of	  a	  Mohist	  aesthetic.	  Here	  we	  might	  distinguish	  between	  two	  different	  ends	  of	  a	  stylistic	  spectrum.	  At	  one	  end,	  we	  are	  confronted	  with	  rhetorical	  language	  and	  philosophical	  argumentation.	  While	  much	  can	  be	  said	  about	  the	  differences	  between	  these	  two	  modes	  communication,	  they	  are	  similar	  in	  that	  they	  are	  aimed	  at	  convincing	  a	  person	  to	  accept	  a	  claim,	  either	  through	  techniques	  of	  persuasion	  or	  by	  means	  of	  logic.	  In	  such	  modes	  of	  communication,	  the	  conclusion	  is	  provided	  and	  reasons	  are	  given	  to	  motivate	  an	  individual	  to	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accept	  that	  conclusion;	  the	  link	  between	  premises	  and	  conclusion	  is	  clear,	  even	  if	  it	  may	  not	  be	  rational.	  For	  example,	  Mencius	  asks	  his	  audience	  to	  imagine	  witnessing	  a	  child	  about	  to	  fall	  into	  a	  well.	  Such	  an	  experiment	  is	  meant	  to	  arouse	  certain	  moral	  feelings	  that	  disclose	  one’s	  nature.	  Mencius’	  thought	  experiment	  supports	  his	  conclusion	  that	  we	  all	  have	  a	  certain	  incipient	  moral	  feelings,	  and	  the	  movement	  from	  reasons	  to	  conclusions	  is	  spelled	  out	  clearly,	  and	  in	  a	  rather	  literal	  way	  for	  the	  audience.	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  this	  stylistic	  spectrum	  is	  what	  I	  will	  call	  a	  more	  aesthetic	  mode	  of	  communication.	  This	  aesthetic	  mode	  of	  communication	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  David	  L.	  Hall	  and	  Roger	  T.	  Ames	  notion	  of	  “aesthetic	  order,”	  which	  they	  suggest	  characterizes	  an	  early	  Chinese	  worldview	  and	  mode	  of	  social	  organization.	  Such	  an	  order	  is	  “aesthetic”	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  rejection	  of	  abstract	  reasoning	  or	  metaphysical	  concerns.1	  With	  respect	  to	  an	  aesthetic	  mode	  of	  communication,	  with	  which	  this	  chapter	  is	  concerned,	  one	  is	  presented	  with	  a	  sensuous	  or	  concrete	  experience	  for	  contemplation,	  through	  which	  one	  apprehends	  the	  work.	  The	  work	  itself	  does	  not	  explicitly	  tell	  the	  audience	  what	  it	  is	  about	  or	  with	  what	  it	  is	  concerned.	  Although	  occasionally	  we	  might	  understand	  it	  by	  looking	  at	  a	  title	  or	  reading	  the	  artist’s	  treatise,	  the	  conceptual	  content	  of	  the	  work	  is	  not	  typically	  spelled	  out	  within	  the	  work.	  Conclusions	  about	  it	  require	  an	  active	  audience,	  who	  can	  imaginatively	  fill	  in	  the	  gaps,	  rather	  than	  passive	  receipt	  of	  
                                                1	  For	  more	  on	  the	  aesthetic	  order,	  see	  David	  L.	  Hall	  and	  Roger	  T.	  Ames,	  
Thinking	  Through	  Confucius	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1987),	  131-­‐138.	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directly	  communicated	  content.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  seems	  to	  communicate	  in	  such	  a	  way.	  Although	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  obviously	  a	  text,	  it	  attempts	  to	  show	  its	  audience	  the	  ethical	  vision	  it	  wishes	  to	  advance,	  rather	  than	  telling	  or	  explaining	  to	  its	  audience.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  uses	  literary	  features	  such	  as	  allegory,	  irony,	  and	  metaphor	  to	  paint	  a	  picture,	  so	  to	  speak,	  of	  the	  good	  life.	  The	  various	  episodic	  passages	  show	  different	  sages,	  teachers,	  and	  friends	  living	  the	  good	  life,	  motivating	  the	  audience	  to	  draw	  its	  own	  conclusions	  about	  that	  ethical	  concept.	  This	  of	  course	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  work	  can	  mean	  anything	  or	  that	  it’s	  meaning	  is	  ultimately	  relative.	  The	  work	  permits	  a	  constrained	  range	  of	  inferences	  that	  are	  grounded	  in	  the	  images	  it	  presents.	  
2.	  Telling	  versus	  Showing	  	  The	  logical	  or	  rhetorical	  and	  aesthetic	  modes	  of	  communication	  touched	  upon	  in	  the	  above	  might	  well	  be	  described	  in	  the	  contrast	  between	  telling	  and	  showing.2	  “Telling”	  is	  a	  direct	  mode	  of	  communication,	  in	  which	  the	  author	  is	  able	  to	  convey	  completely	  what	  is	  meant.	  3	  	  Kuang-­‐Ming	  Wu	  describes	  this	  mode	  of	  communication	  in	  terms	  of	  “literal	  cognitive	  
                                                2	  The	  distinction	  was	  first	  popularized	  in	  narrative	  theory	  by	  Percy	  Lubbock	  in	  The	  Craft	  of	  Fiction	  (1926).	  See	  also	  Norman	  Friedman	  “Point	  of	  View	  in	  Fiction,”	  PMLA	  70,	  no.	  5	  (1955),	  1160-­‐84	  and	  Wayne	  Booth	  The	  
Rhetoric	  of	  Fiction	  (1961).	  	  3	  Kuang-­‐Ming	  Wu	  makes	  this	  distinction	  in	  terms	  of	  “literal	  cognitive	  conveyance”	  and	  “metaphoric	  indirection”	  (See,	  Chuang-­‐Tzu:	  World	  
Philosopher	  at	  Play,	  15).	  Robert	  Allinson	  likewise	  distinguishes	  between	  the	  conceptual	  cognitive	  faculty	  that	  apprehends	  analytic	  language,	  and	  an	  intuitive	  aesthetic	  cognitive	  faculty	  that	  apprehends	  metaphoric	  language	  (See	  Chuang-­‐Tzu	  for	  Spiritual	  Transformation,	  23-­‐39).	  	  	  
 110 
conveyance,”	  and	  explains,	  “	  “the	  author	  says	  something	  by	  stating	  it	  directly	  and	  unambiguously…exactitude	  and	  totality	  of	  conveyance	  make	  up	  the	  ideal.”4	  Here	  the	  recipient	  of	  a	  communication	  more	  passively	  receives	  some	  piece	  of	  information	  in	  complete	  form.	  The	  communication’s	  quality	  of	  totality	  means	  that	  one	  is	  not	  required	  to	  add	  very	  much	  to	  that	  complete	  package	  of	  ideas	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  it.	  For	  example,	  when	  Mozi	  says,	  “Now	  if	  states	  attack	  each	  other,	  if	  houses	  usurp	  each	  other,	  if	  people	  harm	  each	  other…then	  this	  is	  harmful	  to	  the	  world,”5	  there	  is	  little	  ambiguity	  in	  what	  he	  says	  –	  his	  meaning	  is	  quite	  literally	  communicated	  and	  received	  without	  much	  aid	  in	  interpretation	  from	  our	  own	  experiences	  or	  other	  external	  sources.6	  “Showing”	  presupposes	  that	  the	  audience	  has	  immediate	  access	  to	  a	  work.7	  This	  resonates	  with	  enlightenment	  era	  ideas	  about	  aesthetic	  response	  as	  a	  sentiment	  triggered	  by	  a	  certain	  arrangement	  of	  formal	  properties.	  Under	  such	  a	  framework,	  the	  audience	  is	  the	  immediate	  recipient	  of	  an	  
                                                4	  Wu,	  Chuang-­‐Tzu:	  World	  philosopher	  at	  Play,	  15	  and	  31-­‐32.	  	  5	  Mozi	  15.2,	  Johnston	  137.	  今若國之與國之相攻，家之與家之相篡，
人之與人之相賊...此則天下之害也。	  	  6	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Wu	  and	  Alinson	  see	  this	  mode	  of	  communication	  as	  completely	  passive	  requiring	  no	  aid	  from	  the	  reader	  (See	  Wu,	  Chuang-­‐Tzu:	  World	  philosopher	  at	  Play,	  15	  and	  31-­‐32,	  and	  Alinson,	  
Chuang-­‐Tzu	  for	  Spiritual	  Transformation,	  23-­‐39).	  I	  take	  a	  softer	  approach	  than	  these	  two	  –	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  all	  modes	  of	  communication	  require	  something	  of	  the	  reader,	  but	  that	  we	  can	  talk	  about	  those	  requirements	  in	  degrees.	  Whereas	  an	  aesthetic	  mode	  requires	  greater	  reader	  input,	  “telling”	  seems	  to	  require	  less	  from	  the	  reader	  for	  comprehension	  of	  the	  material.	  	  
 7	  See	  Friedman,	  “Point	  of	  View	  in	  Fiction,”	  1169-­‐1175.	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aesthetic	  experience.8	  However,	  “showing”	  departs	  from	  that	  model	  in	  that	  rather	  than	  emphasizing	  the	  passive	  receipt	  of	  aesthetic	  experience,	  the	  audience	  is	  encouraged	  to	  approach	  the	  work	  actively.	  In	  showing	  it’s	  meaning,	  the	  text	  intimates	  an	  idea	  without	  directly	  saying	  it,	  and	  invites	  the	  audience	  to	  participate	  in	  unfolding	  the	  work’s	  meaning.9	  There	  are	  many	  ways	  a	  text	  might	  show	  its	  conceptual	  content.	  For	  example,	  The	  Zhuangzi	  makes	  use	  of	  vivid	  imagery	  in	  describing	  the	  pipes	  of	  heaven,	  Cook	  Ding’s	  butchery,	  and	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  fish,	  Kun,	  into	  the	  emourmous	  Peng	  bird.	  Such	  imagery	  invites	  the	  audience	  to	  be	  a	  witness	  to	  these	  events	  in	  an	  unmediated	  fashion,	  rather	  than	  having	  a	  narrator	  simply	  tell	  us	  what	  occurs.10	  The	  text’s	  use	  circumlocution	  in	  the	  Qiwulun	  chapter	  is	  likewise	  noteworthy;	  Zhuangzi	  supplies	  his	  audience	  with	  riddles,	  strange	  arguments,	  and	  then	  equivocates	  on	  the	  conclusions	  of	  those	  arguments.	  The	  audience	  must	  infer	  from	  what	  might	  first	  appear	  to	  be	  nonsense	  the	  meaning	  of	  these	  roundabout	  arguments.	  In	  recent	  scholarship	  
                                                8	  See	  pages	  39-­‐46	  of	  chapter	  two	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  	  9	  Friedman	  uses	  the	  parallel	  distinctions	  of	  statement	  and	  inference,	  exposition	  and	  presentation,	  narrative	  and	  drama,	  explicit	  and	  implicit,	  and	  idea	  and	  image	  to	  illustrate	  the	  difference	  between	  telling	  and	  showing.	  See	  “Point	  of	  View	  in	  Fiction,”	  1169.	  	  10	  Particularly	  pertinent	  here	  is	  the	  use	  of	  onomatopoeia.	  For	  example,	  chapter	  two	  opens	  with	  Ziqi	  describing	  the	  pipes	  of	  heaven:	  “They	  roar	  like	  waves,	  whistle	  like	  arrow,	  screech,	  gasp,	  cry,	  wail,	  moan,	  and	  howl,	  those	  in	  the	  lead	  calling	  out	  yeee!,	  those	  behind	  calling	  out	  yuuu!”	  激者，謞者，叱者
，吸者，叫者，譹者，宎者，咬者，前者唱于而隨者唱喁。(Zhuangzi	  2.46,	  Watson	  36).	  Here	  the	  audience	  can	  “hear”	  the	  piping	  of	  heaven	  for	  themselves.	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more	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  use	  of	  metaphor	  as	  a	  means	  of	  non-­‐literally	  communicating	  its	  message.	  Metaphors	  work	  by	  extending	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  term	  into	  some	  other	  domain.	  Max	  Black	  points	  out	  that	  a	  source	  term	  brings	  a	  “system	  of	  associated	  commonplaces”	  to	  bear	  on	  some	  other	  concept.	  To	  say	  that	  “man	  is	  a	  wolf”	  is	  to	  import	  a	  system	  of	  meanings	  pertaining	  to	  wolf	  to	  organize	  the	  concept	  of	  man,	  which	  includes	  our	  understanding	  of	  wolf	  as	  ferocious,	  cunning,	  daring,	  etc.	  In	  extending	  this	  system	  of	  meanings	  to	  ‘man’	  we	  understand	  ‘man’	  in	  a	  new	  way.	  Any	  wolf-­‐like	  traits	  of	  man	  will	  be	  made	  prominent,	  while	  traits	  that	  cannot	  be	  rendered	  in	  “wolf-­‐language”	  so	  easily	  will	  be	  pushed	  to	  the	  background.	  Naturally	  ‘wolf’	  cannot	  exhaust	  or	  give	  a	  reductive	  account	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘man’,	  but	  rather	  the	  metaphor	  organizes	  the	  concept	  of	  man	  and	  extends	  its	  meaning.	  11	  	  While	  the	  text	  uses	  imagery,	  circumlocution,	  and	  notably	  metaphor,	  the	  aesthetic	  style	  of	  the	  text	  also	  includes	  other	  literary	  devices	  such	  as	  analogy,	  allegory,	  irony,	  and	  humour.	  The	  use	  of	  literary	  language	  complicates	  the	  distinction	  between	  texts	  in	  early	  China	  that	  are	  more	  oriented	  toward	  telling	  or	  literal	  language	  and	  those	  that	  strive	  to	  show	  or	  make	  use	  of	  a	  more	  aesthetic	  style.	  Mencius,	  for	  example,	  makes	  use	  of	  a	  great	  many	  analogies.	  He	  is	  particularly	  fond	  of	  agrarian	  analogies,	  in	  which	  he	  likens	  our	  four	  incipient	  moral	  tendencies	  that	  constitute	  human	  nature	  to	  
                                                11	  Black,	  “Metaphor,”	  285-­‐94.	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sprouts,	  which	  must	  be	  cultivated	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  their	  full	  potential.	  Here	  we	  can	  distinguish	  between	  aesthetic	  style	  and	  the	  use	  of	  analogy	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  literal	  language.	  An	  analogy	  is	  a	  comparison,	  in	  which	  two	  terms	  are	  shown	  to	  have	  an	  underlying	  similarity	  –	  it	  shows	  that	  P	  is	  like	  Q	  in	  respect	  of	  some	  property,	  R.	  Mencius	  points	  out	  that	  our	  nascent	  moral	  feelings	  are	  like	  sprouts	  in	  that	  they	  both	  must	  be	  cultivated	  so	  that	  they	  may	  be	  extended.	  12	  This	  comparison	  functions	  as	  an	  explanation,	  allowing	  Mencius	  to	  make	  a	  normative	  point	  about	  how	  one	  cultivates	  one’s	  nature.	  	  Instead	  of	  having	  a	  master	  make	  a	  normative	  point,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  metaphorically	  illustrates	  the	  good	  life	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  episodic	  scenes,	  which	  require	  the	  reader	  to	  draw	  on	  each	  illustration’s	  field	  of	  meanings	  in	  order	  to	  flesh	  out	  the	  picture	  for	  herself.	  The	  text	  shows	  the	  reader	  its	  ethical	  vision	  rather	  telling.	  Analogy,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  only	  refers	  to	  a	  single	  point	  of	  overlap	  between	  two	  terms,	  without	  reference	  to	  a	  wider	  and	  dynamic	  field	  of	  meanings,	  and	  is	  thus	  able	  to	  give	  a	  more	  complete	  account	  of	  a	  term.	  So	  analogy	  used	  thusly	  belongs	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  literal	  language	  insofar	  as	  it	  provides	  a	  complete	  explanation	  of	  concepts	  that	  allows	  the	  master	  to	  unequivocally	  tell	  its	  reader	  its	  normative	  point.	  The	  difference	  between	  showing	  and	  telling	  does	  not	  reside	  merely	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  former	  makes	  use	  of	  literary	  language,	  but	  in	  how	  that	  language	  is	  deployed.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  uses	  a	  metaphoric	  approach	  as	  means	  to	  craft	  an	  image,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  means	  to	  make	  a	  normative	  point	  as	  Mencius	  does	  with	  his	  use	  of	  analogy.	  	  
                                                12	  For	  example	  see	  Mencius	  2A2.	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The	  distinction	  between	  showing	  and	  telling	  is	  important	  for	  approaching	  the	  Zhuangzi.	  If	  the	  text	  is	  critical	  of	  linguistic	  instructions	  that	  generate	  theoretical	  commitments,	  then	  to	  unpack	  its	  own	  ethical	  vision	  in	  such	  terms	  would	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  falling	  into	  the	  same	  logical	  traps	  the	  text	  sets	  for	  its	  philosophical	  rivals.	  Supposing	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  structured	  as	  a	  literal	  text	  often	  results	  in	  the	  claim	  that	  it	  runs	  into	  the	  problem	  of	  relativism	  or	  is	  merely	  a	  relativist	  discourse:	  if	  the	  text	  is	  criticizing	  the	  supposition	  that	  one	  should	  affirm	  or	  deny	  different	  moral	  doctrines	  then	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  is	  not	  justified	  in	  affirming	  its	  own	  ethical	  vision	  over	  any	  other	  ethical	  prescription.	  	  This	  justificatory	  problem	  has	  led	  to	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  as	  espousing	  a	  thoroughgoing	  relativism:	  the	  text	  recognizes	  that	  its	  own	  musings	  are,	  like	  all	  others,	  relative	  to	  its	  own	  perspective.	  Brook	  Ziporyn	  suggests	  that	  we	  understand	  the	  Zhuangzian	  perspective	  as	  utilizing	  a	  sort	  of	  ‘wild	  card’.	  Insofar	  as	  a	  person	  “regards	  all	  things	  as	  one”	  and	  is	  not	  invested	  in	  one	  set	  of	  beliefs	  and	  judgments	  over	  another,	  he	  can	  adjust	  to	  any	  situation	  with	  ease;	  he	  is	  like	  a	  wild	  card	  in	  a	  card	  game	  that	  can	  be	  made	  to	  support	  whatever	  other	  cards	  exist	  in	  a	  hand.	  Moreover,	  Ziporyn	  suggests	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  recognizes	  that	  this	  wild	  card	  perspective	  is	  merely	  one	  of	  many,	  and	  ultimately	  is	  not	  more	  or	  less	  admirable	  than	  any	  other	  perspective.13	  But	  Ziproyn’s	  interpretation	  relies	  too	  heavily	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  literal	  telling	  that	  is	  concomitant	  with	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  critique	  of	  linguistic	  
                                                13	  Ziporyn,	  “How	  Many	  are	  the	  Ten	  Thousand	  Things	  and	  I?”	  33-­‐63.	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instruction.	  Because	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  not	  telling	  or	  spelling	  out	  a	  normative	  position	  for	  the	  audience,	  the	  text	  does	  not	  violate	  its	  own	  intimations	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  avoid	  linguistic	  instruction	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  making	  distinctions.	  Its	  use	  of	  metaphoric	  language	  allows	  the	  Zhuangzi	  to	  illustrate	  vision	  of	  the	  good	  life	  without	  literally	  affirming	  it	  and	  therefore	  should	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  embracing	  relativism.	  It	  shows	  its	  audience	  better	  and	  worse	  ways	  of	  living	  as	  means	  of	  extracting	  itself	  from	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  linguistic	  instruction	  and	  shifei	  debates.	  The	  use	  of	  aesthetics,	  particularly	  metaphors,	  allows	  the	  Zhuangzi	  to	  evade	  the	  criticisms	  that	  it	  advances	  on	  those	  who	  use	  more	  literal	  language	  in	  their	  affirmations	  of	  a	  doctrine.	  ///	  	  
3.	  Conceptual	  Metaphors	  and	  their	  Somatic	  Import	  	  Casting	  metaphors	  as	  a	  species	  of	  aesthetic	  showing	  makes	  it	  tempting	  to	  think	  of	  metaphors	  as	  exclusively	  literary.	  However,	  in	  their	  work	  in	  conceptual	  metaphor	  theory,	  George	  Lakoff	  and	  Mark	  Johnson	  suggest	  that	  metaphors	  have	  a	  somatic	  significance.	  They	  argue	  that	  abstract	  concepts	  have	  their	  roots	  in	  sensory-­‐motor	  experience.14	  These	  sensory-­‐motor	  “schemas”	  organize	  our	  concrete	  experiences.	  These	  are	  primary	  metaphors	  that	  can	  then	  be	  mapped	  onto	  hazier	  concepts,	  providing	  them	  with	  structure.	  For	  example,	  I	  understand	  the	  concept	  ‘life’	  by	  mapping	  onto	  
                                                14	  George	  Lakoff	  and	  Mark	  Johnson,	  Metaphors	  We	  Live	  By	  (Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1980),	  14-­‐21	  and	  56-­‐68.	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it	  structural	  elements	  of	  the	  concrete	  somatic	  experience	  I’ve	  had	  of	  ‘taking	  a	  journey.’	  The	  source	  metaphor	  of	  ‘taking	  a	  journey’	  helps	  me	  understand	  ‘life’	  in	  terms	  of	  arriving	  at	  a	  destination,	  planning	  an	  itinerary,	  enjoying	  the	  ride,	  and	  so	  on.15	  	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  acknowledge	  that	  all	  physical	  experience	  is	  experienced	  against	  a	  background	  of	  cultural	  assumptions,	  so	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  neatly	  distinguish	  between	  strictly	  physical	  and	  strictly	  cultural	  experience;	  however	  they	  note	  that	  some	  experiences,	  such	  as	  standing	  up,	  are	  more	  physical,	  while	  others,	  such	  as	  participating	  in	  a	  wedding,	  are	  more	  culturally	  imbued.16	  In	  his	  application	  of	  conceptual	  metaphor	  theory	  to	  comparative	  philosophy,	  Edward	  Slingerland	  has	  suggested	  that	  primary	  metaphors	  of	  the	  “more	  physical”	  sort	  that	  arise	  from	  shared	  somatic	  experience	  point	  to	  shared	  cognitive	  processes.	  That	  is,	  that	  we	  have	  shared	  bodily	  experiences	  as	  the	  root	  of	  conceptual	  thinking	  suggests	  that	  “our”	  (i.e.	  contemporary	  people)	  thinking	  is	  not	  so	  different	  from	  that	  of	  the	  early	  Chinese.	  Slingerland’s	  deployment	  of	  conceptual	  metaphor	  theory	  and	  the	  implication	  of	  shared	  cognitive	  universals	  is	  meant	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  counterweight	  to	  those	  who	  would	  suggest	  that	  “we”	  can	  never	  understand	  
                                                15	  George	  Lakoff,	  “The	  Contemporary	  Theory	  of	  Metaphor,”	  in	  
Metaphor	  and	  Thought,	  Second	  Edition,	  ed.	  Andrew	  Ortony	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  202-­‐251.	  For	  a	  useful	  overview	  of	  positions	  and	  concepts	  within	  conceptual	  metaphor	  theory	  discussions,	  see	  Edward	  Slingerland,	  “Metaphor	  and	  Meaning	  in	  Early	  China,”	  Dao	  10,	  no.	  1	  (2011),	  1-­‐30.	  	  16	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson,	  Metaphors	  We	  Live	  By,	  57.	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“them”	  because	  of	  overwhelmingly	  different	  cultural	  contexts.17	  There	  are	  several	  concerns	  that	  arise	  from	  supposing	  that	  shared	  metaphors	  point	  to	  universal	  cognitive	  content,	  particularly	  with	  respect	  to	  comparative	  philosophy;	  and	  while	  there	  is	  not	  sufficient	  space	  within	  this	  dissertation	  to	  give	  those	  concerns	  the	  treatment	  they	  deserve,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  we	  can	  take	  the	  philosophical	  import	  of	  somatically	  grounded	  conceptual	  thinking	  without	  suggesting	  that	  cognitive	  processes	  are	  universal.	  	  The	  somatic	  nature	  of	  metaphors	  means	  that	  conceptual	  knowledge	  is	  dependent	  upon	  physical	  experience.	  This	  insight	  is	  particularly	  pertinent	  given	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  vision	  of	  the	  good	  life,	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  characterized	  by	  ming	  (明),	  is	  grounded	  in	  practical	  activity,	  and	  prizes	  intuitive	  doing	  over	  more	  theoretical	  saying.	  Wheelwright	  Bian	  is	  a	  paradigmatic	  example	  of	  this,	  as	  he	  metaphorically	  discusses	  the	  good	  life	  in	  terms	  of	  skill	  perfection	  that	  cannot	  be	  taught	  but	  instead	  must	  be	  experienced.18	  Somatic	  experience	  is	  essential	  for	  understanding	  and	  organizing	  conceptual	  knowledge,	  and	  consequently	  gives	  greater	  clarity	  to	  a	  concept	  than	  linguistic	  instruction	  
                                                17	  For	  example,	  Roger	  T.	  Ames	  suggests	  that	  we	  require	  an	  interpretive	  context	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  Asian	  traditions	  to	  speak	  on	  their	  own	  terms,	  which	  helps	  us	  from	  imposing	  our	  own	  contemporary	  Western	  conceptual	  apparatus	  onto	  non-­‐Western	  works.	  To	  impose	  “our”	  conceptual	  apparatuses	  onto	  non-­‐Western	  works	  would	  merely	  be	  a	  task	  in	  assimilating	  those	  works	  to	  our	  own	  ideas.	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  overlapping	  conceptual	  apparatus	  that	  can	  be	  used;	  the	  two	  cultural	  contexts	  are	  incommensurable.	  See	  Confucian	  Role	  Ethics:	  A	  Vocabulary	  (Honolulu:	  University	  of	  Hawaii	  Press,	  2011),	  41-­‐86.	  	  18	  Zhuangzi	  13.490-­‐491,	  Watson	  152-­‐53.	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alone.	  Metaphoric	  understanding	  and	  concomitantly	  Zhuangzian	  aesthetics	  are	  somatic	  as	  well	  as	  literary.	  	  	  
4.	  Masters,	  Texts,	  Teaching	  and	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  Response	  	  	   Because	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  metaphors	  so	  frequently	  play	  with	  teaching	  scenes,	  it	  will	  be	  important	  to	  consider	  background	  assumptions	  about	  teaching	  to	  which	  the	  text	  is	  responding.	  Particularly	  in	  early	  China	  we	  see	  an	  intimate	  relationship	  among	  ideas	  about	  textual	  transmission,	  the	  master-­‐disciple	  relationship,	  and	  the	  act	  of	  teaching.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  plays	  with	  these	  associations	  in	  crafting	  images	  that	  undermine	  our	  expectations	  about	  them	  and	  consequently	  motivates	  an	  ethical	  vision	  that	  likewise	  undermines	  our	  expectations	  about	  the	  transmission	  of	  wisdom	  and	  what	  constitutes	  that	  wisdom.	  	  The	  political	  climate	  of	  the	  Warring	  States	  period	  fostered	  the	  growth	  of	  moral,	  political,	  and	  technical	  scholarship,	  giving	  rise	  to	  different	  groups	  and	  schools	  of	  thought.	  As	  the	  centralized	  authority	  of	  the	  Zhou	  dynasty	  disintegrated	  and	  new	  regional	  powers	  emerged,	  the	  demand	  for	  technical	  specialists	  and	  advisors	  contributed	  to	  the	  upward	  mobility	  of	  lower	  level	  aristocrats.	  Within	  this	  group	  of	  aristocrats	  we	  see	  the	  emergence	  of	  what	  the	  Han	  dynasty	  Shiji	  will	  call	  Jia	  (家),	  conventionally	  translated	  as	  “schools”,	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but	  probably	  better	  understood	  as	  teaching	  lineages.19	  	  Despite	  the	  Han	  dynasty’s	  classifications	  of	  these	  schools,	  during	  the	  Warring	  States	  period	  divisions	  among	  them	  were	  often	  fluid.	  Therefore	  it	  might	  best	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  master	  and	  disciple,	  rather	  than	  “school”	  affiliation.	  Mark	  Lewis	  points	  out	  that	  in	  the	  later	  History	  of	  the	  Former	  Han	  these	  loosely	  grouped	  lineages	  are	  variously	  referred	  to	  as	  zhujia	  (‘various	  schools’)	  and	  zhuzi	  (‘various	  masters’)	  and	  concludes	  that,	  “To	  be	  a	  school,	  means	  to	  have	  a	  master.”20	  Some	  of	  the	  master’s	  teachings	  and	  interactions	  with	  disciples	  were	  recorded	  and	  collected	  on	  bamboo	  strips,	  which	  then	  formed	  the	  basis	  for	  early	  Warring	  States	  master	  texts,	  and	  textual	  transmission	  becomes	  a	  central	  occupation	  of	  the	  teaching	  lineage.	  Nathan	  Sivin	  explains	  that	  within	  teaching	  traditions,	  the	  disciple	  is	  expected	  to	  study	  the	  text	  and	  only	  when	  his	  own	  resources	  are	  exhausted	  does	  the	  master	  step	  in	  to	  offer	  explanation.	  Linguistic	  instruction,	  textual	  transmission,	  and	  the	  master-­‐disciple	  relationship	  are	  intimately	  bound	  up	  with	  one	  another	  in	  the	  act	  of	  teaching.	  21	  
                                                19	  Lu	  Xing	  provides	  a	  useful	  overview	  of	  this	  social	  shift	  in	  Rhetoric	  in	  
Ancient	  China,	  Fifth	  to	  Third	  Century,	  BCE	  (Columbia,	  SC:	  University	  of	  South	  Carolina	  Press,	  1998),	  44-­‐67.	  	  20	  Mark	  Lewis,	  Writing	  and	  Authority	  in	  Early	  China	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1999),	  55-­‐56.	  	  21	  Nathan	  Sivin	  discusses	  this	  with	  respect	  to	  medical	  teaching	  lineages,	  and	  compares	  it	  to	  the	  Confucian	  teaching	  lineage.	  His	  point	  is	  that	  the	  recorded	  wisdom	  need	  not	  exclusively	  be	  the	  recorded	  wisdom	  of	  a	  master	  (as	  with	  the	  Analects,	  Mencius,	  or	  Mozi),	  but	  can	  also	  refer	  to	  some	  older	  text	  unaffiliated	  with	  a	  master,	  such	  as	  the	  Odes	  (See	  “Text	  and	  Experience	  in	  Classical	  Chinese	  Medicine”	  in	  Knowledge	  and	  the	  Scholarly	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While	  argumentation	  would	  have	  certainly	  been	  a	  preoccupation	  of	  these	  emerging	  teaching	  lineages,	  it	  is	  worth	  pointing	  out	  that	  there	  are	  texts	  that	  are	  not	  so	  squarely	  within	  the	  teaching	  traditions	  that	  make	  use	  of	  different	  rhetorical	  strategies	  and	  give	  insight	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  argumentation	  from	  a	  different	  angle.	  Lisa	  Raphals	  distinguishes	  between	  two	  kinds	  of	  argumentation	  in	  early	  China:	  rhetorical	  persuasive	  and	  instructive	  arguments.	  The	  former	  tend	  to	  portray	  subordinates	  attempting	  to	  persuade	  superiors	  of	  the	  merits	  of	  some	  course	  of	  action,	  and	  are	  commonly	  used	  within	  the	  context	  of	  politics.22	  Within	  the	  realm	  of	  rhetorical	  persuasion,	  effective	  strategies	  include	  psychological	  manipulation	  of	  the	  sort	  Hanfeizi	  describes	  in	  “The	  Difficulties	  of	  Persuasion”	  chapter	  of	  the	  Hanfeizi.	  Here,	  Hanfeizi	  suggests,	  “On	  the	  whole	  the	  difficult	  thing	  about	  persuasion	  is	  to	  know	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  person	  one	  is	  trying	  to	  persuade	  and	  to	  be	  able	  to	  fit	  one’s	  words	  to	  it.”23	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  teaching	  lineages,	  instructive	  arguments	  are	  much	  more	  common.	  Such	  arguments	  are	  aimed	  at	  students	  and	  therefore	  required	  less	  convincing.	  The	  student,	  having	  come	  to	  ask	  the	  master’s	  advice,	  was	  presumably	  already	  convinced	  of	  the	  master’s	  authority	  on	  the	  
                                                                                                                                
Medical	  Traditions,	  ed.	  Don	  Bates	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  177-­‐204).	  	  22	  Lisa	  Raphals,	  “Arguments	  by	  Women	  in	  Early	  Chinese	  Texts,”	  Nan	  
Nü	  3,	  no.	  2	  (2001),	  157-­‐195.	  	  23	  Hanfeizi:	  the	  Basic	  Writings,	  trans.	  Watson	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1964),	  73.	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matter.	  Raphals	  points	  out	  that	  “our	  major	  sources	  for	  instructive	  arguments	  within	  teaching	  lineages	  are	  the	  texts	  of	  the	  Masters	  category,	  supported	  by	  anecdotal	  traditions	  within	  the	  teaching	  lineage.”24	  In	  these	  texts	  the	  author	  must	  still	  convince	  the	  reader	  of	  the	  efficaciousness	  of	  a	  course	  of	  action,	  but	  within	  teaching	  scenes	  associated	  with	  texts	  of	  teaching	  lineages,	  we	  commonly	  see	  “appeals	  to	  the	  rectitude	  and	  authority	  of	  sages,	  claims	  for	  one’s	  own	  position	  within	  a	  teaching	  lineage	  and	  access	  to	  its	  secrets	  and	  esoteric	  meaning…or	  texts,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  adversarial	  arguments	  against	  competitors,	  either	  inside	  the	  lineage…or	  to	  defend	  the	  lineage	  against	  attacks	  from	  without.”25	  The	  master’s	  authority	  is	  buttressed	  by	  what	  Mark	  Lewis	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  “enunciatory	  scene.”	  Here	  the	  master’s	  authority	  is	  conferred	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  disciples.	  26	  These	  scenes	  often	  begin	  with	  something	  like,	  “The	  Master	  said…”	  Sometimes	  the	  reader	  is	  told	  outright	  who	  is	  the	  audience	  of	  the	  scene.	  In	  the	  Analects,	  frequently	  Confucius’	  famous	  disciples	  are	  on	  the	  receiving	  end	  of	  the	  lesson,	  while	  in	  the	  Mozi	  the	  audience	  is	  often	  left	  implied.	  The	  wisdom	  of	  the	  text	  is	  couched	  in	  a	  teaching	  scene,	  in	  which	  an	  authoritative	  master	  dispenses	  lessons	  to	  his	  disciples.	  But	  because	  of	  the	  
                                                24	  Lisa	  Raphals,	  “Arguments	  by	  Women,”	  189.	  	  25	  Ibid.,	  188.	  	  26	  Lewis	  suggests	  that	  the	  enunciatory	  scene	  is	  widely	  used	  in	  early	  master	  texts,	  such	  as	  the	  Analects,	  Mencius,	  Sunzi	  Bingfa,	  and	  Mozi,	  but	  acknowledges	  that	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  device	  it	  falls	  out	  of	  favor	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  third	  person	  narratives	  and	  masters	  who	  are	  also	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  texts	  that	  bear	  their	  name	  (Writing	  and	  Authority	  in	  Early	  China,	  54-­‐63).	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composite	  nature	  of	  a	  text	  compiled	  by	  disciples	  and	  later	  interpreters,	  conflicting	  theoretical	  commitments	  are	  smuggled	  into	  the	  texts.27	  Additionally	  the	  moral	  lessons	  dispensed	  are	  sometimes	  difficult	  to	  systematize;	  this	  is	  particularly	  true	  of	  the	  Analects	  in	  which	  Confucius	  offers	  different	  pieces	  of	  advice	  to	  different	  students.	  Some	  texts	  offer	  a	  diversity	  of	  interpretations	  of	  the	  master’s	  wisdom	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  diversity	  of	  moral	  lessons.	  The	  master	  here	  serves	  a	  functional	  role	  as	  the	  unifying	  point	  upon	  which	  potentially	  differing	  theoretical	  commitments	  and	  moral	  lessons	  converge.	  He	  anchors	  the	  text,	  providing	  an	  overarching	  voice	  of	  wisdom	  throughout	  it.	  	  The	  role	  of	  the	  master	  was	  largely	  understood	  within	  a	  master-­‐disciple	  mode	  of	  instruction	  that	  takes	  place	  within	  a	  teaching	  lineage	  that	  was	  concerned	  with	  the	  transmission	  of	  a	  text.	  The	  master	  rhetorically	  couched	  himself	  as	  an	  authority	  by	  virtue	  of	  his	  position	  within	  that	  teaching	  lineage,	  and	  that	  authority	  was	  also	  buttressed	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  disciples,	  whether	  implied	  or	  explicitly	  represented.	  As	  a	  character	  in	  a	  text,	  the	  master	  additionally	  anchored	  a	  text	  by	  serving	  as	  the	  focal	  point	  around	  which	  interpretations	  and	  various	  moral	  lessons	  were	  organized.	  In	  surveying	  the	  landscape	  of	  these	  teaching	  lineages,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  masters,	  texts,	  and	  teaching	  lineages	  worked	  together	  to	  generate	  certain	  expectations	  and	  assumptions	  about	  who	  has	  wisdom,	  and	  how	  it	  is	  transmitted.	  
                                                27	  See	  E.	  Bruce	  Brooks	  and	  A.	  Taeko	  Brooks,	  The	  Original	  Analects	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press	  2001).	  They	  suggest	  that	  the	  later	  stratifications	  of	  the	  Analects	  preserve	  conflicts	  within	  the	  early	  Confucian	  tradition.	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斧，物無害者，無所可用，安所困苦哉！」	  	   Huizi	  said	  to	  Zhuang	  Zhou,	  “I	  have	  a	  big	  tree	  of	  the	  kind	  men	  call	  
shu.	  Its	  trunk	  is	  too	  gnarled	  and	  bumpy	  to	  apply	  a	  measuring	  line	  to,	  its	  branches	  too	  bent	  and	  twisty	  to	  match	  up	  to	  a	  compass	  or	  square	  you	  
                                                28	  I	  use	  the	  name	  “Zhuang	  Zhou”	  to	  designate	  the	  character	  that	  appears	  in	  the	  text,	  which	  is	  distinct	  from	  “Zhuangzi,”	  who	  is	  traditionally	  regarded	  as	  the	  author	  of	  the	  text,	  or	  “the	  Zhuangzi,”	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  text	  itself.	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could	  stand	  it	  by	  the	  road	  and	  no	  carpenter	  would	  look	  at	  it	  twice.	  Your	  words,	  too,	  are	  big	  and	  useless,	  and	  so	  everyone	  alike	  spurns	  them!”	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  replied,	  “Maybe	  you’ve	  never	  seen	  a	  wildcat	  or	  a	  weasel.	  It	  crouches	  down	  and	  hides,	  watching	  for	  something	  to	  come	  along.	  It	  leaps	  and	  races	  east	  and	  west,	  not	  hesitating	  to	  go	  high	  or	  low	  –	  until	  it	  falls	  into	  the	  trap	  and	  dies	  in	  the	  net.	  Then	  again	  there’s	  the	  yak,	  big	  as	  a	  cloud	  covering	  the	  sky.	  It	  certainly	  knows	  how	  to	  be	  big,	  though	  it	  doesn’t	  know	  how	  to	  catch	  rats.	  Now	  you	  have	  this	  big	  tree	  and	  you’re	  distressed	  because	  it’s	  useless.	  Why	  don’t	  you	  plant	  it	  in	  Not-­‐Even-­‐Anything	  Village,	  or	  the	  field	  of	  Broad-­‐and-­‐Boundless,	  relax	  and	  do	  nothing	  by	  its	  side,	  or	  lie	  down	  for	  a	  free	  and	  easy	  sleep	  under	  it?	  Axes	  will	  never	  shorten	  its	  life,	  nothing	  can	  ever	  harm	  it.	  If	  there’s	  no	  use	  for	  it,	  how	  can	  it	  come	  to	  grief	  or	  pain?”29	  	  Hui	  Shi	  challenges	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  making	  an	  analogy	  between	  lofty	  words	  and	  a	  useless	  tree.	  But	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  turns	  the	  comparison	  around	  to	  point	  out	  the	  benefits	  of	  being	  useless,	  and	  Hui	  Shi	  ends	  up	  on	  the	  receiving	  end	  of	  a	  lesson,	  having	  been	  bested	  in	  a	  friendly	  debate.	  It	  is	  clear	  here	  that	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  is	  not	  dispensing	  a	  lesson	  to	  an	  advice-­‐seeking	  disciple,	  who	  is	  already	  convinced	  of	  the	  master’s	  authority	  on	  the	  matter.	  Hui	  Shi	  is	  a	  peer,	  who	  is	  accomplished	  in	  disputation	  and	  who	  may	  have	  even	  served	  at	  court,	  and	  who	  is	  delighted	  to	  repeatedly	  challenge	  and	  make	  fun	  of	  Zhuang	  Zhou.30	  This	  kind	  of	  adversarial	  debate	  among	  peers	  is	  not	  completely	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  instructive	  argumentation	  associated	  with	  teaching	  lineages	  as	  outlined	  by	  Raphals	  –	  such	  debates	  were	  seen	  among	  rival	  masters	  defending	  their	  traditions.31	  Carine	  Defoort	  further	  suggests	  that	  the	  “lack	  of	  any	  
                                                29	  Zhuangzi	  1.39-­‐40,	  Watson	  35.	  	  	  30	  Lisa	  Raphals,	  “On	  Hui	  Shi”	  in	  Wandering	  at	  Ease	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  ed.	  Roger	  T.	  Ames	  (Albany:	  SUNY,	  1998),	  143-­‐161.	  	  31	  Raphals,	  “Arguments	  by	  Women,”	  188.	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institutional	  framework	  to	  determine	  standards	  of	  equality	  and	  mediate	  rivalries	  no	  doubt	  contributed	  to	  the	  early	  masters’	  sensitivity	  about	  their	  reputations,”	  and	  that	  consequently	  debates	  among	  masters	  were	  a	  serious	  affair	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  one’s	  students	  and	  therefore	  livelihood.32	  Yet	  no	  students	  witness	  Hui	  Shi	  and	  Zhuang	  Zhou’s	  interaction.	  In	  fact	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  is	  never	  portrayed	  as	  having	  disciples	  in	  the	  Inner	  Chapters,	  and	  only	  once	  in	  the	  Outer	  Chapters.33	  Furthermore	  the	  text	  repeatedly	  denounces	  the	  pursuit	  of	  reputation.	  For	  example,	  the	  wise	  but	  mutilated	  convict,	  Shu	  Shan	  Choptoes	  in	  speaking	  with	  Lao	  Dan	  criticizes	  Confucius	  for	  being	  thusly	  concerned:	  “He	  is	  after	  the	  sham	  illusion	  of	  fame	  and	  reputation	  and	  doesn’t	  know	  that	  the	  Perfect	  Man	  looks	  on	  these	  as	  so	  many	  handcuffs	  and	  fetters!”34	  The	  motivation	  behind	  the	  sparring	  is	  not	  preservation	  of	  one’s	  reputation	  or	  maintaining	  one’s	  students.	  Rather	  it	  seems	  that	  they	  are	  given	  to	  debate	  because	  they	  enjoy	  the	  friendly	  sparring.	  After	  all,	  Hui	  Shi	  is	  widely	  
                                                32	  Carine	  Defoort,	  “Instruction	  Dialogues	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi,”	  Dao	  11,	  no.	  4	  (2012),	  465.	  	  33	  Zhuangzi	  20.667-­‐668,	  Watson	  209-­‐10.	  	  34	  Zhuangzi	  5.204,	  Watson	  71.	  彼且蘄以諔詭幻怪之名聞，不知至人之
以是為己桎梏邪？	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                                                35	  On	  this	  point	  see	  Raphals,	  “On	  Hui	  Shi,”	  143-­‐161.	  	  36	  Zhuangzi	  24.843,	  Watson	  269.	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  exclaims,	  “Since	  you	  died	  Master	  Hui,	  I	  have	  had	  no	  material	  to	  work	  on.	  There’s	  no	  one	  I	  can	  talk	  to	  anymore.”	  自夫子之死也，吾以為質矣，吾與言之矣。	  	  	  37	  Zhuangzi	  13.462-­‐462,	  17.603-­‐604,	  and	  22.749-­‐750,	  Watson,	  143,	  187-­‐88,	  and	  240-­‐242	  respectively.	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You	  chatter	  like	  a	  rhetorician	  and	  all	  your	  words	  betray	  the	  entanglements	  of	  a	  living	  man.	  The	  dead	  know	  nothing	  of	  these!	  Would	  you	  like	  to	  hear	  a	  lecture	  on	  the	  dead?	  …Among	  the	  dead	  there	  are	  no	  rulers	  above,	  no	  subjects	  below,	  and	  no	  chores	  of	  the	  four	  seasons.	  With	  nothing	  to	  do,	  our	  springs	  and	  autumns	  are	  as	  endless	  as	  heaven	  and	  earth.	  A	  king	  facing	  south	  on	  his	  throne	  could	  have	  no	  more	  happiness	  than	  this!38	  	  	   Zhuang	  Zhou	  is	  made	  out	  to	  be	  the	  moral	  dolt	  for	  accepting	  the	  common	  assumption	  that	  death	  is	  something	  bad	  and	  ought	  to	  be	  avoided,	  while	  the	  skull	  occupies	  the	  role	  of	  teacher.39	  Zhuang	  Zhou’s	  serving	  as	  the	  butt	  of	  a	  joke	  is	  an	  ironic	  reversal	  of	  our	  assumptions	  regarding	  how	  a	  master	  should	  be	  portrayed.	  Rather	  than	  being	  a	  teacher,	  he	  is	  the	  student.	  And	  rather	  than	  being	  wise,	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  is	  foolish	  in	  at	  least	  two	  senses:	  1)	  in	  that	  he	  lacks	  knowledge,	  and	  2)	  in	  that	  he	  is	  silly	  or	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously.	  The	  portrayal	  of	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  is	  markedly	  different	  than	  other	  masters	  in	  the	  texts	  that	  bear	  their	  names.	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  is	  not	  portrayed	  as	  wise	  teacher	  with	  disciples.	  Instead,	  when	  he	  dispenses	  lessons	  they	  are	  in	  the	  form	  of	  besting	  an	  opponent	  through	  debate.	  Those	  adversarial	  interactions	  with	  Hui	  Shi	  seem	  to	  have	  no	  external	  motivation	  that	  would	  put	  him	  more	  in	  line	  with	  master	  texts	  who	  engage	  in	  similar	  activities	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  prestige	  and	  by	  extension	  their	  livelihoods.	  Furthermore,	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  occasionally	  serves	  as	  the	  moral	  dolt	  rather	  than	  wise	  master.	  And	  importantly,	  the	  relative	  infrequency	  of	  Zhuang	  Zhou’s	  appearance,	  particularly	  in	  the	  Inner	  Chapters,	  
                                                38	  Zhuangzi	  18.617-­‐619,	  Watson	  193-­‐94.	  	  
	  39	  Another	  instance	  of	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  serving	  as	  the	  moral	  dolt	  is	  found	  in	  Zhuangzi	  20.695-­‐698,	  Watson	  218-­‐19,	  in	  which	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  is	  nearly	  captured	  poaching.	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means	  he	  cannot	  serve	  as	  an	  overarching	  voice	  of	  wisdom	  throughout	  the	  text.	  His	  character	  does	  not	  anchor	  the	  text	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  Confucius,	  Mencius,	  Mozi,	  or	  Sunzi	  do,	  for	  example.	  Although	  he	  is	  frequently	  portrayed	  as	  wise,	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  is	  far	  from	  the	  kind	  of	  master-­‐teachers	  of	  Lewis’s	  enunciatory	  scene.	  	   Moreover,	  the	  reduced	  role	  of	  what	  is	  often	  the	  unifying	  authority	  figure	  of	  the	  text	  and	  subsequent	  imputing	  of	  wisdom	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  characters	  has	  epistemic	  implications	  that	  were	  elucidated	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter’s	  discussion	  of	  shifei	  distinctions40:	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  there	  is	  no	  single	  overarching	  master	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  voice	  of	  authority	  or	  wisdom,	  there	  is	  no	  single	  perspective	  or	  belief	  system	  that	  will	  give	  us	  access	  to	  some	  ultimately	  correct	  way	  of	  approaching	  the	  world.	  The	  sheer	  multitude	  of	  authoritative	  voices	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  and	  concomitant	  multiplicity	  of	  perspectives	  on	  the	  good	  life	  is	  a	  departure	  from	  the	  general	  trend	  of	  masters’	  texts	  in	  which	  the	  master	  for	  whom	  the	  text	  is	  named	  is	  the	  primary	  voice	  of	  wisdom.	  These	  portraits	  of	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  and	  the	  variety	  of	  other	  wise	  protagonists	  help	  us	  understand	  the	  text’s	  ethical	  vision	  as	  one	  in	  which	  there	  is	  no	  overarching	  authority	  that	  dictates	  universal	  standards.	  The	  standards,	  like	  the	  many	  voices	  of	  wisdom	  within	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  are	  shifting	  and	  dependent	  upon	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  one	  finds	  oneself.	  	  	  
                                                40	  For	  more	  on	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  criticism	  of	  shifei	  distinctions	  see	  pages	  74-­‐81	  of	  chapter	  three	  in	  this	  dissertation.	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4.2	  Teaching	  Scenes	  	  	  	   Despite	  not	  choosing	  to	  portray	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  as	  a	  traditional	  teacher,	  the	  text	  does	  in	  fact	  contain	  illustrations	  of	  teaching	  scenes	  with	  masters	  and	  disciples.	  But	  these	  scenes	  are	  wholly	  untraditional	  in	  that	  most	  of	  these	  teachers	  either	  do	  not	  have	  the	  answers,	  encourage	  students	  to	  forget	  what	  they	  know,	  are	  altogether	  silent,	  or	  when	  they	  speak	  they	  acknowledge	  that	  they	  are	  not	  as	  good	  as	  those	  who	  have	  wisdom	  that	  cannot	  be	  formulated	  to	  be	  easily	  transmitted.	  The	  previous	  chapter	  mentioned	  Wang	  Tai,	  who	  is	  described	  as	  standing	  but	  not	  teaching	  and	  sitting	  but	  not	  speaking.41	  But	  other	  examples	  of	  “do	  nothing”	  masters	  include	  Ziqi	  Nanguo,	  who	  is	  so	  detached	  from	  his	  surroundings	  he	  appears	  dead	  to	  his	  disciple,	  Wang	  Ni	  who	  when	  queried	  responds	  with	  “How	  would	  I	  know?”	  and	  of	  course	  Lao	  Dan,	  of	  whom	  Qin	  Shi	  says,	  “must	  have	  done	  something	  to	  make	  them	  talk	  about	  him,	  though	  he	  didn’t	  ask	  them	  to	  talk…”42	  	  Although	  they	  are	  presented	  with	  students,	  these	  teachers	  don’t	  intend	  to	  teach	  or	  they	  are	  reluctant	  to	  do	  so.	  There	  are	  at	  least	  two	  conclusions	  we	  should	  draw	  from	  this	  observation:	  1)	  Those	  who	  do	  actively	  engage	  in	  teaching	  understood	  as	  the	  transmission	  of	  texts	  and	  oral	  instruction,	  are	  doing	  it	  wrong.	  These	  teachers	  are	  portrayed	  as	  wise	  in	  
                                                41	  Zhuangzi	  5.187-­‐193,	  Watson	  68.	  For	  more	  on	  Wang	  Tai,	  see	  pages	  91-­‐92	  of	  chapter	  three	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  	  42	  Zhuangzi	  2.43-­‐50,	  Watson	  36,	  Zhuangzi	  2.91-­‐96,	  Watson	  45,	  and	  Zhuangzi	  3.127-­‐128,	  Watson	  52.	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virtue	  of	  their	  avoidance	  of	  such	  practices.	  2)	  There	  is	  something	  about	  their	  reluctance	  to	  teach	  that	  nonetheless	  motivates	  learning.	  	  Regarding	  the	  first	  point	  we	  ought	  to	  consider	  the	  case	  of	  Confucius	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi.	  While	  the	  figure	  of	  Confucius	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  complicated	  and	  about	  which	  a	  whole	  book	  could	  be	  written,	  some	  summary	  comments	  regarding	  his	  portrayal	  with	  students	  can	  be	  made.	  In	  an	  aforementioned	  pair	  of	  related	  passages	  Confucius	  instructs	  Yan	  Hui	  to	  “fast	  the	  heart-­‐mind,”	  which	  Yan	  Hui	  later	  talks	  about	  in	  terms	  of	  “forgetting”	  accrued	  social	  conventions	  and	  Confucian	  doctrines.43	  Here	  Confucius’	  student	  transcends	  his	  own	  abilities	  and	  Confucius	  pleads	  to	  become	  a	  student	  of	  Yan	  Hui’s.	  While	  encouraging	  his	  students	  to	  revert	  to	  a	  natural	  state	  in	  which	  they	  are	  unbounded	  by	  the	  distinctions	  that	  characterize	  the	  common	  man,	  Confucius	  believes	  that	  he	  himself	  is	  “one	  of	  those	  men	  punished	  by	  Heaven,”	  and	  therefore	  unable	  to	  wander	  beyond	  the	  realm	  in	  the	  way	  of	  the	  sage.44	  Confucius	  finds	  himself	  unable	  to	  eschew	  these	  teaching	  practices,	  and	  resultantly	  can	  never	  achieve	  the	  cultivated	  state	  that	  he	  prescribes	  to	  his	  students.	  Regarding	  the	  second	  point,	  these	  teachers’	  reluctance	  to	  teach	  does	  somehow	  eventuate	  in	  learning	  for	  a	  disciple.	  In	  her	  analysis	  of	  teaching	  
                                                43	  Zhuangzi	  4.131-­‐145,	  Watson	  54-­‐58	  &	  Zhuangzi	  6.282-­‐285,	  Watson	  90-­‐91.	  For	  More	  on	  Yan	  Hui’s	  forgetting,	  see	  pages	  96-­‐97	  of	  chapter	  three	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  	  44	  Zhuangzi	  6.264-­‐273,	  Watson	  86-­‐87.	  Graham	  offers	  some	  summary	  comments	  on	  the	  portrayal	  of	  Confucius	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  his	  translation.	  See	  Chuang-­‐Tzu,	  15-­‐19.	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scenes	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  Carine	  Defoort	  suggests	  that	  such	  reluctance	  on	  the	  teacher’s	  part	  forces	  the	  student	  to	  turn	  his	  efforts	  inward	  forcing	  an	  active	  learning,	  rather	  than	  passive	  receipt	  of	  wisdom.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  also	  shows	  the	  teacher	  as	  a	  model	  who	  is	  himself	  absorbed	  in	  an	  activity	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  he	  may	  not	  even	  notice	  the	  student.45	  This	  point	  reflects	  back	  on	  the	  portrayal	  of	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  as	  absorbed	  in	  friendly	  debate	  rather	  than	  in	  disseminating	  information	  to	  disciples,	  but	  also	  implicates	  the	  portrayal	  of	  sagely	  craftsmen	  absorbed	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  skillful	  practices.	  The	  teacher	  motivates	  learning	  by	  serving	  as	  a	  model	  of	  some	  cultivated	  practice,	  rather	  than	  the	  transmission	  of	  knowledge.	  	  
4.3	  Subordinates	  Edifying	  Superiors	  and	  the	  Reversal	  of	  Conventional	  Values	  	  	   Another	  category	  of	  scenes	  has	  those	  who	  are	  typically	  subordinates	  in	  social	  hierarchies	  edifying	  their	  superiors.	  The	  edification	  of	  a	  superior	  is	  something	  that	  traditionally	  requires	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  caution	  so	  as	  not	  to	  incur	  the	  superior’s	  anger	  and	  bring	  misfortune	  upon	  oneself;	  indeed	  when	  Yan	  Hui	  expresses	  his	  desire	  to	  Confucius	  to	  reform	  a	  vicious	  ruler	  in	  chapter	  five	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  Confucius	  exclaims,	  “you	  will	  probably	  go	  and	  get	  yourself	  executed,	  that’s	  all.”46	  This	  danger	  is	  the	  motivation	  for	  Hanfeizi’s	  pointed	  discussion	  of	  techniques	  of	  persuasion	  aimed	  at	  superiors,	  in	  which	  he	  
                                                45	  Defoort,	  “Instruction	  Dialogues,”	  459-­‐478.	  	  46	  Zhuangzi	  4.134,	  Watson	  54.	  譆！若殆往而刑耳	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particularly	  advocates	  psychological	  manipulation.47	  However	  Raphals	  notes	  that	  within	  the	  context	  of	  teaching	  lineages,	  dialogues	  in	  which	  a	  subordinate	  addresses	  a	  superior	  in	  a	  hierarchical	  relationship	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  adversarial	  than	  those	  in	  political	  contexts.48	  In	  these	  cases	  the	  superior	  is	  reduced	  to	  occupy	  the	  role	  of	  student	  or	  interlocutor,	  while	  the	  master-­‐teacher	  maintains	  his	  position	  of	  authority	  despite	  his	  lower	  standing	  in	  the	  social	  hierarchy.	  	  We	  see	  this	  mechanism	  at	  play	  in	  the	  Mencius:	  Kings	  Hui	  and	  Xuan,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  important	  ministers	  and	  political	  figures,	  and	  of	  course	  his	  own	  disciples,	  regularly	  seek	  Mencius’	  advice,	  and	  Mencius	  in	  return	  is	  not	  afraid	  to	  chastise	  these	  figures	  and	  give	  instruction	  in	  the	  proper	  moral	  path.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  Mencius	  we	  read,	  
梁惠王曰：「寡人願安承教。」孟子對曰：「殺人以梃與刃，有以異
乎？」曰：「無以異也。」「以刃與政，有以異乎？」曰：「無以異
也。」曰：「庖有肥肉，廐有肥馬，民有飢色，野有餓莩...	  」	  	   King	  Hui	  of	  Liang	  said,	  ‘We	  are	  willing	  to	  calmly	  accept	  your	  instruction.’	  Mencius	  replied,	  ‘Is	  there	  any	  difference	  between	  killing	  a	  person	  with	  a	  club	  and	  killing	  him	  with	  a	  blade?’	  The	  king	  said,	  ‘There	  is	  no	  difference.’	  Mencius	  continued,	  ‘Is	  there	  a	  difference	  between	  using	  a	  blade	  and	  government?’	  The	  king	  said,	  ‘There	  is	  no	  difference.’	  
                                                47	  See	  “The	  Difficulties	  of	  Persuasion,”	  in	  Han	  Fei	  Tzu:	  The	  Basic	  
Writings,	  trans.	  Watson	  (New	  York:	  Columbia,	  1964).	  	  48	  Raphals	  “Arguments	  by	  Women,”	  189.	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Mencius	  said,	  ‘In	  your	  kitchens	  there	  is	  fat	  meat,	  and	  in	  your	  stables	  there	  are	  fat	  horses.	  Yet	  the	  people	  appear	  starved,	  and	  there	  are	  corpses	  of	  the	  starved	  in	  the	  wild.’49	  	  Like	  a	  disciple,	  the	  king	  need	  not	  be	  convinced	  to	  accept	  his	  master’s	  advice,	  and	  Mencius	  is	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  the	  King’s	  shortcomings.	  The	  typical	  hierarchical	  relationship	  is	  inverted	  to	  maintain	  the	  superiority	  of	  the	  teacher.	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  teaching	  lineages,	  masters	  retain	  the	  superior	  status,	  and	  so	  it	  is	  not	  particularly	  odd	  that	  the	  ruler	  would	  be	  recast	  in	  the	  role	  of	  student.	  	   However	  the	  episodes	  in	  which	  the	  Zhuangzi	  portrays	  a	  subordinate	  edifying	  a	  superior,	  do	  not	  deal	  with	  merely	  masters	  illuminating	  rulers,	  but	  figures	  much	  lower	  in	  the	  social	  hierarchy.	  The	  Zhuangzi’s	  sagely	  subordinates	  include	  craftsmen	  in	  the	  service	  of	  lords,	  students,	  and	  physically	  mutilated	  convicts.	  These	  mutilated	  convicts	  might	  occupy	  the	  lowest	  rung	  on	  the	  social	  ladder.	  In	  classical	  China	  we	  see	  a	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  body.	  Mark	  Csikszentmihalyi’s	  study	  discusses	  the	  link	  between	  virtue	  and	  body	  in	  the	  Wuxing	  and	  Mencius,	  suggesting	  that	  in	  many	  circles	  it	  was	  believed	  that	  moral	  virtue	  had	  a	  material	  representation	  that	  could	  be	  seen,	  measured,	  or	  gauged	  in	  the	  body.50	  According	  to	  Graham,	  the	  Confucian	  was	  tasked	  with	  returning	  a	  complete	  body	  to	  his	  ancestors	  upon	  death.	  The	  Yangists	  were	  likewise	  concerned	  with	  preserving	  one’s	  nature	  (xing	  性)	  
                                                49	  Mencius	  1A4.1-­‐4,	  Van	  Norden	  5.	  	  50	  Mark	  Csikszentmihalyi,	  Material	  Virtue	  (Leiden:	  Brill	  Academic	  Publishers,	  2004).	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以復補前行之惡，而況全德之人乎！」	  	   “I	  just	  didn’t	  understand	  my	  duty	  and	  was	  too	  careless	  of	  my	  body,	  and	  so	  I	  lost	  a	  foot.	  But	  I’ve	  come	  now	  because	  I	  still	  have	  something	  that	  is	  worth	  more	  than	  a	  foot	  and	  I	  want	  to	  try	  to	  hold	  on	  to	  it.	  There	  is	  nothing	  that	  heaven	  doesn’t	  cover,	  nothing	  that	  earth	  doesn’t	  bear	  up.	  I	  supposed,	  Master,	  that	  you	  would	  be	  like	  heaven	  and	  earth.	  How	  did	  I	  know	  you	  would	  act	  like	  this?”	  “It	  was	  stupid	  of	  me,”	  said	  Confucius.	  “Please,	  Sir,	  won’t	  you	  come	  in?	  …	  Be	  diligent,	  my	  disciples!	  Here	  is	  Shushan	  a	  man	  who	  has	  had	  his	  foot	  cut	  off,	  and	  still	  he’s	  striving	  to	  learn	  so	  he	  can	  make	  up	  
                                                51	  Graham,	  Chuang-­‐Tzu,	  24.	  	  52	  ibid.	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for	  the	  evil	  of	  his	  former	  conduct.	  How	  much	  more,	  then	  should	  men	  whose	  virtue	  is	  still	  unimpaired!”53	  	  Here	  Shushan	  reprimands	  Confucius	  for	  initially	  turning	  him	  away,	  pointing	  out	  that	  Confucius	  is	  not	  acting	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  ethical	  ideals	  he	  believes	  himself	  to	  uphold.	  Confucius	  accepts	  the	  lesson	  and	  holds	  Shushan	  up	  as	  a	  motivator	  for	  his	  students;	  if	  the	  already	  morally	  damaged	  Shushan	  is	  here	  trying	  to	  better	  himself,	  his	  undamaged	  students	  are	  certainly	  capable	  of	  greater	  moral	  development.	  Clearly	  Confucius	  misses	  the	  point:	  Shushan	  may	  have	  lost	  a	  foot,	  but	  Confucius	  is	  the	  real	  cripple	  in	  that	  he	  is	  limited	  by	  his	  desire	  to	  maintain	  his	  reputation	  and	  authority.	  	  This	  subverts	  our	  expectations	  about	  who	  the	  master	  is	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  Firstly,	  we	  see	  a	  subordinate	  addressing	  a	  superior.	  It	  is	  usually	  the	  case	  that	  superiors	  dispense	  moral	  lessons	  to	  persons	  of	  socially	  inferior	  rank.	  	  Secondly,	  when	  we	  see	  this	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  master	  text	  and	  teaching	  lineage,	  we	  expect	  that	  the	  subordinate	  will	  be	  a	  master,	  which	  recasts	  the	  hierarchy	  in	  a	  master-­‐disciple	  relationship.	  Instead	  we	  see	  those	  who	  are	  conventionally	  regarded	  as	  morally	  deficient	  convicts54	  or	  commonplace	  craftsmen,	  such	  as	  Cook	  Ding	  and	  Wheelwright	  Bian,	  in	  the	  superior	  position.	  These	  craftsmen	  do	  not	  have	  quite	  the	  same	  moral	  deficiency	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  mutilated	  convicts	  but	  nonetheless,	  are	  
                                                53	  Zhuangzi	  5.202-­‐204,	  Watson	  71.	  	  	  54	  Shen	  Tujia	  is	  another	  example	  of	  a	  mutilated	  convict	  addressing	  a	  superior.	  In	  this	  case	  he	  edifies	  a	  prime	  minister,	  see	  Zhuangzi	  5.196-­‐201,	  Watson	  71.	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in	  the	  service	  of	  a	  lord	  and	  would	  have	  occupied	  some	  of	  the	  lowest	  positions	  within	  that	  lord’s	  house.	  This	  is	  why	  it	  seems	  almost	  absurd	  that	  a	  butcher	  would	  be	  able	  to	  tell	  his	  lord	  how	  to	  nourish	  life	  or	  a	  Wheelwright	  would	  be	  able	  to	  mount	  an	  enlightened	  criticism	  of	  his	  lord’s	  moral	  education.55	  But	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  these	  subordinates	  metaphorically	  take	  up	  the	  role	  of	  the	  master,	  and	  despite	  their	  doubly	  low	  social	  status,	  occupy	  the	  position	  of	  authority	  in	  these	  dialogues.	  The	  cases	  of	  subordinates	  edifying	  superiors	  are	  a	  reversal	  of	  traditional	  valuations	  that	  associate	  status	  and	  wisdom,	  where	  the	  wisest	  are	  also	  the	  lowliest.	  The	  inversion	  of	  social	  hierarchies	  challenges	  conventional	  associations	  about	  whom,	  morally	  speaking,	  is	  at	  the	  top.	  Where	  the	  portrayals	  of	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  decentralize	  authority	  and	  undermine	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  an	  overarching	  standard	  by	  which	  we	  can	  make	  judgments,	  these	  stories	  demonstrate	  that	  conventional	  evaluations	  in	  which	  social	  status	  or	  prestige	  is	  often	  aligned	  with	  right	  living	  is	  inadequate	  for	  picking	  out	  sagacity.	  56	  	  	  
                                                55	  The	  story	  of	  Cook	  Ding	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Zhuangzi	  3.117-­‐124,	  Watson	  50-­‐51,	  and	  Wheelwright	  Bian	  in	  13.490-­‐491,	  Watson	  152-­‐53.	  Yan	  Hui	  is	  another	  example	  of	  a	  subordinate	  edifying	  a	  superior	  in	  his	  ability	  to	  forget	  traditional	  moral	  and	  social	  conventions,	  see	  Zhuangzi	  6.282-­‐285,	  Watson	  90.	  	   	  56	  The	  reversal	  of	  values	  and	  subsequent	  admirableness	  of	  those	  who	  are	  traditionally	  regarded	  as	  lowly	  resonates	  with	  a	  passage	  in	  the	  Outer	  Chapters,	  in	  which	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  explains	  that	  Dao	  exists	  in	  all	  things,	  even	  in	  the	  lowest	  things	  such	  as	  excrement.	  See	  Zhuangzi	  22.749-­‐75,	  Watson	  241.	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4.4	  Sages	  Living	  Beyond	  the	  Bounds	  	  In	  another	  genre	  of	  episodes	  the	  reader	  is	  presented	  with	  unconventional	  sages	  who	  take	  the	  forms	  of	  madmen,	  hermits,	  and	  simply	  nameless	  individuals	  who	  exist	  outside	  of	  the	  bounds	  of	  civilized	  society.	  Appeals	  to	  sagely	  authority	  and	  ancient	  wisdom	  were	  important	  strategies	  in	  instructive	  arguments	  as	  ways	  of	  making	  a	  normative	  point,	  and	  Yao,	  Shun,	  and	  Yu	  were	  among	  the	  more	  popular	  references.	  They	  served	  both	  as	  models	  for	  emulation	  and	  standards	  by	  which	  one	  could	  evaluate	  one’s	  own	  progress,	  either	  in	  terms	  of	  personal	  moral	  development	  or	  political	  policy.	  For	  example	  in	  the	  Fei	  Ming	  chapters	  of	  the	  Mozi,	  when	  met	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  how	  to	  distinguish	  between	  competing	  doctrines,	  Mozi	  suggests	  that	  the	  Sage	  Kings’	  words	  and	  practices	  provide	  a	  standard	  by	  which	  we	  can	  gauge	  doctrines.57	  In	  this	  instance	  the	  sages	  function	  as	  an	  ordering	  mechanism.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  broader	  sage	  mythology	  in	  which	  Yao,	  Shun,	  and	  Yu	  were	  widely	  regarded	  as	  the	  figures	  that	  made	  civilized	  society	  possible	  by	  instituting	  order	  on	  a	  number	  of	  different	  levels.	  	  One	  popular	  legend	  concerns	  Yao	  as	  the	  individual	  whom	  instills	  order	  upon	  the	  cosmos.	  In	  her	  analysis,	  Sarah	  Allan	  suggests	  that	  Yao	  is	  much	  
                                                57	  For	  example,	  the	  Fei	  Ming	  chapters	  of	  the	  Mozi	  suggest	  that	  the	  sage	  kings	  can	  serve	  as	  standards	  against	  which	  we	  can	  measure	  doctrines.	  See	  “Fei	  Ming”	  chapters	  in	  Mozi,	  trans.	  Johnston,	  318-­‐49.	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closer	  to	  god	  than	  man,	  citing	  the	  addition	  of	  di	  (帝)	  to	  Yao’s	  name.58	  In	  the	  “Yaodian”	  chapter	  of	  the	  Shangshu	  Yao	  tasks	  Xihe	  with	  calculating	  the	  heavenly	  bodies,	  and	  he	  is	  thus	  responsible	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  first	  calendar.	  Yao	  goes	  on	  to	  send	  officials	  in	  each	  of	  the	  four	  cardinal	  directions	  and	  names	  the	  different	  winds.	  When	  it	  comes	  time	  to	  select	  a	  successor,	  Yao	  passes	  the	  empire	  to	  Shun.	  Another	  oft	  repeated	  legend	  during	  the	  Chunqiu	  and	  Warring	  States	  period	  is	  that	  of	  Yu	  conquering	  the	  floods.59	  According	  to	  the	  legend	  Shun	  appointed	  Yu’s	  father	  Gun	  to	  control	  the	  floods,	  but	  Gun	  was	  unable	  to	  complete	  the	  task,	  and	  instead	  it	  fell	  to	  his	  son	  Yu.	  After	  years	  of	  hard	  work	  and	  technical	  ingenuity,	  Yu	  succeeded	  in	  managing	  the	  floods,	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  the	  human	  flourishing.	  Yu	  was	  eventually	  rewarded	  when	  Shun	  passed	  the	  thrown	  to	  him,	  and	  he	  thus	  established	  the	  first	  hereditary	  dynasty,	  the	  Xia	  dynasty,	  in	  ancient	  China.60	  Yao,	  Shun,	  and	  Yu’s	  ingenuity	  and	  political	  aptitude	  instill	  order	  upon	  a	  chaotic	  world.	  The	  invention	  of	  a	  calendar,	  the	  mastery	  of	  natural	  floods,	  and	  the	  general	  human	  domestication	  of	  the	  natural	  landscape	  make	  civilized	  society	  possible.	  Though	  various	  teaching	  lineages	  cashed	  out	  culture’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  ingenuity	  and	  ordering	  of	  the	  sage	  kings	  differently,	  the	  
                                                58	  Sarah	  Allan,	  The	  Shape	  of	  the	  Turtle:	  Myth,	  Art,	  and	  Cosmos	  in	  Early	  
China	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1991),	  58-­‐62.	  	  59	  This	  legend	  is	  mentioned	  in	  the	  Mozi,	  Mencius,	  Guo	  Yu,	  Zuo	  Zhuan,	  
Xunzi,	  Hanfeizi,	  Shang	  Shu,	  and	  Lu	  Shi	  Chun	  Qiu.	  	  60	  Lu	  Xing’s	  summary	  of	  this	  legend	  is	  very	  helpful.	  See	  Rhetoric	  in	  
Ancient	  China,	  44-­‐48.	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心於淡，合氣於漠，順物自然而無容私焉，而天下治矣。」	  	   “Get	  away	  from	  me,	  you	  peasant!	  What	  kind	  of	  a	  dreary	  question	  is	  that?	  I’m	  just	  about	  to	  set	  off	  with	  the	  Creator.	  And	  if	  I	  get	  bored	  with	  that,	  then	  I’ll	  ride	  on	  the	  Light-­‐and-­‐Lissome	  Bird	  out	  beyond	  the	  six	  directions,	  wandering	  in	  the	  village	  of	  Not-­‐Even-­‐
                                                61	  For	  more	  on	  this	  see	  Michael	  Puett’s	  discussion	  of	  culture	  and	  nature	  in	  The	  Ambivalence	  of	  Creation	  (Standford,	  CA:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  39-­‐92.	  Puett	  suggests	  that	  Confucius	  interpreted	  the	  establishment	  of	  culture	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  sage	  kings’	  ability	  to	  pattern	  their	  behavior	  on	  Heaven,	  while	  Mozi	  envisioned	  sage	  kings	  as	  the	  innovators	  of	  the	  patterns	  of	  culture	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  conscientious	  responses	  to	  the	  rewards	  and	  punishments	  of	  Heaven.	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Anything.	  What	  Business	  do	  you	  have	  coming	  with	  this	  talk	  of	  governing	  the	  world	  and	  disturbing	  my	  mind?”	  But	  Tian	  Gen	  repeated	  his	  question.	  The	  Nameless	  Man	  said,	  “Let	  your	  mind	  wander	  in	  simplicity,	  blend	  your	  spirit	  with	  the	  vastness,	  follow	  along	  with	  things	  the	  way	  they	  are,	  and	  make	  no	  room	  for	  personal	  views	  –	  then	  the	  world	  will	  be	  governed.”62	  	  This	  passage	  might	  also	  be	  classed	  as	  a	  teaching	  scene	  insofar	  as	  it	  follows	  the	  format	  laid	  out	  by	  Defoort	  in	  her	  analysis	  of	  instruction	  passages	  in	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  in	  which	  we	  first	  see	  the	  teacher	  doing	  nothing	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  he	  is	  absorbed	  in	  some	  non-­‐goal	  oriented	  activity,	  and	  contact	  is	  initiated	  by	  the	  individual	  seeking	  instruction.	  The	  initial	  response	  of	  the	  teacher	  is	  to	  refuse	  instruction,	  but	  something	  in	  the	  advice-­‐seeker	  prompts	  him	  to	  give	  some	  piece	  of	  rather	  obscure	  advice.63	  The	  resistance	  to	  teaching	  or	  offering	  linguistic	  instruction	  is	  concomitant	  with	  the	  resistance	  of	  these	  sages	  to	  be	  governed	  by	  the	  social	  conventions	  of	  civilized	  culture.	  	  	   The	  use	  of	  the	  madman	  Jieyu	  (接輿)	  in	  such	  teaching	  scenes	  reinforces	  this	  detachment	  from	  civilized	  society.	  Jieyu	  famously	  makes	  an	  appearance	  in	  the	  Analects,	  in	  which,	  according	  to	  Slingerland,	  the	  madman	  makes	  a	  flattering	  comparison	  between	  Confucius	  and	  the	  phoenix,	  whose	  arrival	  is	  auspicious.	  However	  other	  interpretations	  suggest	  that	  this	  passage	  was	  a	  later	  daoist	  interpolation	  and	  that	  Jieyu	  is	  ultimately	  intended	  to	  mock	  
                                                	  62	  Zhuangzi	  7.292-­‐294,	  Watson	  93-­‐94.	  	  	  63	  Defoort,	  “Instruction	  Dialogues,”	  459-­‐478.	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Confucius.64	  Regardless,	  Jieyu	  comes	  to	  symbolize	  the	  primitivist	  movement,	  which	  desires	  to	  return	  to	  a	  simple	  agricultural	  lifestyle	  outside	  of	  the	  confines	  of	  political	  and	  social	  structures.65	  If	  the	  Confucians	  envisioned	  ritualized	  patterns	  of	  behavior	  and	  social	  interactions	  as	  a	  key	  part	  of	  the	  good	  life,	  the	  madman	  Jieyu	  is	  a	  foil	  for	  these	  sorts	  of	  rule-­‐guided	  social	  interactions.66	  These	  illustrations	  of	  sagacity	  not	  only	  undermine	  conventional	  evaluations	  about	  the	  goodness	  of	  social	  order	  and	  social	  distinctions,	  but	  also	  demonstrate	  that	  to	  the	  perspective	  limited	  by	  civilized	  society’s	  standards	  these	  sages	  appear	  lowly,	  insane,	  silly,	  or	  even	  incomprehensible.	  
                                                64	  See	  Analects	  18.5	  in	  Edward	  Slingerland’s	  Confucius’	  Analects,	  216.	  Slingerland	  suggests	  that	  Jieyu’s	  song	  betrays	  a	  positive	  response	  to	  Confucius,	  but	  laments	  the	  fact	  that	  even	  though	  there	  is	  a	  sagely	  master	  about,	  the	  world	  is	  still	  in	  disorder.	  However,	  there	  are	  other	  interpretations,	  which	  suggest	  that	  the	  figure	  of	  Jieyu	  is	  intended	  to	  mock	  Confucius	  and	  that	  this	  passage	  is	  a	  later	  Daoist	  interpolation	  (see	  The	  Analects	  of	  Confucius,	  trans.	  Simon	  Leys	  (New	  York:	  W.W.	  Norton,	  1997).	  	  	  65	  For	  more	  on	  primitivism	  see	  Graham’s	  discussion	  in	  Disputers	  of	  the	  
Tao,	  64-­‐75.	  Graham	  also	  distinguishes	  other	  Primitivist	  strands	  and	  influences	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  (see	  Graham,	  “How	  Much	  of	  ‘Chuang-­‐tzu’	  did	  Chuang-­‐tzu	  Write?”	  459-­‐502).	  	  66	  Jieyu	  makes	  several	  appearances	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  additionally	  being	  found	  in	  Zhuangzi	  1.26-­‐30	  &	  4.183,	  Watson	  33	  &	  66,	  with	  the	  latter	  of	  these	  passages	  being	  an	  expanded	  take	  on	  what	  occurs	  in	  Analects	  18.5.	  Xu	  You	  is	  another	  example	  of	  an	  unconventional	  sage	  in	  a	  teaching	  scene.	  Since	  I	  have	  previously	  discussed	  him	  on	  pages	  89-­‐91	  of	  chapter	  three	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  will	  not	  dwell	  on	  him	  here	  except	  to	  note	  that	  he	  too	  is	  portrayed	  as	  a	  wise	  individual	  in	  a	  retelling	  of	  the	  legend	  of	  Yao	  ceding	  the	  empire	  to	  Shun.	  Here	  Yao	  cedes	  the	  empire	  to	  the	  hermit	  Xu	  You	  who	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  most	  capable	  person	  for	  the	  job,	  although	  Xu	  You	  eviscerates	  Yao	  for	  supposing	  that	  merely	  bestowing	  Xu	  You	  with	  a	  new	  title	  would	  have	  any	  substantial	  change	  that	  corresponds	  to	  reality.	  Xu	  You,	  like	  Jieyu	  and	  the	  Nameless	  man,	  both	  metaphorically	  criticize	  the	  linguistic	  instruction	  and	  social	  convention	  (See	  Zhuangzi	  1.22-­‐24,	  Watson	  32-­‐33).	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This	  motif	  is	  likewise	  apparent	  in	  teaching	  scenes	  in	  which	  the	  reluctant	  master	  is	  boggling	  to	  their	  lesser	  students.	  Civilized	  society	  sets	  up	  a	  system	  of	  distinctions	  and	  values,	  adherence	  to	  which	  limits	  the	  knowledge	  of	  an	  individual	  and	  stunts	  one’s	  ability	  to	  both	  identify	  sagacity	  and	  achieve	  the	  good	  life.	  	   The	  Zhuangzi	  offers	  a	  two-­‐fold	  subversion	  of	  our	  expectations	  regarding	  masters’	  texts:	  firstly,	  it	  inverts	  hierarchies	  that	  frame	  conventional	  wisdom	  and	  evaluations,	  by	  putting	  the	  lowliest	  and	  most	  absurd	  of	  persons	  in	  the	  most	  revered	  position.	  Secondly,	  it	  decentralizes	  authority	  by	  reducing	  the	  role	  of	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  and	  imputing	  wisdom	  into	  the	  mouths	  of	  many	  different	  individuals.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  reader	  is	  afforded	  a	  view	  of	  the	  text’s	  ethical	  vision	  from	  a	  number	  of	  different	  perspectives,	  rather	  than	  the	  singular	  perspective	  of	  an	  authoritative	  master.	  A	  non-­‐exhaustive	  list	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  good	  life	  is	  illustrated	  includes	  playful	  banter	  between	  friends,	  as	  wordless	  teaching,	  as	  unsightly	  and	  incomprehensible,	  and	  as	  existing	  outside	  social	  boundaries.	  The	  epistemic	  implication	  of	  not	  having	  any	  overarching	  master	  of	  the	  text	  means	  that	  no	  single	  perspective	  on	  the	  good	  life	  is	  the	  ultimate	  portrait	  to	  which	  others	  can	  be	  reduced.	  Instead,	  the	  various	  episodes	  illuminate	  different	  motifs	  and	  features	  of	  one	  another,	  expanding	  the	  reader’s	  concept	  of	  the	  good	  life	  into	  a	  robust	  ethical	  vision.	  For	  example,	  when	  Tian	  Gen	  queries	  the	  Nameless	  Man,	  the	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reader	  has	  a	  sense	  of	  freedom	  from	  the	  constraints	  of	  civilized	  society.	  Bringing	  this	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  episode	  in	  which	  Zhuang	  Zhou	  is	  chastised	  by	  a	  brash	  skull,	  the	  reader	  understands	  this	  passage	  as	  likewise	  concerned	  with	  the	  freedom	  from	  civilized	  society	  that	  death	  brings.	  The	  skull’s	  criticism	  of	  making	  assumptions	  about	  things	  that	  we	  do	  not	  know	  is	  pushed	  to	  the	  background.	  Likewise,	  if	  we	  bring	  Wang	  Tai’s	  wordless	  teaching	  to	  bear	  in	  understanding	  the	  Nameless	  Man,	  the	  latter’s	  use	  of	  obscure	  and	  fantastical	  language	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  is	  indeed	  nameless	  are	  brought	  to	  the	  forefront,	  while	  his	  own	  brash	  attitude	  becomes	  less	  central	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  passage.	  Hall	  and	  Ames	  talk	  about	  this	  movement	  in	  terms	  of	  correlative	  thinking,	  which	  “involves	  the	  association	  of	  image-­‐	  or	  concept-­‐clusters	  related	  by	  meaningful	  disposition….”67	  In	  terms	  of	  metaphoric	  language	  we	  might	  say	  that	  one	  vignette	  helps	  us	  understand	  another	  illustration	  of	  the	  good	  life	  in	  a	  new	  way	  by	  reorganizing	  that	  image	  and	  extending	  its	  meaning.	  	  But	  the	  emerging	  concept	  of	  the	  good	  life	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  identify	  with	  a	  single	  passage.	  For	  example,	  were	  the	  concept	  reducible	  to	  our	  image	  of	  the	  Nameless	  Man,	  the	  text	  would	  be	  giving	  us	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  good	  life	  that	  exists	  outside	  of	  social	  structures.	  However,	  Wang	  Tai,	  Cook	  Ding,	  and	  others	  exist	  within	  those	  structures,	  although	  their	  relationships	  to	  them	  are	  unusual.	  Of	  the	  process	  of	  extending	  meaning	  through	  correlating	  
                                                67	  David	  L.	  Hall	  and	  Roger	  T.	  Ames,	  Anticipating	  China	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1995),	  125.	  Hall	  and	  Ames	  were	  not	  the	  first	  to	  exposit	  a	  concept	  of	  correlative	  thinking,	  although	  the	  concept	  has	  been	  central	  to	  their	  work.	  Also	  see	  Graham,	  Disputers	  of	  the	  Tao,	  315-­‐370.	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ideas,	  Ames	  notes	  that	  it	  “depends	  upon	  neither	  the	  identification	  of	  essences	  nor	  or	  the	  principle	  of	  noncontradiction.”68	  The	  various	  images	  illuminate	  the	  good	  life	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  perspectives	  rather	  than	  capture	  and	  directly	  convey	  its	  essence.	  	  	  
5.	  Zhuangzian	  Aesthetics	  and	  its	  Ethical	  Import	  	  	   The	  aesthetic	  structure	  of	  the	  text,	  which	  provides	  images	  that	  metaphorically	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  robust	  and	  irreducible	  vision	  of	  the	  good	  life,	  is	  important	  in	  that	  it	  allows	  the	  text	  to	  do	  what	  it	  says.	  That	  is,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  elicits	  a	  concept	  of	  the	  good	  life	  in	  which	  one	  is	  unconstrained	  by	  conventional	  evaluations	  and	  social	  distinctions,	  and	  is	  able	  to	  adopt	  new	  perspectives	  and	  approach	  things	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  points	  of	  view;	  the	  text	  itself	  is	  doing	  this	  by	  providing	  multiple	  and	  shifting	  perspectives	  from	  which	  to	  understand	  the	  good	  life.	  In	  assessing	  the	  text’s	  aesthetic	  mode	  of	  communication	  we	  ought	  to	  consider	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  good	  life	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  ming	  (明).	  Recall	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  appropriates	  this	  concept	  in	  a	  novel	  way:	  early	  usages	  of	  
                                                68	  Roger	  T.	  Ames,	  “Paronomasia:	  A	  Confucian	  Way	  of	  Making	  Meaning,”	  in	  Confucius	  Now:	  Contemporary	  Encounters	  with	  the	  Analects,	  ed.	  David	  Jones	  (LaSalle,	  Il:	  Open	  Court,	  2008),	  39.	  The	  above	  quote	  refers	  more	  specifically	  to	  paronomastically	  defining	  terms,	  which	  Ames	  sees	  as	  a	  correlate	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  correlative	  thinking.	  It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  Ames	  suggests	  that	  the	  entirety	  of	  early	  China	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  relied	  upon	  correlative	  thinking	  and	  paronomastic	  modes	  of	  making	  meaning.	  However,	  I	  am	  only	  claiming	  that	  such	  a	  framework	  is	  useful	  for	  understanding	  the	  metaphoric	  relation	  of	  passages	  that	  describe	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  ethical	  vision.	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the	  terms	  often	  place	  it	  in	  educational	  contexts,	  which	  are	  associated	  with	  the	  transmission	  of	  wisdom,	  qua	  linguistic	  instruction.	  The	  teacher	  illuminates	  the	  student,	  by	  distinguishing	  the	  proper	  path,	  and	  communicates	  his	  message	  using	  literal	  language.	  However,	  Zhuangzi	  rejects	  this	  characterization	  of	  ming,	  instead	  casting	  it	  as	  something	  that	  is	  practiced	  or	  absorbed	  in	  activity,	  undermines	  stringent	  beliefs	  systems,	  and	  is	  responsive	  to	  nature	  rather	  than	  cutting	  across	  it.	  	  On	  this	  account,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  exercise	  in	  
ming.	  Like	  its	  various	  depictions	  of	  sagacity,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  itself	  remains	  uncommitted	  to	  an	  essential	  concept	  of	  the	  good	  life.	  Instead	  it	  approaches	  its	  vision	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  perspectives	  that	  come	  to	  bear	  on	  one	  another.	  It	  requires	  one	  to	  refine	  and	  rethink	  her	  understanding	  of	  that	  vision	  as	  it	  shifts	  from	  vignette	  to	  vignette,	  forming	  fresh	  judgments	  as	  one	  moves	  through	  the	  text.	  The	  text	  can	  likewise	  be	  understood	  as	  absorbed	  in	  this	  activity	  of	  playfully	  shifting	  perspectives,	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  display	  of	  a	  skill	  than	  in	  instructing	  its	  audience.	  And	  yet,	  like	  the	  reluctant	  teacher	  who	  refuses	  to	  speak,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  does	  teach.	  Rather	  than	  handing	  down	  linguistic	  instructions	  that	  aid	  the	  reader	  in	  discerning	  the	  moral	  path,	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  serves	  as	  a	  model	  of	  the	  good	  life,	  understood	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  skillful	  activity.	  The	  reader	  is	  forced	  to	  make	  the	  connections	  herself,	  rather	  than	  having	  them	  delineated	  by	  the	  text’s	  master,	  by	  bringing	  the	  various	  fields	  of	  meaning	  to	  bear	  in	  different	  vignettes.	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The	  Zhuangzi	  is	  a	  skillful	  attempt	  to	  do	  what	  it	  says:	  the	  text	  demonstrates	  that	  linguistic	  instruction	  is	  insufficient	  for	  a	  program	  of	  self-­‐cultivation	  and	  instead	  emphasizes	  the	  practice	  of	  undermining	  deeply	  held	  beliefs	  by	  disrupting	  expectations	  and	  redirecting	  judgments	  about	  who	  the	  master	  is	  and	  how	  wisdom	  should	  be	  transmitted	  or	  acquired.	  The	  text	  understood	  as	  an	  exercise	  in	  ming	  does	  not	  have	  to	  contend	  with	  the	  same	  kinds	  of	  criticisms	  as	  it	  levies	  against	  its	  philosophical	  rivals.	  The	  Confucians	  and	  Mohists	  strive	  to	  assert	  their	  moral	  programs	  and	  presuppose	  that	  their	  beliefs	  correspond	  to	  some	  objective	  reality.	  The	  Zhuangzi,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  merely	  engaging	  in	  a	  practice	  of	  shifting	  perspectives.	  Like	  Cook	  Ding,	  the	  aesthetic	  dimensions	  of	  the	  text	  work	  together	  to	  give	  the	  reader	  a	  model	  of	  sagely	  activity,	  without	  directly	  asserting	  its	  position.	  	  
6.	  Conclusion	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  aesthetic	  style	  is	  an	  important	  feature	  that	  distinguishes	  it	  from	  other	  masters’	  texts.	  Moreover	  the	  use	  of	  metaphor	  has	  somatic	  import	  that	  links	  aesthetic	  features	  with	  the	  
Zhuangzi’s	  ethical	  vision	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  practicing	  ming.	  A	  more	  in	  depth	  look	  at	  the	  images	  the	  Zhuangzi	  uses	  to	  metaphorically	  intimate	  the	  good	  life,	  show	  that	  they	  are	  responding	  to	  rhetorical	  strategies	  and	  themes	  that	  are	  present	  in	  various	  Warring	  States	  masters’	  texts	  by	  imputing	  wisdom	  into	  multiple	  voices	  of	  sagely	  authority,	  inverting	  traditional	  social	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hierarchies,	  and	  extolling	  the	  virtues	  of	  those	  who	  live	  outside	  of	  the	  bounds	  of	  civilized	  society.	  These	  images	  aesthetically	  demonstrate	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  ethical	  vision,	  inviting	  the	  reader	  to	  rethink	  conventional	  assumptions	  about	  the	  transmission	  of	  wisdom,	  and	  to	  understand	  the	  good	  life	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  perspectives	  by	  bringing	  different	  images	  of	  it	  to	  bear	  on	  one	  another.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  text’s	  use	  of	  aesthetics	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  non-­‐literal	  mode	  of	  teaching	  that	  invites	  the	  reader	  to	  join	  in	  the	  on	  the	  practical	  activity	  that	  constitutes	  the	  good	  life.	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CHAPTER	  FIVE:	  CONCLUSION	  –	  AESTHETICS	  AS	  A	  DEMONSTRATION	  OF	  THE	  ETHICAL	  	  	  The	  Zhuangzi’s	  aesthetic	  import	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  literary	  flourishes.	  Rather,	  the	  text’s	  aesthetic	  style	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  exercise	  in	  the	  well-­‐lived	  life	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  	  ming	  (明):	  the	  practical	  activity	  of	  self-­‐cultivation,	  in	  which	  one	  continually	  usurps	  his	  expectations,	  intuitively	  responding	  to	  the	  ever-­‐changing	  situation.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  serves	  as	  a	  demonstration	  of	  the	  good	  life,	  in	  which	  the	  audience	  is	  invited	  to	  play	  along	  by	  shifting	  perspectives,	  rethinking	  old	  beliefs,	  and	  metaphorically	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  text’s	  lessons	  for	  themselves.	  The	  text	  uses	  metaphor	  as	  a	  means	  of	  demonstrating	  an	  ethic,	  in	  which	  the	  text	  itself	  parallels	  the	  sagely	  but	  reluctant	  teachers	  it	  illustrates.	  In	  conclusion	  this	  chapter	  will	  review	  some	  of	  the	  major	  arguments	  of	  this	  project,	  respond	  to	  potential	  concerns	  regarding	  those	  arguments,	  consider	  some	  implications	  of	  this	  research,	  and	  note	  newly	  opened	  avenues	  for	  future	  research.	  	  	  
1.	  Zhuangzian	  Aesthetics	  and	  the	  Good	  Life	  	  The	  Zhuangzi’s	  use	  of	  aesthetics	  as	  means	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  good	  life	  is	  a	  departure	  from	  the	  dominant	  model	  of	  Western	  aesthetics	  that	  has	  been	  influential	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  aesthetic	  discourse.	  Aesthetics	  emerges	  as	  an	  independent	  field	  of	  inquiry	  during	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  as	  aesthetic	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concerns	  are	  distinguished	  from	  moral	  ones.	  This	  is	  related	  to	  the	  characterization	  of	  art	  as	  autonomous.1	  Aesthetics	  understood	  thus	  classifies	  a	  work	  as	  ‘art’	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  disutility,	  and	  the	  ideal	  audience	  is	  a	  passive,	  disinterested	  recipient	  of	  aesthetic	  experience.	  However,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  has	  extrinsic	  ethical	  concerns	  and	  invites	  its	  audience	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  much	  more	  active	  way	  that	  the	  Western	  model	  permits.	  I	  have	  discussed	  the	  text’s	  ethical	  concerns	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  negative	  criticism	  of	  conventional	  moral	  and	  epistemic	  judgments	  and	  a	  positive	  prescription	  for	  ethical	  living.	  	  With	  regards	  to	  the	  former,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  attacks	  those	  who	  suppose	  that	  the	  judgments	  of	  one’s	  heart-­‐mind	  correspond	  to	  the	  way	  things	  really	  are.	  In	  fact,	  knowledge	  is	  contingent;	  our	  beliefs	  and	  judgments	  are	  always	  known	  relative	  to	  some	  perspective,	  and	  consequently	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  correspond	  to	  some	  independently	  existing	  reality.	  In	  opposition	  to	  rigidly	  adhering	  to	  our	  shifei	  judgments,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  suggests	  using	  ming.	  The	  concept	  of	  ming	  has	  educational	  implications	  that	  associated	  it	  with	  clarity	  in	  distinctions,	  which	  Zhuangzi	  would	  most	  certainly	  reject.2	  However,	  the	  text	  reconceives	  of	  ming	  as	  a	  cultivated	  practice,	  in	  which	  one	  undermines	  one’s	  commitment	  to	  his	  distinctions	  and	  
                                                1	  The	  autonomous	  conception	  of	  art	  is	  most	  prominently	  argued	  for	  by	  Clive	  Bell,	  in	  Art	  (New	  York:	  Frederick	  A.	  Stokes	  Company,	  1914).	  For	  more	  on	  artistic	  autonomy	  see	  pages	  54-­‐57	  of	  chapter	  two	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  	  2	  See	  Lo,	  “To	  Use	  or	  Not	  To	  Use:	  The	  Idea	  of	  Ming	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi,”	  149-­‐168,	  and	  Lai	  and	  Chiu,	  “Ming	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  Neipian,”	  527-­‐543.	  For	  more	  on	  the	  educational	  implications	  of	  ming,	  see	  pages	  82-­‐87	  of	  chapter	  three	  in	  this	  dissertation.	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is	  able	  to	  adopt	  new	  perspectives	  and	  continually	  form	  fresh	  judgments.	  The	  text	  offers	  a	  number	  of	  craftsmen	  as	  models	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  cultivated	  practice,	  underscoring	  the	  role	  of	  somatic	  experience	  as	  part	  of	  the	  well	  lived	  life.	  The	  exercise	  of	  ming	  is	  an	  active	  doing,	  rather	  than	  a	  passive	  receipt	  of	  distinctions	  encased	  in	  linguistic	  instructions,	  and	  this	  quality	  of	  doing	  rather	  than	  saying	  is	  why	  the	  aesthetic	  dimensions	  of	  the	  text	  are	  so	  important.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  makes	  particular	  use	  of	  metaphor	  as	  an	  aesthetic	  mode	  of	  communication	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  ethical	  vision	  rather	  than	  giving	  a	  philosophical	  or	  rhetorical	  argument	  for	  it.	  Metaphors	  also	  have	  somatic	  import,	  in	  that	  they	  are	  grounded	  in	  physical	  experience.	  These	  physical	  experiences	  are	  the	  primary	  metaphors	  that	  organize	  conceptual	  content,	  although	  higher	  order	  concepts	  also	  serve	  as	  metaphors	  for	  structuring	  other	  less	  explicit	  concepts.	  The	  text’s	  ethical	  vision	  is	  hinted	  at	  metaphorically	  and	  emerges,	  as	  the	  reader	  is	  able	  to	  bring	  the	  different	  images	  of	  the	  good	  life	  to	  bear	  upon	  one	  another.	  Such	  a	  conceptualizing	  of	  the	  good	  life	  means	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  any	  single	  one	  of	  the	  perspectives	  that	  constitute	  it	  or	  reduced	  to	  any	  essential	  moral	  principle.	  Instead	  it	  is	  understood	  paronomastically	  as	  a	  number	  of	  correlated	  meanings.	  The	  Zhuangzi,	  insofar	  as	  it	  provides	  a	  variety	  of	  perspectives	  on	  the	  good	  life	  that	  shift	  and	  develop	  its	  meaning,	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  exercise	  in	  ming:	  the	  cultivated	  practice	  that	  undermines	  attempts	  to	  essentialize	  meaning	  and	  limit	  oneself	  to	  a	  single	  belief	  system.	  The	  practice	  of	  ming	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	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metaphoric	  in	  nature,	  as	  it	  is	  grounded	  in	  practical	  doing,	  which	  undermines	  beliefs	  and	  reorganizes	  conceptual	  content	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  vantage	  points.	  	  The	  Zhuangzian	  aesthetic	  that	  emerges	  is	  one	  that	  is	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  Western	  model.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  is	  a	  demonstration	  of	  normativity,	  and	  as	  such	  clearly	  has	  extrinsic	  concerns.	  Moreover,	  the	  text	  requires	  a	  much	  more	  active	  audience,	  who	  is	  able	  to	  discern	  and	  apply	  different	  fields	  of	  meaning	  to	  hazier	  visions	  of	  the	  good	  life.	  She	  must	  be	  able	  to	  interrogate	  the	  text	  in	  order	  to	  continually	  reform	  her	  understanding	  of	  the	  good	  life	  and	  adopt	  new	  perspectives,	  making	  fresh	  judgments.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  understanding	  of	  ming	  to	  which	  the	  text	  is	  responding	  is	  passive;	  returning	  to	  an	  earlier	  analogy,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  the	  teacher	  merely	  turns	  on	  the	  lights	  for	  the	  student,	  handing	  her	  the	  tools	  by	  which	  she	  can	  discern	  the	  correct	  moral	  path.	  But	  for	  the	  Zhuangzian	  student,	  lessons	  are	  learned	  and	  ethical	  living	  is	  preformed	  through	  practical	  activity	  that	  loosens	  one’s	  commitment	  to	  rigid	  systems	  of	  belief.	  Moreover,	  as	  the	  audience	  or	  student	  is	  invited	  to	  take	  on	  a	  more	  active	  role	  in	  relating	  to	  the	  work,	  the	  text	  becomes	  less	  about	  a	  fundamental	  lesson	  that	  must	  be	  discerned	  from	  behind	  a	  litany	  of	  literary	  language,	  and	  more	  about	  meaning	  and	  ethical	  living	  as	  a	  practical	  collaboration	  between	  the	  work	  and	  the	  audience.	  	  	  
2.	  Aesthetic	  Indeterminacy,	  Relativism,	  and	  Amorality	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The	  aesthetic	  and	  poly-­‐vocal	  nature	  of	  the	  text	  may	  bring	  up	  a	  few	  concerns	  with	  regard	  to	  this	  project’s	  claims.	  One	  concern	  is	  that	  stylistic	  indeterminacy	  means	  that	  the	  text	  can	  be	  made	  to	  say	  anything.	  The	  objection	  is	  that	  making	  too	  much	  of	  the	  text’s	  aesthetic	  features	  prevents	  us	  from	  excluding	  certain	  interpretations.	  But	  approaching	  the	  text	  metaphorically	  means	  that	  the	  source	  metaphor	  only	  allows	  for	  a	  constrained	  range	  of	  meanings.	  Returning	  to	  Max	  Black’s	  example	  used	  to	  illustrate	  the	  function	  of	  metaphor,	  the	  metaphor	  “man	  is	  a	  wolf”	  uses	  the	  concept	  of	  wolf	  to	  reorganize	  the	  concept	  of	  man.	  In	  so	  doing,	  certain	  aspects	  of	  man	  that	  resonate	  with	  wolf	  are	  foregrounded,	  while	  other	  aspects	  are	  pushed	  into	  the	  background.3	  From	  the	  metaphor	  that	  man	  is	  wolf	  we	  understand	  man	  as	  a	  vicious	  and	  perhaps	  cunning	  creature.	  But	  the	  field	  of	  meaning	  that	  surrounds	  ‘wolf’	  would	  not	  allow	  us	  to	  infer	  that	  man	  is	  cowardly,	  since	  ‘coward’	  is	  not	  typically	  one	  of	  the	  associated	  meanings	  of	  ‘wolf.’4	  A	  metaphoric	  approach	  to	  the	  Zhuangzi	  precludes	  certain	  inferences	  that	  simply	  do	  not	  fit	  with	  the	  field	  of	  associated	  meaning	  that	  are	  presented.	  The	  reorganization	  of	  a	  concept	  is	  constrained	  by	  the	  source	  metaphor.	  	  
                                                3	  For	  more	  on	  Max	  Black’s	  conception	  of	  metaphor	  see	  page	  112	  of	  chapter	  four	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  	  4	  Black	  does	  note	  that	  the	  various	  associated	  meanings	  of	  a	  concept	  are	  context	  sensitive	  (“Metaphor,”	  287).	  That	  is,	  ‘wolf’	  may	  have	  a	  different	  field	  of	  meaning	  in	  another	  culture,	  such	  that	  we	  could	  conceivably	  understand	  the	  metaphor	  “man	  is	  a	  wolf”	  to	  suggest	  that	  man	  is	  cowardly.	  However,	  this	  interpretation	  would	  not	  likely	  cohere	  with	  the	  meanings	  of	  wolf	  from	  my	  own	  and	  many	  readers’	  cultural	  contexts.	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Likewise,	  the	  images	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  do	  not	  permit	  just	  any	  inference	  about	  the	  good	  life.	  Although	  the	  open-­‐ended	  field	  of	  meanings	  on	  which	  a	  source	  metaphor	  draws	  means	  that	  there	  are	  better	  and	  worse	  interpretations.	  The	  presence	  of	  Robber	  Zhi	  (盜跖),	  who	  scolds	  Confucius	  in	  chapter	  twenty-­‐nine	  is	  illustrative:	  here	  a	  famous	  bandit	  serves	  as	  the	  allegory’s	  protagonist,	  while	  the	  typically	  revered	  Confucius	  is	  made	  to	  be	  a	  fool.	  5	  The	  conclusion	  we	  ought	  to	  draw	  from	  this	  passage	  is	  not	  that	  criminal	  activity	  is	  constitutive	  of	  the	  good	  life.	  Such	  a	  conclusion	  would	  seem	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  decided	  lack	  of	  criminal	  activity	  in	  much	  of	  the	  text,	  particularly	  in	  the	  earlier	  stratum.	  6	  Rather	  the	  narrower	  conclusion	  should	  be	  drawn	  that	  living	  well	  has	  little	  to	  do	  with	  traditional	  moral	  values,	  which	  coheres	  much	  more	  with	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  inversion	  of	  traditional	  hierarchies.	  Additionally	  we	  see	  very	  little	  traditional	  mourning7,	  reverence	  for	  literati	  or	  educated	  people,	  and	  no	  sagely	  kings.	  The	  absence	  of	  sagely	  kings	  not	  only	  separates	  the	  Zhuangzi	  from	  his	  Confucian	  and	  Mohist	  counterparts,	  but	  also	  from	  other	  Daoist	  texts:	  the	  Laozi	  very	  often	  reads	  as	  a	  ruler’s	  manual.	  The	  lack	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  source	  metaphors	  precludes	  us	  from	  
                                                
5  Zhuangzi 29.990-1012, Watson 323-338. 
 6	  Philip	  J.	  Ivanhoe	  observed	  that	  within	  the	  earlier	  stratum	  of	  the	  text	  there	  are	  no	  skillful	  assassins,	  for	  example	  (See	  “Zhuangzi	  on	  Skepticism”).	  	  7	  Although	  the	  text	  does	  depict	  very	  non-­‐traditional	  mourning	  scenes.	  For	  example,	  the	  death	  of	  Zhuangzis	  wife	  (Zhuangzi	  18.614-­‐615,	  Watson	  191-­‐192),	  Zishanghu’s	  funeral	  (Zhuangzi	  6.264-­‐273,	  Watson	  86-­‐87)	  or	  Qin	  Shi’s	  mourning	  for	  Lao	  Dan	  (Zhuangzi	  3.127-­‐128,	  Watson	  50-­‐51).	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making	  certain	  inferences	  about	  good	  life.	  In	  metaphoric	  understanding,	  one	  concept	  structures	  another,	  thereby	  extending	  its	  meaning,	  however	  the	  extension	  of	  meaning	  and	  inferences	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  are	  constrained	  by	  the	  metaphor.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  is	  indeed	  poly-­‐vocal,	  but	  that	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  it	  can	  be	  made	  to	  say	  anything.	  	  A	  more	  serious	  objection,	  which	  has	  already	  been	  touched	  upon,	  is	  from	  those	  who	  would	  claim	  the	  Zhuangzi	  has	  no	  moral	  content.	  There	  are	  at	  least	  two	  kinds	  of	  amoral	  interpretations,	  which	  argue	  that	  the	  text	  does	  not	  espouse	  an	  ethical	  way	  of	  living.	  The	  first	  suggests	  that	  while	  the	  text	  seems	  to	  make	  suggestions	  as	  to	  how	  to	  live,	  that	  way	  of	  living	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  morality.	  As	  mentioned	  in	  chapter	  three,	  this	  is	  the	  approach	  of	  Radice	  who	  suggests	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  ultimately	  merely	  concerned	  with	  biological	  survival	  and	  therefore	  has	  no	  moral	  content.8	  The	  second	  kind	  of	  amoral	  approach	  suggests	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  merely	  critiquing	  morality.	  Moeller	  sees	  ethics	  as	  a	  tool	  that	  is	  neither	  inherently	  good	  nor	  bad,	  but	  can	  have	  negative	  outcomes.	  According	  to	  Moeller,	  Zhuangzi	  is	  deconstructing	  the	  commonplace	  view	  of	  ethics	  as	  something	  necessarily	  good;	  it	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  questioning	  the	  use	  of	  morality.9	  	  
                                                8	  Radice,	  “Clarity	  and	  Survival,”	  33-­‐40.	  For	  more	  on	  amoral	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  see	  pages	  69-­‐74	  of	  chapter	  three	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  	  9	  Hans-­‐Georg	  Moeller,	  The	  Moral	  Fool:	  A	  Case	  for	  Amorality	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  3.	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These	  two	  amoral	  interpretations	  are	  in	  some	  sense	  at	  odds	  with	  each	  other:	  while	  one	  suggests	  there	  is	  a	  positive	  recommendation	  being	  made	  (albeit	  one	  without	  moral	  content),	  the	  other	  treats	  the	  text	  as	  a	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  undermining	  the	  idea	  that	  positive	  recommendations	  can	  be	  made	  or	  do	  any	  good.	  The	  tension	  resides	  in	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  text	  makes	  any	  positive	  recommendation.	  While	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  deconstructive	  maneuvers	  are	  richly	  fascinating,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  disentangle	  them	  from	  the	  positive	  vision	  that	  is	  being	  offered,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  accept	  that	  vision	  as	  a	  moral	  one.	  For	  example,	  the	  aimless	  wandering	  of	  Ai	  Tai	  Tuo	  both	  challenges	  our	  assumptions	  about	  moral	  goodness	  and	  who	  has	  it,	  and	  offers	  a	  model	  of	  ethical	  living	  understood	  as	  not	  being	  rigidly	  committed	  to	  belief	  systems.10	  	  The	  first	  type	  of	  amoralist	  would	  of	  course	  deny	  that	  a	  suggestion	  to	  refrain	  from	  rigid	  adherence	  to	  any	  moral	  belief	  system	  or	  set	  of	  social	  norms	  has	  any	  ethical	  content.	  However,	  this	  understanding	  of	  morality	  or	  ethics	  seems	  unduly	  narrow.	  Here	  ethics	  is	  reduced	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  determine	  right	  and	  wrong	  according	  to	  a	  set	  of	  principles	  or	  maxims	  that	  constitute	  the	  parameters	  of	  a	  particular	  belief	  system.	  However,	  another	  understanding	  of	  ethics	  grounds	  moral	  activity	  in	  a	  concept	  of	  human	  flourishing.11	  The	  
                                                10	  For	  more	  on	  Ai	  Tai	  Tuo	  see	  pages	  101-­‐103	  of	  chapter	  three	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  	   11	  See	  Anscombe	  ,	  “Modern	  Moral	  Philosophy,”	  or	  Alasdair	  MacIntyre,	  
After	  Virtue:	  A	  Study	  in	  Moral	  Theory	  (Notre	  Dame,	  IN:	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  Press,	  2007).	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Zhuangzi	  does	  criticize	  the	  tendency	  to	  suppose	  that	  one’s	  judgments	  correspond	  to	  the	  way	  things	  really	  are,	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  those	  judgments	  are	  always	  dependent	  upon	  a	  perspective.	  But,	  as	  Chris	  Fraser	  notes,	  it	  also	  points	  out	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  switch	  perspectives	  and	  wander	  through	  life	  without	  adhering	  to	  some	  ultimate	  goal	  as	  defined	  by	  a	  single	  belief	  system	  is	  constitutive	  of	  eudaimonia.12	  Morality	  or	  ethics	  need	  not	  be	  reduced	  to	  deductions	  about	  right	  and	  wrong,	  which	  would	  render	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  an	  amoral	  text,	  but	  can	  also	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  human	  flourishing,	  about	  which	  the	  Zhuangzi	  has	  much	  to	  say.	  A	  persistent	  objection	  to	  ethical	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  if	  the	  text	  is	  urging	  us	  to	  shift	  perspectives	  and	  continually	  make	  fresh	  judgments	  in	  response	  to	  the	  details	  of	  a	  particular	  situation,	  then	  the	  text	  is	  espousing	  ethical	  relativism.13	  This	  underscores	  Chad	  Hansen’s	  point,	  when	  he	  suggests	  that	  the	  text	  equally	  approves	  of	  different	  ‘daos’	  or	  ways	  of	  living.	  All	  judgments	  are	  justified	  relative	  to	  the	  perspective	  from	  which	  they	  are	  made.14	  Consequently,	  the	  text	  is	  a	  commentary	  on	  our	  natural	  tendency	  to	  internally	  justify	  claims	  according	  to	  the	  dao	  or	  way	  of	  life	  in	  which	  we	  are	  
                                                12	  Fraser,	  “Wandering	  the	  Way.”	  Fraser	  suggests	  that	  while	  the	  text	  does	  offer	  a	  eudaimonistic	  idea	  or	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  well-­‐lived	  life,	  it	  does	  not	  give	  us	  a	  virtue	  theory	  precisely	  because	  the	  well-­‐lived	  life	  is	  not	  governed	  by	  any	  telos	  or	  end	  goal.	  On	  this	  account	  the	  Zhuangzi	  can	  both	  criticize	  morality	  and	  offer	  an	  eudaimonistic	  ideal.	  	  	  13	  	  This	  is	  David	  Wong’s	  position	  in,	  “Zhuangzi	  and	  the	  Obsession	  with	  Being	  Right,”	  Philosophy	  Quarterly	  22,	  no.	  2	  (2005),	  91-­‐107.	  
 14	  Chad	  Hansen,	  “A	  Tao	  of	  Tao	  in	  Chuang-­‐Tzu,”	  24-­‐55.	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operating,	  and	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  espousing	  ethical	  relativism.	  Insofar	  as	  all	  moral	  judgments	  are	  equally	  justifiable	  they	  are	  all	  correct.	  But	  this	  rather	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  sort	  of	  position	  against	  which	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  is	  reacting.	  To	  suggest	  that	  the	  text	  espouses	  this	  kind	  of	  moral	  relativism	  would	  mean	  denying	  that	  there	  is	  any	  difference	  in	  value	  between	  the	  squabbling	  Confucians	  and	  Mohists	  and	  the	  Sage;	  each	  would	  be	  right	  relative	  to	  their	  own	  perspective.	  And	  yet	  the	  Zhuangzi	  does	  contrast	  the	  
shifei	  of	  those	  who	  adhere	  rigidly	  to	  a	  belief	  system,	  supposing	  that	  their	  judgments	  correspond	  to	  what	  really	  is	  the	  case,	  with	  the	  sage	  who	  “relegates	  all	  to	  the	  constant.”15	  The	  Zhuangzi	  does	  not	  merely	  describe	  the	  process	  by	  which	  judgments	  are	  made	  and	  internally	  justified	  relative	  to	  a	  belief	  system,	  but	  also	  contrasts	  this	  mode	  of	  knowing	  with	  a	  sagely	  mode	  of	  knowing,	  which	  does	  not	  find	  itself	  limited	  to	  a	  single	  belief	  system.	  	  Van	  Norden	  answers	  this	  objection	  by	  distinguishing	  between	  relativism	  and	  particularism.	  The	  difference	  is	  subtle	  but	  important.	  Relativism	  can	  be	  contrasted	  with	  absolutism:	  relativism	  precludes	  the	  possibility	  of	  absolute	  rights	  and	  wrongs	  that	  apply	  universally.	  Particularism	  is	  contrasted	  with	  generalism:	  where	  generalism	  holds	  that	  there	  are	  general	  principles	  that	  discern	  right	  and	  wrong,	  particularism	  says	  that	  there	  are	  no	  such	  principles,	  but	  rather	  right	  and	  wrong	  are	  deduced	  
                                                	  15	  Zhuangzi	  2.75,	  Watson	  42.	  是故滑疑之耀，聖人之所圖也。為是不
用而寓諸庸，此之謂以明。	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from	  the	  particular	  details	  of	  a	  context.	  Where	  relativism	  suggests	  that	  all	  moral	  judgments	  are	  right	  relative	  to	  a	  context,	  particularism	  holds	  that	  what	  is	  right	  is	  contextually	  dependent.	  16	  So	  for	  a	  particularist,	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do	  should	  I	  happen	  upon	  a	  car	  accident	  might	  be	  dependent	  upon	  the	  particular	  details:	  whether	  or	  not	  people	  are	  hurt,	  if	  the	  police	  are	  already	  there	  or	  need	  to	  be	  called,	  etc.	  But	  most	  of	  us	  would	  agree	  that	  there	  is	  a	  right	  and	  wrong	  thing	  to	  do,	  which	  is	  also	  contingent	  upon	  the	  details.	  	  It	  is	  this	  kind	  of	  particularism	  that	  is	  at	  play	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  and	  the	  skilled	  craftsmen	  are	  good	  exemplars	  of	  it.	  Wheelwright	  Bian	  must	  synthesize	  the	  particular	  details	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  order	  to	  effectively	  respond	  to	  the	  wheel	  in	  front	  him,	  and	  there	  are,	  of	  course,	  better	  and	  worse	  ways	  to	  respond	  to	  that	  wheel.	  We	  would	  not	  be	  inclined	  to	  think	  of	  him	  as	  a	  model	  sagely	  action	  were	  he	  haphazardly	  chopping	  away	  at	  it	  with	  little	  success.	  Moreover,	  Van	  Norden’s	  account	  of	  Zhuangzian	  particularism	  resonates	  with	  the	  aesthetic	  nature	  of	  the	  text.	  Metaphoric	  understanding	  is	  grounded	  in	  physical	  experience	  and	  consequently	  has	  somatic	  import.	  Extending	  the	  meaning	  of	  an	  experience	  to	  organize	  a	  hazier	  concept	  is	  a	  practical	  doing,	  in	  which	  the	  ethical	  agent	  must	  be	  an	  active	  participant.	  Zhuangzian	  particularism	  is	  concomitant	  with	  metaphoric	  understanding	  in	  that	  that	  agent	  is	  invited	  to	  figure	  it	  out	  for	  herself,	  rather	  than	  simply	  applying	  a	  maxim	  or	  principle.	  She	  engages	  with	  the	  context,	  intelligently	  
                                                16	  Van	  Norden,	  “Competing	  Interpretations	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi,”	  248-­‐249.	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responding	  to	  it,	  bringing	  concrete	  experiences	  and	  facts	  of	  the	  situation	  to	  bear	  in	  finding	  the	  way	  forward	  or	  the	  response	  that	  best	  fits	  the	  situation.	  That	  there	  are	  more	  or	  less	  fitting	  responses,	  undercuts	  the	  charge	  of	  relativism,	  which	  holds	  that	  all	  things	  are	  right	  relative	  to	  their	  context.	  In	  the	  same	  way	  that	  there	  are	  better	  and	  worse	  interpretations	  of	  the	  
Zhuangzi,	  there	  are	  also	  better	  and	  worse	  responses	  to	  particular	  situations.	  Wheelwright	  Bian	  intuitively	  responds	  to	  the	  particularities	  of	  the	  wheel	  that	  he	  crafts,	  and	  this	  is	  what	  distinguishes	  him	  from	  his	  misguided	  lord	  who	  searches	  for	  answers	  in	  the	  sayings	  of	  the	  former	  kings.	  Were	  the	  text	  espousing	  ethical	  relativism	  Wheelwright	  and	  his	  lord	  would	  be	  both	  right,	  yet	  to	  suppose	  that	  the	  Wheelwright	  is	  living	  the	  good	  life,	  while	  his	  lord	  is	  misguided	  is	  a	  far	  better	  fit	  with	  the	  field	  of	  meanings	  offered	  up	  by	  the	  text’s	  metaphors.	  	  
3.	  Demonstrating	  Normativity	  	  	   The	  Zhuangzi’s	  demonstration	  of	  its	  normative	  points	  has	  both	  aesthetic	  and	  interpretive	  implications.	  Focusing	  on	  the	  aesthetic	  choices	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  encourages	  us	  to	  rethink	  some	  common	  aesthetic	  ideals.	  Roger	  Ames’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  artist	  Xu	  Bing’s	  Book	  from	  the	  Sky	  (Tian	  Shu天書)	  is	  insightful	  here.17	  	  The	  work	  itself	  is	  a	  bound	  text	  containing	  over	  four	  
                                                17	  Roger	  T.	  Ames,	  “Reading	  Xu	  Bing’s	  a	  Book	  from	  the	  Sky,”	  in	  Xu	  Bing	  
and	  Contemporary	  Chinese	  Art,	  ed.	  Roger	  T.	  Ames,	  and	  Hsingyuan	  Tsao	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  2011),	  33-­‐64.	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thousand	  graphs	  that	  are	  constructed	  according	  Chinese	  word	  making	  principles,	  but	  which	  are	  ultimately	  unspeakable.	  The	  graphs	  appear	  to	  be	  Chinese	  characters,	  but	  upon	  closer	  inspection	  they	  are	  unintelligible	  combinations	  of	  radicals	  and	  signifiers.	  18	  	  By	  using	  recognizable	  features	  of	  writing	  the	  work	  suggests	  the	  possibility	  of	  meaning	  without	  making	  any	  sense.	  Ames	  suggests	  that	  the	  text	  invites	  the	  audience	  to	  search	  for	  meaning	  in	  that	  which	  is	  both	  familiar	  and	  unintelligible.	  Book	  from	  the	  Sky,	  like	  the	  
Zhuangzi,	  encourages	  its	  audience	  to	  take	  an	  active	  role	  in	  interpreting	  its	  meaning.	  The	  ideal	  audience	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  passive	  recipient	  of	  a	  readymade	  aesthetic	  experience,	  but	  participates	  in	  constructing	  that	  experience	  by	  intelligently	  responding	  to	  the	  work.	  The	  way	  in	  which	  the	  work	  invites	  the	  audience	  to	  respond	  to	  it	  also	  means	  that	  the	  work	  points	  outside	  of	  itself.	  Its	  meaning	  and	  value	  is	  not	  solely	  contained	  in	  the	  text.19	  	  	   Approaching	  other	  philosophical	  texts	  from	  an	  aesthetic	  perspective	  also	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  open	  up	  new	  layers	  of	  meaning,	  in	  which	  the	  philosophical	  content	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  new	  light.	  While	  not	  all	  texts	  
                                                                                                                                	  18	  Xu	  Bing,	  Tian	  Shu	  (天書),	  1988.	  Ink	  on	  paper,	  45.9cm	  x	  30cm	  x	  2cm	  (closed)	  or	  52cm	  (opened).	  The	  British	  Museum.	  No.	  1993.0709.0.1.	  	  	   19	  While	  a	  full	  catalog	  of	  different	  possible	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  audience	  might	  respond	  to	  showing	  and	  telling	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  project,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  aesthetic	  showing	  does	  not	  guarantee	  active	  participation	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  audience.	  We	  can	  certainly	  imagine	  a	  reader	  of	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  or	  an	  audience	  approaching	  Book	  from	  the	  Sky	  in	  a	  passive	  way,	  and	  still	  coming	  away	  with	  something.	  However,	  such	  an	  audience	  member	  would	  not	  be	  exploiting	  the	  full	  potential	  of	  the	  work,	  and	  would	  leave	  with	  a	  comparatively	  impoverished	  experience	  relative	  to	  the	  audience	  member	  who	  engages	  in	  a	  more	  active	  way.	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would	  be	  amenable	  to	  such	  an	  analysis,	  there	  is	  an	  increasing	  amount	  of	  scholarship	  that	  does	  attempt	  to	  address	  the	  relationship	  between	  style	  and	  content,	  and	  how	  aesthetic	  features	  of	  a	  text	  communicate	  a	  normative	  point.	  Within	  Asian	  philosophical	  traditions,	  Joel	  Kupperman	  suggests	  taking	  this	  sort	  of	  approach	  to	  the	  Analects	  and	  Dhammapada.20	  Kupperman	  notes	  that	  the	  fragmentary	  nature	  of	  these	  texts	  provides	  some	  difficulty	  in	  interpretation,	  and	  that	  any	  “fragment	  cannot	  be	  appreciated	  at	  all	  well	  until	  it	  is	  related	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  text…	  Intelligent	  reading	  and	  understanding	  of	  these	  Asian	  texts…require	  a	  sense	  of	  a	  coherent	  vision,	  whose	  parts	  support	  one	  another	  and	  which	  also	  implicitly	  argues	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  life	  experience.”21	  But	  more	  importantly,	  these	  texts	  provide	  implicit	  arguments	  that	  attempt	  to	  motivate	  the	  reader	  to	  relate	  to	  what	  is	  written	  on	  the	  page	  to	  her	  own	  life	  experiences,	  thereby	  making	  connections	  between	  the	  work	  and	  the	  real	  world.	  If	  Confucius’	  pedagogical	  stance	  is	  that	  students	  should	  make	  
                                                20	  Within	  Asian	  philosophical	  traditions,	  the	  Fu	  (賦)	  chapter	  of	  the	  
Xunzi	  is	  another	  good	  example	  of	  a	  demonstration	  of	  normativity.	  Here	  Xunzi	  supplies	  his	  reader	  with	  poetic	  riddles	  that	  allude	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  ritual	  propriety,	  wisdom,	  and	  more	  (See	  John	  Knoblock’s	  Xunzi:	  A	  Translation	  and	  
Study	  of	  the	  Complete	  Works,	  Vol.	  3	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1994),	  189-­‐204).	  Likewise	  the	  Mencius’	  episodic	  movement	  through	  vignettes	  in	  which	  Mencius	  edifies	  students	  and	  competing	  masters	  could	  also	  be	  construed	  as	  a	  demonstration	  of	  normativity.	  	  21	  Joel	  Kupperman,	  Learning	  From	  Asian	  Philosophy,	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  13.	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connections	  for	  themselves,	  then	  the	  Analect’s	  implicit	  argument	  structure	  motivates	  the	  reader	  to	  do	  just	  that.22	  An	  aesthetic	  approach	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  Asian	  philosophies.	  There	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  scholarship	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Plato’s	  dialogues	  show	  rather	  than	  tell.	  These	  readings	  of	  Plato	  suggest	  that	  the	  dialogue	  format,	  characters,	  and	  dramatic	  setting	  of	  Platonic	  dialogues	  show	  that	  the	  text	  operates	  at	  multiple	  levels.23	  For	  example,	  Seth	  Benardete	  argues	  that	  Plato’s	  Sophist	  is	  not	  only	  about	  the	  arguments	  that	  aim	  to	  define	  sophistry,	  but	  also	  stylistically	  undermines	  the	  possibility	  that	  Socrates	  is	  capable	  of	  directly	  presenting	  the	  Philosopher,	  who	  silently	  discourses	  with	  himself.24	  Charles	  Griswold	  goes	  beyond	  that	  and	  argues	  that	  Plato’s	  dialogue	  style	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  points	  Socrates	  wishes	  to	  make	  in	  the	  Phaedrus;	  namely,	  that	  self-­‐knowledge,	  insofar	  as	  it	  consists	  of	  the	  soul	  discoursing	  with	  itself,	  tends	  toward	  solipsism.	  Consequently,	  knowledge	  requires	  dialogue	  with	  other	  people.	  Written	  works	  or	  treatises	  do	  not	  expand	  understandings,	  since	  students	  will	  merely	  rely	  on	  the	  treatise	  and	  not	  learn	  to	  think	  things	  through	  for	  themselves,	  and	  consequently	  encourages	  forgetfulness.	  The	  written	  
                                                22	  Ibid.,	  10-­‐13	  and	  26-­‐35.	  	  23	  For	  examples,	  see	  Debra	  Nails,	  Agora,	  Academy,	  and	  the	  Conduct	  of	  
Philosophy	  (Dordrecht:	  Kluwer	  Academic	  Publishers,	  1995),	  John	  Sellars,	  “Plato’s	  Apology	  of	  Socrates:	  A	  Metaphilosophical	  Text,”	  Philosophy	  and	  
Literature	  38,	  no.	  2	  (2014),	  443-­‐445,	  and	  Alexander	  Nehamas,	  “What	  Did	  Socrates	  Teach	  and	  to	  Whom	  Did	  He	  Teach	  It?”	  The	  Review	  of	  Metaphysics	  46,	  no.	  2	  (1992),	  157-­‐186).	  	   24	  Seth	  Benardete,	  “On	  Plato’s	  ‘Sophist’,”	  The	  Review	  of	  Metaphysics	  46,	  no.	  4	  (1993),	  747-­‐780.	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treatise	  is	  parallel	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  self-­‐knowledge	  in	  which	  one	  confirms	  what	  one	  is	  already	  certain	  of	  rather	  than	  acquiring	  knowledge.	  On	  this	  reading,	  Plato’s	  aesthetics	  are	  necessary	  to	  the	  normative	  point	  it	  wishes	  to	  communicate:	  a	  discussion	  about	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  written	  treatises	  and	  the	  advantages	  of	  dialectical	  engagement	  requires	  dialogue.	  The	  aesthetics	  of	  the	  text	  demonstrate	  its	  philosophical	  content.25	  	  In	  more	  contemporary	  philosophical	  scholarship	  we	  can	  see	  the	  relevance	  of	  aesthetics	  in	  Gaston	  Bachelard’s	  The	  Poetics	  of	  Space,	  and	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Felix	  Guattari’s	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus:	  Capitalism	  and	  
Schizophrenia.	  Both	  works	  attempt	  to	  make	  a	  point	  about	  the	  instability	  of	  language	  by	  recourse	  to	  non-­‐scientific	  language.	  In	  the	  introduction	  to	  his	  influential	  treatise	  on	  the	  experience	  of	  space,	  poetic	  images,	  and	  the	  imagination,	  Bachelard	  notes,	  “In	  my	  earlier	  works	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  imagination,	  I	  did,	  in	  fact,	  consider	  it	  preferable	  to	  maintain	  as	  objective	  a	  position	  as	  possible…I	  tried	  to	  consider	  images	  without	  attempting	  personal	  interpretation.	  Little	  by	  little,	  this	  method,	  which	  has	  in	  its	  favor	  scientific	  prudence,	  seemed	  to	  me	  to	  be	  an	  insufficient	  basis	  on	  which	  to	  found	  a	  metaphysics	  of	  the	  imagination.”26	  For	  Bachelard,	  the	  poetic	  image	  is	  a	  dwelling	  in	  which	  meanings	  and	  associations	  are	  integrated	  into	  dynamic	  network,	  which	  exceeds	  the	  capacity	  of	  objective	  or	  scientific	  language	  to	  
                                                25	  Charles	  Griswold,	  “Style	  and	  Philosophy:	  The	  Case	  of	  Plato’s	  Dialogues,”	  The	  Monist	  63,	  no.	  4	  (1980),	  530-­‐546.	  	  26	  Gaston	  Bachelard,	  The	  Poetics	  of	  Space,	  trans.	  Maria	  Jolas,	  (Boston:	  Beacon	  Press,	  1994),	  xviii.	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capture	  it.	  Instead	  he	  takes	  a	  phenomenological	  approach,	  attempting	  to	  understand	  the	  poetic	  image	  as	  it	  is	  experienced.	  Bachelard’s	  study	  is	  another	  instance	  in	  which	  the	  method	  by	  which	  one	  proceeds	  is	  intimately	  related	  to	  the	  content	  of	  the	  text.	  Indeed	  Bachelard’s	  phenomenological	  approach	  to	  the	  poetic	  image	  of	  the	  home	  prompts	  Christian	  Thiboutot	  to	  note,	  “His	  readings	  are	  patient	  explorations	  of	  splendid	  mansions	  or	  magnificent	  gardens	  and	  his	  writings	  are	  first	  and	  foremost	  guideposts	  on	  how	  to	  visit	  these	  promising	  sites.”27	  Likewise,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  no	  fixed	  subjective	  position	  or	  essential	  ‘I’	  and	  concomitantly	  that	  language	  does	  not	  transparently	  present	  it’s	  meaning,	  but	  is	  rhizomatic.	  They	  note,	  “a	  rhizome	  ceaselessly	  establishes	  connections	  between	  semiotic	  chains,	  organizations	  of	  power,	  and	  circumstances	  relative	  to	  the	  arts,	  sciences,	  and	  social	  struggles…there	  is	  no	  language	  in	  itself,	  nor	  are	  there	  any	  linguistic	  universals,	  only	  a	  throng	  of	  dialects,	  patois,	  slangs,	  and	  specialized	  languages.”28	  Accordingly,	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus	  is	  organized	  rhizomatically;	  the	  reader	  can	  begin	  from	  any	  chapter	  and	  proceed	  to	  any	  other	  chapter	  without	  having	  to	  start	  at	  the	  beginning	  and	  work	  through	  the	  text	  in	  a	  linear	  fashion.	  
                                                27	  Christian	  Thiboutot,	  “Some	  Notes	  on	  Poetry	  and	  Language	  in	  the	  Works	  of	  Gaston	  Bachelard,”	  Journal	  of	  Phenomenological	  Psychology	  32,	  no.	  22	  (2001),	  167.	  	  28	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Felix	  Guattari,	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus:	  Capitalism	  
and	  Schizophrenia,	  trans.	  Brian	  Massumi	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2007):	  8.	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Approaching	  philosophical	  texts	  from	  an	  aesthetic	  perspective	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  illuminate	  certain	  normative	  claims	  and	  philosophical	  projects	  in	  new	  ways,	  and	  indeed	  some	  contemporary	  works	  are	  quite	  deliberate	  in	  trying	  to	  get	  the	  reader	  to	  take	  such	  an	  approach.	  However,	  we	  certainly	  should	  not	  think	  that	  any	  text	  could	  be	  read	  aesthetically.	  For	  example,	  we	  might	  be	  at	  a	  loss	  as	  to	  what	  an	  aesthetic	  reading	  of	  the	  Kant’s	  Critique	  of	  
Pure	  Reason	  might	  offer.	  Nonetheless,	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  we	  might	  glean	  something	  from	  approaching	  Heidegger’s	  later	  works,	  such	  as	  “Building	  Dwelling	  Thinking”	  or	  even	  Descartes’	  Mediations	  on	  First	  Philosophy,	  as	  texts	  that	  make	  use	  of	  aesthetics	  in	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  points.	  	  
4.	  New	  Avenues	  	  
 The	  research	  presented	  in	  this	  dissertation	  opens	  up	  a	  variety	  of	  avenues	  for	  new	  research.	  Of	  particular	  interest	  to	  ethicists	  would	  be	  the	  possibility	  of	  understanding	  the	  Zhuangzi	  as	  offering	  a	  virtue	  ethic.	  Huang	  Yong	  is	  among	  the	  few	  who	  have	  attempted	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  as	  offering	  a	  virtue	  ethic.29	  Huang,	  however	  eschews	  the	  eudaimonistic	  approach	  to	  virtue	  ethics,	  in	  which	  virtue	  is	  grounded	  in	  human	  flourishing,	  instead	  drawing	  on	  Michael	  Slote’s	  intuitionist	  brand	  of	  virtue	  ethics.	  Huang	  argues	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  “difference”	  stories	  tell	  us	  
                                                29	  Huang	  Yong,	  “Respecting	  Different	  Ways	  of	  Life:	  A	  Daoist	  Ethics	  of	  Virtue	  in	  the	  “Zhuangzi,””	  The	  Journal	  of	  Asian	  Studies	  69,	  no.	  4	  (2010),	  1049-­‐1069.	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what	  to	  do,	  while	  the	  “knack”	  stories	  illustrate	  how	  we	  ought	  to	  do	  it.	  But	  Huang’s	  denial	  of	  the	  text’s	  ability	  to	  furnish	  us	  with	  a	  eudaimonistic	  ideal	  is	  hasty.	  Chris	  Fraser	  provides	  a	  nice	  counterbalance	  by	  etching	  out	  an	  account	  of	  human	  flourishing	  in	  the	  text,	  but	  he	  denies	  that	  we	  can	  talk	  about	  such	  flourishing	  in	  terms	  of	  virtue.30	  To	  ground	  virtue	  in	  a	  eudaimonistic	  ideal	  requires	  an	  overarching	  telos	  or	  end	  that	  guides	  or	  directs	  the	  development	  of	  that	  virtue.	  Since	  the	  Zhuangzi’s	  conception	  of	  human	  flourishing	  rests	  in	  aimless	  wandering	  (you	  遊),	  without	  commitment	  to	  any	  overarching	  goal	  or	  end,	  that	  eudaimonistic	  ideal	  cannot	  be	  conceived	  of	  in	  terms	  of	  moral	  virtue.	  However,	  insofar	  as	  such	  wandering	  activity	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  constitutive	  of	  the	  Zhuangzian	  good	  life,	  it	  seems	  as	  though	  there	  is	  still	  room	  to	  consider	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  Zhuangzian	  eudaimonistic	  virtue	  ethic.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  invites	  us	  to	  think	  about	  the	  pedagogical	  uses	  of	  aesthetics.	  The	  text	  highlights	  a	  contrast	  between	  learning	  qua	  passive	  reception	  and	  imaginative	  synthesis	  of	  understanding.	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  learning	  is	  an	  active	  undertaking,	  in	  which	  the	  student	  imaginatively	  makes	  connections	  between	  her	  own	  experiences	  and	  the	  concrete	  work	  in	  which	  she	  lives.	  This	  sort	  of	  imaginative	  synthesis	  speaks	  to	  the	  role	  of	  creativity	  in	  learning;	  here	  one	  learns	  how	  to	  creatively	  make	  sense	  of	  and	  respond	  to	  the	  nuances	  of	  a	  particular	  situation.	  While	  we	  do	  typically	  value	  creativity,	  we	  are	  skeptical	  of	  those	  who	  are	  morally	  or	  legally	  creative.	  But	  understanding	  the	  learner	  as	  an	  active	  audience	  who	  participates	  in	  making	  
                                                30	  Chris	  Fraser,	  “Wandering	  the	  Way,”	  541-­‐565. 
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meaning	  opens	  up	  new	  ways	  to	  think	  about	  the	  value	  of	  creativity;	  and	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  specifically	  is	  a	  rich	  resource	  for	  talking	  about	  moral	  imagination.	  	  	   The	  Zhuangzi	  does	  lend	  itself	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  interpretations,	  but	  this	  quality	  of	  indeterminacy	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  anything	  can	  be	  said	  about	  it,	  including	  that	  it	  lacks	  ethical	  content,	  or	  that	  it	  views	  all	  ways	  of	  life	  as	  equally	  good.	  But	  understanding	  its	  ethical	  vision	  requires	  careful	  querying	  of	  the	  text	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  bring	  different	  parts	  into	  dialogue	  with	  one	  another,	  rather	  than	  reducing	  the	  entirety	  of	  its	  vision	  to	  a	  single	  thematic	  trope.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  is	  more	  complex	  than	  that,	  and	  it	  encourages	  its	  reader	  to	  likewise	  be	  more	  complex,	  by	  not	  merely	  accepting	  any	  moral	  distinction	  but	  intelligently	  responding	  to	  particular	  demands	  of	  each	  unique	  situation,	  and	  making	  connections	  for	  oneself.	  The	  text	  encourages	  its	  audience	  thusly	  using	  an	  aesthetic	  style	  that	  motivates	  learning	  on	  the	  part	  of	  its	  audience.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  functionally	  parallels	  its	  sagely	  teachers	  who	  refuse	  to	  speak	  directly,	  but	  in	  so	  doing	  serve	  as	  exemplars	  of	  the	  good	  life.	  Rather	  than	  speaking,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  shows	  us	  what	  it	  is	  to	  live	  the	  good	  life.	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